

लौकिकन्यायाञ्जलिः ॥

तृतीयो भागः ॥

A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS

CURRENT IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE.

COLLECTED BY

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PREFACE.

It is with somewhat of a feeling of regret that I launch this third instalment of nyâyas; for I had hoped that they might be embodied in a revised re-issue of the first and second, so as to have the whole alphabetically arranged in one volume. There are not many, however, amongst India's two hundred and ninety millions, who take much interest in an effort of this kind, so we were compelled to follow a less ambitious course. To facilitate reference, I have prepared an index to the whole of the 430 nyâyas explained in the three volumes, and have written additional notes on several of those contained in the first and second. The latter will be found in the Superaddenda.

The present 'handful' differs materially from the two which preceded it in that it contains a goodly number of technical nyâyas; to wit, most of those representing important *adhi-karaṇas* in the Mīmāṃsā system, as well as certain *paribhāṣās* from Patanjali and Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. All of these appear to be quoted as nyâyas by writers on the various schools of philosophy; and I hope that such explanations of them as I have been able to give will prove of service to young students of these interesting works, and that the numerous references to the *Mahābhāṣya* will not be considered superfluous. That work, as presented in Benares editions, used to have a most forbidding aspect; for sūtra, vārtika, and bhāṣya, were crowded together, like sardines in a box, without numbers or any distinguishing marks to facilitate reference, and then this conglomerate was frequently (as in my own copy) sandwiched between two equally compressed portions of Kaiyaṭa! Dr. Kielhorn, however, has turned the impenetrable jungle into a well-laid-out park in which one can roam about with ease and comfort! Amongst other treasures, I was delighted to find there my two mango-tree nyâyas, namely, “आम्रसेकपितृतर्पण” and “आम्रान्पृष्ठः क्रोविदारानाचष्टे.”

Now for a word regarding the title of these pamphlets. I am by no means satisfied with 'maxim' as the equivalent of *nyâya*, but adopted it because many great scholars had already done so. As to the naturalness of such a course on my part let two Indian poets speak:—"यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः । स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते." "एकस्य कर्म संवीक्ष्य करोत्यन्योऽपि गृहीतम् । गतानुगतिको लोको न लोकः पारमार्थिकः" ॥ The *nyâyas* dealt with by me come under three distinct heads, and are either (1) Illustrations [*dr̥ṣṭānta*], (2) Rules, or principles [as in the case of *paribhāṣās* &c.], or (3) Topics [*adhikaraṇas*, as in the case of the *kapinjalanyâya* and others from the same source]. It would, therefore, be better, in my opinion, to adopt the term *nyâya* itself, without translating it into English.

This would seem to be the most suitable place for a note on the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, a work now in course of publication in *The Paṇḍit*, and from which I have occasionally quoted in the following pages. It has been stated by some Indian scholars of repute (beginning with Paṇḍit Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, in 1871, in the preface to his edition of *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*), and the statement is now stereotyped in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Government College, Calcutta, for the year 1900, that the Vācaspati who wrote the above work in refutation of S'ri Harsha's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, is identical with the celebrated philosopher Vācaspati Miśra. No reasons have been given for this assertion, and no evidence in its favor seems to be forthcoming from the work itself.

In a prefatory note by Mr. Arthur Venis, issued with the first part of the *Tārīkikarākṣā* (in the *Paṇḍit* for Nov. 1899), he tells us that Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana were contemporaries, the *Nyāyasūcti* of the former having been written in 976 A. D., whilst the latter composed his *Lakṣaṇāvali* in 984-5. He adds that Udayana was "probably much the younger man, as his *Paris'uddhi* is a commentary on Vacaspati's *Tātparyatīkā*; and he may be supposed to have lived as late as 1050 A. D." Now, on page 13, the author of *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* quotes *Kusumāñjali* i. 19, prefaced with the words "तदुक्तमा-

चार्यैः,” and, on the next page, cites i. 10 of the same, with the words “आचार्या अप्याहुः.” On page 45, he refers to *Āmatattva-viveka* in the same way. Is it in the least likely that a renowned Ācārya like Vācaspati Miśra would quote a *very junior contemporary* in such language as that, even if he condescended to notice him at all? Again, on page 25, the author of the *Uddhāra* says “विस्तरस्तु तत्त्वालोके मयैवोक्त इतीहोपरम्यते,” but the author of the *Bhāmati* has never been credited with a treatise of that name, though we know of his *Tattvasamāṅga*. Lastly, on page 35, there is a reference to *विवरणमत*, and, on page 40, to *नरसिंहहरिशर्ममत*, which could hardly carry us back to the tenth century.

It has been suggested by some that S'rī Harsha, too, was a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana,—but, since he quotes the former on page 354 of the *Khaṇḍana* (as I pointed out on page 29 of the Second Handful), and cites Udayana four times at least (see, especially, pages 633–637), this position can hardly be maintained. In 1871, Dr. Bühler, on the authority of a Jain writer named Rājas'ekhara, placed S'rī Harsha in the twelfth century; and, if that is correct, the question of the authorship of the *Uddhāra* is finally settled as far as Vācaspati Miśra is concerned. There was a prolonged discussion as to S'rī Harsha's date in the first three volumes (1872–4) of the *Indian Antiquary*, but nothing was conclusively established as against Dr. Bühler's view which is recorded on page 30 of the first volume.

On page 49 of *Khaṇḍanamoddhāra* we read:—“अथ खण्डनकृत् षोडशपदार्थी खण्डयिष्यंस्तत्र मूर्धन्यं प्रमाणं खण्डयितुं तदुपधायिकां प्रमामादौ खण्डयति स्म ‘तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमेत्युक्तम्.’” The passage in question will be found on page 143 of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, and the commentator S'ankara Miśra ascribes this definition of *pramā* to the *Lakṣaṇamālā*, a work which the editor, in a footnote, attributes to S'ivāditya, the author of the *Saptapadārthā*. The latter was published in the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series in 1893, and in the Preface we have the same authorship of the

Lakṣaṇamālā asserted on the authority of a *Citsukhīvyākhyā*, the date of which is not stated. In opposition to this, however, I would point out that Varadarāja quotes the *Lakṣaṇamālā* on pages 179 and 225 of his *Tārṅgikarakṣā*, and, in both cases, the famous commentator Mallinātha ascribes it to Udayana. The doubt expressed by Fitzedward Hall, on page 27 of his *Index*, as to this being "the well-known commentator on the poems of Kālidāsa and others," is set aside by Mallinātha's quoting, on page 39, a portion of his commentary on *Raghuvams'a* ii. 34, and adding "इति स्फुटीकृतं चैतदस्माभिः पञ्चकान्यादिटीकासु 'अलं मही-पाल तव श्रमेणेत्यादौ.'"

G. A. J.

REDHILL, SURREY. }
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A THIRD HANDFUL OF POPULAR MAXIMS.



अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यात् ॥

A thing done at a wrong time [might as well be left undone, for it] would be regarded as not done. It occurs in the following passage of Mādhava's *Nyāyamālāvistara* 10. 1. 1:—“किं चतुर्थी-करणादूर्ध्वमावाह्यते किंवा प्रयाजेभ्यः पुरा । नाद्यः । अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यादिति न्यायेनावाहनस्य निरर्थकत्वात्.”

Again, in S'abara on Jaimini 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the Agnihotra, and New and Full Moon sacrifices, we read “तस्मादन्येषु कालेषु अविहितत्वात्कृतमप्यकृतं स्यात्.”

अग्निहोत्रन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Agnihotra sacrifice* [consisting of morning and evening libations]. It forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 2. 23-26, where the injunction “यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति” is discussed. The interpretation put upon these words by the pûrvapakṣin is that the householder is to do nothing else but offer the Agnihotra during his whole life! Kunte thus summarizes his argument:—“From the time of the establishment of a sacred fire to the time of death the Agnihotra is to be performed continuously, without the remission of a moment. This is the duty of an Ārya. He cannot rest for a moment. The Agnihotra is not a constituent part of any other sacrifice. It is an independent sacrifice by itself. It therefore accomplishes the purpose of a person; and must therefore be unremittingly adhered to; and it does not matter if, in performing a principal act, minor acts are neglected. It is therefore reasonable to perform the Agnihotra-sacrifice alone continuously for life”. The reply to all this is that the

meaning of the *vidhi* is simply that it is to be offered every morning at daybreak, and every evening, according to the injunction “प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं होतव्यं व्युष्टायां प्रातः.” For a description of the Agnihotra, see *S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa*, Kâṇḍa 2, Adhyâyas 3 and 4; also a very useful excursus of Kunte's on pages 410-420 of his *Śaḍḍars'anacintanikâ. Brahmasûtra-bhâṣya* 3. 4. 32 shows how Vedantists apply the injunction relating to the Agnihotra.

अङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिः ॥

Attempting to dispel the darkness with a lamp no bigger than your finger! Endeavouring to bring about a great result by the use of manifestly inadequate means. It occurs in the following passage of *Âtmatattvarivēka*, page 52:—“न चास्माकमिव तवाप्यत्र मूकतैव शरणं सर्वथा वचनविरोधे ह्युदासीनस्य सा शोभते । न चात्र विधौ विरोधः कश्चित् । न च त्वमुदासीनः प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तस्मादलमङ्गुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिमनुष्ठाय.” I am indebted to Mr. Arthur Venis for an explanation of this nyâya.

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यते ॥

The tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself. Akin to the sayings “A man cannot mount on his own shoulder”, and “The edge of a sword cannot cut itself.” It occurs in *Nyâyavârtika-tâtparyatîkā* page 466, line 10 from bottom:—“यथाङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैवाङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृश्यत एवं ज्ञानं न तेनैव ज्ञानेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते.” We meet with it again in Pârthasârathi's comment on the *S'ûnyavâda* section of the *S'lokovârtika* (page 288):—“न हि पाकः पच्यते छिदा वा छिद्यते । नापि करणकर्मत्वं कर्तृकर्मत्वं वा एकस्य संभवति । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रेणैवाङ्गुल्यग्रं स्पृश्यते नाप्यङ्गुल्यग्रमात्मानं स्पृशति । तेनासां विधानां दृष्टान्ते कचिदप्यदर्शनाज्ज्ञानेऽपि नास्ति संभवः.”

I do not understand the double statement here about the

finger-tip. Pārthasārathi could not mean that the tip of one finger cannot be touched by the tip of another finger! The second part of the statement looks like a marginal gloss which has got into the text. The first part of the extract is found in *Bhāmatī* 2. 2. 28 (page 448):—“अपि च भेदाश्रयः कर्मफलभावो नाभिन्ने ज्ञाने भवितुमर्हति । नो खलु छिदा छिद्यते किन्तु दारु नापि पाकः पच्यतेऽपि तु तण्डुलाः । तदिहापि न ज्ञानं स्वांशेन ज्ञेयम्.”

अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते ॥

There are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger! This illustration of an absurdity occurs frequently. In *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 232 g, we read:—अत्र केचिच्चोदयन्ति । व्यर्थोऽयं व्युत्पत्तिनिरूपणप्रयासः । शब्दस्यार्थासंस्पर्शित्वात् । न ह्यङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इत्यादिशब्दैः कश्चिदर्थः प्रमीयते । यत्राप्तवाक्ये प्रमीयते तत्रापि मानान्तरनिबन्धना सा प्रमितिर्न शब्दनिबन्धनेति.” Then in *Citsukhī* ii. 32:—“आप्तोदीरितवाक्येषु मालतीमाधवादिषु । व्यभिचाराच्च तद्युक्तमाप्तत्वस्यानिरुक्तितः ॥ ३२ ॥ स्वकपोलकल्पितमालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु प्रामाण्याभावादतिव्याप्तिः । नहि पुराप्त एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचनमात्रेणानाप्तो भवति भवभूतिः । उक्तं चैतदुम्बकेन ‘यदाप्तोऽपि कस्मैचिदुपदिशति न त्वयाननुभूतार्थविषयं वाक्यं प्रयोक्तव्यं यथाङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति’ । तत्रार्थव्यभिचारः स्फुटः.”

In the commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, page 104, the saying is modified to “अङ्गुल्यग्रे करिशतं विहरति,” and another of a like kind is added, namely “मम कर्णकुहरं प्रविश्य सिंहः क्रीडति;” and in *Ātmatattvarivēka*, page 65, Udayana gives us “मम कर्णे प्रविश्य गजो गर्जति भेषजमुच्यताम्.” The Umbaka quoted above is perhaps the Umbeka referred to by Hall (on page 166) as an authority on Mīmāṃsā. In the *Catalogus Catalogorum*, the latter is identified with Maṇḍanamisra, which is one of the names by which Sures'varācārya is known.

अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि
बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः ॥

Even very powerful men from town and country are held in check by weaker men who have the king's support. This verse from the Tantravārtika (page 863) is thus applied by Raghunātha:—“यत्र निर्बलेनापि प्रबलसहायेन प्रबलो बाध्यते तत्र ‘अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि पौरजानपदा जनाः । दुर्बलैरपि बाध्यन्ते पुरुषैः पार्थिवाश्रितैः’ इति न्यायोऽवतरति । स्पष्टार्थोऽयम् । उदाहरणं तु श्रुत्यपेक्षाया दुर्बलाया अपि स्मृतेराचमनरूपप्रबलपदार्थाश्रितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् । अतः श्रौतक्रमत्यागेन वेदकरणानन्तरं क्षुते आचमनमेव कार्यमिति दिक्.” We may compare with this the following from Sures'vara's large vārtika, page 753:—

“आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम् ।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा ॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम् ।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्वलवत्तमः” ॥

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

A truth or conclusion which implies another truth or conclusion. This is the third of four kinds of सिद्धान्त defined in Nyāyasūtras 1. 1. 28-31, the others being (1) सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त, (2) प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त, and (4) अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त. Ballantyne's rendering of the four is (1) a dogma of all the schools, (2) a dogma peculiar to some school, (3) a hypothetical dogma, and (4) a dogmatic corollary. In Tārīkīkarakṣā i. 29 (page 126) we have the following description of manas:—“युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । एवं चाणुतयैव मनसः सिद्धिः । अन्यथा युगपदनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानाद्युगपद्ज्ञानोदयप्रसंगात्” । On this, Mallinātha comments thus:—“एवं चेति । जगत्कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वादिवन्मनसोऽणुत्वमधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायाद्धर्मिग्राहकादेव सिद्धमित्यर्थः” ॥ There is another example in Ātmatattvavivēka, page 83, line 9; and a third in Yāmunācārya's Āgamaprāmāṇya, page 17, line 1.

अधिकारन्यायः ॥

The rule regarding the *qualifications* [required of a sacrificer] Jaimini 6. 1. 1-3 deals with part of this. The decision is that he must be desirous of heaven, according to the vidhis “दर्शपूर्ण-मासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत,” “ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत.” The principal thing here is the desire for heaven, whilst the sacrificial act is subordinate. The remainder of the pāda deals with the physical and social fitness demanded. See under आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c, below. For a full description of the four kinds of injunction, of which *adhikāra-vidhi* is the third, see Laugākṣi-bhāskara's *Arthasaṅgraha*, page 4, with Dr. Thibaut's translation, page 7 &c.

अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा भवति प्रतिषेधो वा ॥

[A rule containing] *an injunction or a prohibition* [enjoins or forbids only] *that which is nearest* [to it in some other rule]. Here is one of Raghunātha's grammatical nyāyas, included in both of his works. My translation is based on that of Dr. Kielhorn in his well-known edition and translation of the *Paribhāṣendus'ekhara*, where it appears as Paribhāṣā LXI. Nāgoji-Bhaṭṭa took it, of course, from the *Mahābhāṣya*, and I have noted the following ten instances of its occurrence:—1. 1. 43 (vārt. 3); 1. 2. 48 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 12 (vārt. 7); 1. 3. 14 (vārt. 3); 1. 3. 58 (vārt. 3); 1. 4. 17; 3. 1. 67 (vārt. 5); 7. 1. 21 (vārt. 1) 7. 2. 3 (vārt. 2); and 7. 3. 85 (vārt. 4).

अन्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलीयः ॥

Of the proximate [or, more closely related] *and the remote* [or, less closely related], *the former is the stronger*. I find it most difficult to give a rendering of this nyāya. It seems to belong primarily to the grammarians, though found also in philosophical works. It is included in Śīradeva's list of paribhāṣās, but not in that of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa. The terms अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग

are, however, explained by the latter, under his *paribhâṣâ* “असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे,” in the following manner, and I subjoin Dr. Kielhorn’s translation. As this eminent scholar gives no English equivalent of the two terms here described, it may fairly be assumed that no satisfactory one is to be found. “अन्तर्मध्ये बहिरङ्गशास्त्रीयनिमित्तसमुदायमध्येऽन्तर्भूतान्यङ्गानि निमित्तानि यस्य तदन्तरङ्गम् । एवं तदीयनिमित्तसमुदायाद्वहिर्भूताङ्गकं बहिरङ्गम्.” “*Antaranga* is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within (or before) the sum of the causes of a *bahiranga* rule; in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (*antaranga* rule) is *bahiranga*.” The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—“अन्तरङ्ग and बहिरङ्ग are two *Bahuvrīhi*-compounds and denote a rule, or an operation, or that which is taught in a rule. The word अङ्ग here neither denotes a member of the body, nor is it the grammatical term अङ्ग as defined in P. 1. 4. 13; but it is equivalent to उपकारक ‘that which assists (an operation),’ or, in other words, it denotes the निमित्त, that is, ‘the cause’ of an operation”.

The *nyāya* is employed by S’abara on Jaimini 12. 2. 27, and by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 4; and there is another example of it in the following passage of the *Vivaraṇa-prameyasangraha* (page 15):—“कार्यस्य तावदुपादानापेक्षा प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चाद्विरोधिसंसर्गाभावापेक्षा तथा चान्तरङ्गबहिरङ्गयोरन्तरङ्गं बलवदिति न्यायेनान्तरङ्गोपादानविषयत्वमेव तयोर्न्याय्यम्.”

अन्यवेशमस्थिताद्धूमान्न वेशमान्तरमग्निमत् ॥

From seeing smoke rising from one house we do not infer that there is a fire in another house. This is from Tantra-vārtika (page 180, line 9) on Jaimini’s sūtra “अनुमानव्यवस्थानात्तत्संयुक्तं प्रमाणं स्यात्” (1. 3. 15).

अन्याथेमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति ॥

A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve for another. This is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 23 (vârt. 4), 1. 3. 12 (vârt. 5), and 6. 1. 50, as follows:—“यत्तावदुच्यते न चान्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवतीत्यन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति । तद्यथा । शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्यश्च पानीयं पीयत उपस्पृश्यते च शाल्यश्च भाव्यन्ते.” It is quoted by S’abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 220), and is referred to by Kumārila in his long and interesting discussion of शेष (an accessory—that which serves the purpose of something else) in the opening part of the third chapter of the *Tantravārtika*. On page 668, line 13, we read:—“न हि कश्चिदपि शालि-कुल्यास्थमुदकं पिबन्मदर्थमेताः प्रणीता इत्यध्यवस्यति । तस्मादन्यत्तादर्थ्य-मन्यश्चोपकार इति विज्ञायते.”

अपच्छेदन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *interruption* [of a procession of priests]. It is thus explained by Goldstücker:—“Used in the liturgical writings of the interruption of a procession of priests, caused by the inadvertence of one or several amongst them; thus, ‘it being the rule that at the first Savana of the Jyotishtōma the priests must proceed one after the other ‘in the black-ant fashion,’ the one that comes after holding his preceper by the hem of his garment, an interruption caused by the dropping of the hem, on the part of one priest would be एककर्तृकोऽपच्छेदः &c.” This curious ceremony is discussed in Jaimini 6. 5. 49–56, where certain penalties are prescribed for letting go the garment (कच्छ-विमोचन). The matter is well and concisely put in the Nyāya-mâlāvistara on the above portion of Jaimini, and much information is contained in Kunté’s notes on the same sūtras.

The nyāya is employed by writers on Vedānta. It is found, for example, in *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla*, page 10, line 8:—“ज्येष्ठस्यापीति । अपच्छेदन्यायेन पूर्वस्य परेण बाधमाशङ्क्य तदपेक्षस्येति विशेषितं तेनोत्तरस्य पूर्वापेक्षायामुपक्रमाधिकरणन्याय एव प्रवर्तत इति सूचितमित्यर्थः” ॥

The passage of the *Vedântakalpataru* here explained is found on page 6, line 8:—"ज्येष्ठस्यापि पौर्वापर्यन्यायेन बाधमाशङ्क्याह तदपेक्ष-
स्येति." The पौर्वापर्यन्याय is a part of the अपच्छेदन्याय, and derives its name from sūtra 54, namely "पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत्," the subject of the adhikaraṇa being that when the priests, walking in procession, let go their hold one after another, the one who does so last is liable to a penalty. This same sūtra is quoted in full in *Bhāmati*, page 5, last line, and is immediately followed by a verse from Kumārila's *Tantravârtika*, page 819; where, however, the reading of the first line is पौर्वापर्यबलीयस्त्वं instead of the पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं of the *Bhāmati*. The same verse is quoted by Vācaspatimisra at the bottom of page 59 of his *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyatîkā*, where the reading agrees with that of the *Bhāmati*. The अपच्छेदन्याय is found also in *S'ribhâṣya*, page 143.

अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्

Scripture can attach a meaning [to an act &c.] when such [a meaning] has not been established [and could not be established in any other way]. I take this to be the drift of this somewhat difficult nyâya which forms part of Jaimini's sūtra 6. 2. 18. In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 18 there is a discussion as to the aim of certain S'rutis which prescribe the rinsing of the mouth, before and after eating, in connection with the *prâṇavidyâ*. Were they intended to enforce आचमन as an act of cleanliness, and also as an act of ritual directed to prâṇa? The decision is that the former was already provided for by smṛiti, and that s'ruti merely attached to it its significance as a religious ceremonial. Bhâratîrtha sums up the case in *Adhikaraṇamâlâ* 3. 3. 9, as follows:—"इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थ-
वत्' इति न्यायेन मानान्तराप्राप्तमनश्रुताचिन्तनमेव विधेयम्...आचमनं तु शुद्ध्यर्थतया स्मृतिबलादेव प्राप्तमिति न विधीयते...तस्मादाचमनस्य प्राप्तत्वाद-
नश्रुताबुद्धिरेव प्राणोपासकं प्रति-विधेया." The nyâya is found also in *Tantravârtika*, page 145, line 3, and again on page 232; in

Citsukhâ i. 7 (Pāṇḍit, vol. iv. page 475, line 2), and again in the Rāmānuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69, line 12 of Jivānanda's edn.), where Professor Gough renders it—"Before its signification is attained the system is significant."

अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम् ॥

The more worthy should come first. These words form part of Patanjali's comment on a vārtika on Pāṇini's rule 2. 2. 34 in regard to the position of words in a dvandva compound. The whole sentence is as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वं निपततीति वक्तव्यम् । मातापितरौ श्रद्धामेधे" ॥ Its use is not restricted to grammar, however, as the following extract from the first paragraph of Sāyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Rīgveda shows:—"ऋग्वेदस्य प्राथम्येन सर्वत्रास्मात्त्वादभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायेनाभ्यर्हितत्वात्तद्व्याख्यानमादौ युक्तम्" ॥ Again, at the commencement of the twelfth chapter of the *Jaiminīyanyāyamañvānistara*, we read as follows:—"अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वमिति न्यायमाश्रित्य तन्नप्रसङ्गप्रतिपादकयोरेकादशद्वादशाध्याययोः पूर्वोत्तरभाव उपपादितः" ॥ And in Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 4. 28:—"प्रधानवादस्यैव प्राधान्येन निरासे हेत्वन्तरमाह स चेति । न केवलमभ्यर्हितत्वात्तस्य प्राधान्यं स्मृतिमूलत्वादीत्याह."

अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते ॥

Gourds sink in water, but stones float! This is often quoted as, an illustration of an absurdity. It is as old as the *Mahābhārata* and appears at the end of chapter LXIV of the Sabhāparvan:—"मज्जन्त्यलावूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते मुह्यन्ति नावोऽम्भसि शश्वदेव." I have met with it twice in Sābara's bhāṣya. In 1. 1. 5 (page 11):—"एवंजातीयकं प्रमाणविरुद्धं वचनमप्रमाणम् । अम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि ग्रावाणः प्लवन्त इति यथा." In 4. 3. 10:—"न चैवंजातीयकं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धं वचनं प्रमाणं भवति । यथाऽम्बुनि मज्जन्त्यलावूनि शिलाः प्लवन्ते पाप्मः शीत इति."

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

The *māxim* of a red [cow] one year old. This *nyāya*, found in *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 41, in *Nyāyamanjari*, page 294 (line 2 from bottom), and in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 619 (line 4), is the *अरुणिन्याय* of Jaimini 3. 1. 12, and is based on the following words connected with the ritual of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice—“अरुण्या पिङ्गाक्ष्यैकहायन्या सोमं क्रीणाति,” “he buys Soma with a red-coloured, yellow-eyed [cow] of a year old.” The *Mīmāṃsaka* delights in hair-splitting, and in trifling with language; and we have a typical instance of this idiosyncrasy in the way in which this simple sentence is dealt with. Because the cow is not actually mentioned, and the word *अरुणा* denotes a quality (redness), an objector says “how can one buy Soma with a mere quality?” S’abara’s reply to this occupies ten octavo pages, whilst that of Kumārila fills twenty-nine! The objection is concisely put in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*, part of which is as follows:—

“अरुणाशब्दोऽरुणिमानं गुणमाचष्टे । गुणिविषयतया प्रयुज्यमानस्यापि ‘ना-
गृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टे बुद्धिः’ इति न्यायेन गुणबोधकत्वात् । अन्वयव्यतिरेका-
भ्यां गुणमात्रे तद्भुत्पक्षे । तस्य चारुणिमगुणस्य तृतीयाश्रुत्या सोमक्रयसाधनत्वं
प्रतीयते तच्चानुपपन्नम् । अमूर्तस्य गुणस्य वासोहिरण्यादिवत्क्रयसाधनत्वासंभ-
वात्” ॥ The reply to this is:—“यद्यप्यमूर्तो गुणस्तथापि हायनवदक्षिवच्च
गोद्रव्यमवच्छिनत्ति । तच्च द्रव्यं साधनमिति तद्वारा गुणस्य क्रयेणान्वयो भवति ।
एवं सति वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति” ॥

अवतप्तेनकुलस्थितम् ॥

A *mongoose’s* standing on hot ground. Used of a fickle, changeable person who never sticks to a thing. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 1. 47, as follows:—“यथावतप्ते नकुला न चिरं स्थातारो
भवत्येवं कार्याण्यारभ्य यो न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यतेऽवतप्तेनकुलस्थितं त
एतदिति.” It occurs a second time in 6. 2. 49 (vārt. 6), in
company with the expression उदकेविश्रीर्णं. The compound तीर्थकाक

which is found in 2. 1. 42, has much the same meaning. Patanjali says:—“यथा तीर्थे काका न चिरं स्थातारो भवन्त्येवं यो गुरुकुलानि गत्वा न चिरं तिष्ठति स उच्यते तीर्थकाक इति.” In Marāṭhī, however, the name is applied to “a person ever watchful after some booty or spoil,” a meaning which seems more in accord with the character of the crow than that assigned to it by Patanjali!

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी ॥

For this paribhāṣā see under रथकारन्याय. It is quoted by Kumārila in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 11, more than once, but one example will suffice:—“लब्धात्मिका हि समुदायप्रसिद्धिरवयवप्रसिद्धिं बाधते तस्यास्त्वात्मलाभो यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण पूर्वानुभूतावयवार्थरहितेऽर्थे शब्द-प्रयोगो दृश्यते । यथाश्वत्वकर्णत्वरहिते वृक्षेऽश्वकर्णशब्दस्य.” As a parallel to this, we might take our word cockroach, which is neither a cock nor a roach! For other examples of the paribhāṣā see *Tantravārtika* pages 538, 1002, 1048, and 1149.

अविरविकन्यायः ॥

The principle of the words *avi* and *avika*. Though both mean ‘a sheep,’ yet a derivative in the sense of the flesh of a sheep (आविक) can be formed only from the latter. It occurs in *Mahābhāṣya* 4. 1. 88 (vārt. 2) as follows:—“तत्र द्वयोः शब्दयोः समानार्थयोरेकेन विग्रहोऽपरस्मादुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यत्यविरविकन्यायेन । तद्यथा । अवेमौसमिति विगृह्य अविकशब्दादुत्पत्तिर्भवति आविकमिति” ॥ Similarly in 8. 1. 89 (vārt. 6); 4. 2. 60; 4. 3. 131; 5. 1. 7; 5. 1. 28; and 6. 2. 11 (vārt. 2). This inaccurate compound is one of the instances brought forward by Kumārila of the way in which grammar &c. are set aside by learned writers. On this, see the nyāya “अश्वारूढाः &c.” below.

अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः ॥

How could men of intelligence be mounted on horses and yet

forget their horses? Yet grammarians and others sometimes ignore their own rules! In *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 18 (according to the incorrect numbering of the Benares edition), Kumārila comments at great length on the corrupt forms of words employed by even learned writers. On page 200, he says “अन्तो नास्त्यपशब्दानामितिहासपुराणयोः” and then instances the curious word उभाभ्य which is made to mean “a blow given by an elephant with both tusks” (युगपदुभाभ्यां दन्ताभ्यां ग्रहारः). On the following page he says:—“येऽपि व्याकरणस्यैव परे पारे प्रतिष्ठिताः । सुतरां तेऽपि गाव्यादितुल्यानेव प्रयुज्यते ॥ सूत्रवार्तिकभाष्येषु दृश्यते चापशब्द-नम् । अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान्विस्मरेयुः सचेतनाः” ॥

Mallināth probably had this in mind when, in his comment on Varadarāja's *Tārīkīkarakṣā* (page 20), he wrote:—“तदे-तत्तुरगाधिरूढस्य तुरगविस्मरणं यद्वेदप्रामाण्यसाधने प्रवृत्तस्य मीमांसागुरो-स्तत्प्रमाद इति सोपहासं परिहरति.” See Addenda.

असाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति ॥

Names are given in consideration of some speciality. This was perhaps taken from *Sāṃkhyasūtra* V. 112:—“सर्वेषु पृथि-व्युपादानमसाधारण्यात्तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत्.” “In all [bodies] earth is the material: in consideration [however] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case.” This is Dr. Ballantyne's rendering. The nyāya is found in the early part of the Akṣapāda section of *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, and I append Prof. Cowell's translation:—“ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते । सत्यम् । तथाप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्था-नुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते”.

“But here an objector may say, ‘If these sixteen topics, proof &c, are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyāya S'āstra [as reasoning, i. e. *Nyāya*, or

logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?']. We allow the force of the objection; still, as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyâya was rightly applied to Gotama's System, since 'reasoning', or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit." See also *S'âlikâ*, page 98.

असिधारामधुलेहनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *licking honey from the edge of a sword*! This is found in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (page 45 of Jivânanda's edn.), as follows:—"सदसद्वेदनीयस्य सुखदुःखोत्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत्," which Prof. Cowell renders, "An object recognized as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge—this is *vedanīya*."

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ॥

Power [of understanding on the part of the hearer] *co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense*. This is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in Laugākshibhāskara's *Arthasangraha* (page 16) in a passage explanatory of *adhikāra-vidhi*. The portion connected with the nyâya, and the translation, are as follows:—"एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात्समर्थं प्रत्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः" ॥ "In the same manner, capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power &c.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words 'power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense' (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it)." The commentator, Rāmes'vara S'ivayogibhikshu, explains

that blind, deaf, and lame persons are excluded as being incapable of performing various parts of the sacrificial ritual.

A much earlier instance of the employment of this nyāya is met with in Sures'vara's *Sambandhavārtika*, verse 75, which I here subjoin, together with Ānandagiri's comment.

“सहकर्त्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।

मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

आख्यातानामर्थं बोधयतामधिकारिशक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायाद्विधेयार्थानुष्ठानशक्तमधिकारिणं विना विधेर्विधित्वायोगात्काम्यादि मुमुक्षुर्वर्जयेदित्याख्यातस्य मनुष्यं प्रतिस्वार्थं बोधयतो मनुष्यशक्तिसापेक्षत्वाद्देवमात्रगोचरत्वमस्यासिद्धमिति शङ्केते । सहकर्त्रीति । यत्राख्यातमस्ति तत्र तत्सहकर्त्री कर्तृशक्तिरिष्टा न च मोक्षकामी काम्यादि वर्जयेदित्याख्यातं ख्यात्यतो न मनुष्यगोचरतोक्तहेतोरिति समाधत्ते नाख्यातेति” ॥

The nyāya probably originated with S'abara who makes use of it in his bhāṣya on Jaimini 1. 4. 30. There, however, the reading is आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं &c. The expression “सर्वाख्यातसहकारिशक्त्यनुसारेण” in *Tantravārtika* 2. 2. 27, page 558, line 9, incorporates the same nyāya. See Addenda.

आर्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते ॥

A wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind. This illustration is taken from the Jaina section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 44 of Jivānanda's edn). The text, and Professor Cowell's translation, are as follows:—“यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते तथा कषायजलार्द्रं आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टप्तायःपिण्डे जले क्षिप्तेऽम्भः समन्ताद्गृह्णाति तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीतं कर्म समन्तादादत्ते.” “As a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins, collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by *yoga*. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the *jīva*, heated by

previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by *yoga*." In a footnote, the Professor adds:—"Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act."

इष्यमाणस्यैव प्राधान्यं न त्विच्छायाः ॥

The thing wished for is of more importance than the wish. This occurs in *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 56, as follows:—"ननु विध्यन्वयित्वेनाविवक्षितमपि प्रैषानुवचनमनुवाद्यतया यथा-विधेयदण्डान्वयि एवमिच्छापि प्रारभ्यमाणब्रह्मज्ञानान्वयिनी सती ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य प्रयोजनत्वं ब्रह्मणः सन्दिग्धत्वं च गमयेत् । इच्छेप्यमाणसमभिव्याहारे चेप्यमाणप्राधान्यं यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादौ क्लृप्तम् । अत इहापीच्छाप्राधान्यं विहायेप्यमाणप्राधान्यमभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तम्" ॥ Again, on page 62 of the same:—"प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति सामान्यन्यायादिच्छेप्यमाणसमभिव्याहृता-विध्यमाणं प्रधानमिति स्वर्गकामपदादिषु क्लृप्तो विशेषन्यायो बलवानिति भावः" ॥ So too, in Râmânûja's *Srîbhâṣya*, page 31:—"ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । इच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधीयते" ॥ This is repeated *verbatim* in the Râmânûja section of *Sarva-dars'anasangraha*, page 69 (Jivânanda's edn).

उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तोऽप्यपवाद उपसंजातनिमित्तमप्युत्सर्गं बाधते ॥

This is another of Raghunâtha's grammatical *nyâyas*. It is not met with in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, but forms one of Nâgoji-bhaṭṭas paribhâṣâs. The following is Prof. Kielhorn's rendering of it:—"An *apavâda*, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present themselves, supersedes a general rule the causes (of the application) of which are already present." In connection with this paribhâṣâ we have the *देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्याय* which see below.

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A rope which binds at both ends. An embarrassing position;

a dilemma. The following is from the Jaimini section of *Sarvādars'anasangraha* (page 133, Bib. Ind., or 150 of Jivānanda's edition), with Professor Cowell's translation (page 198):—
 “अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यमभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा ।
 यदि नास्ति तदा पटप्रध्वंसानुपपत्त्या नित्यताप्रसङ्गः । अथास्ति किमपराद्धं
 कारणत्वेनेति । सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ” ॥

“If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its ‘emergent non-existence’ or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends.”

The following example is from the opening part of *Citsukhī* (Pāṇḍit, vol. iv. page 466):—“स्वप्रकाशतायां सति प्रमाणे तद्वैयर्थ्यम् ।
 असति च साधकाभावादेव न तत्सिद्धिरिति सैषौपनिषदानामुभयतःपाशा
 रज्जुरित्यलमतिविस्तरेण” ॥ Other instances will be found in *Kusumāñjali* iii. 6 (page 374); in the same author's *Lakṣaṇāvali*, page 56; in *Tārīkīkarakṣāṭikā*, page 26; and in *Khaṇḍanābhaṇḍakhāḍya*, page 530. See Addenda.

एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् ॥

My rendering of this in the Second Handful was not quite correct. It should rather be—*A thing that is changed in one part does not thereby become something else* (literally, like something else). For example, as Patanjali says under 1. 1. 56 (vārt. 10), the cutting of a dog's ears or tail does not turn it into a horse or a donkey, but it is still a dog! Other passages of the *Mahābhāṣya* where this *paribhāṣā* occurs are as follows:—*S'ivasūtra* 2, vārtika 4 (i. e. vol. i. page 21); 2. 4. 85 (vārt. 10); 4. 1. 83; 6. 1. 69 (vārt. 3); 6. 4. 149 (vārt. 2); and 8. 3. 85. Raghunātha probably took this, with his other grammatical *nyāyas*, from the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, Professor Kielhorn's translation of which enabled me to correct my rendering. For other illustrations of ~~the~~ above, see under “श्चा कर्णे वा &c.”

एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनेऽन्यसम्बन्धिस्मरणम् ॥

On seeing one thing we are reminded of others connected with it. The nyāya is found in this form in the *Nyāyapradīpa* on *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 44, where the presence of smoke is said to remind the spectator of the invariably connected fire. In both of Raghunāthavarman's books it is given as एकसम्बन्धिदर्शनमन्यसम्बन्धिस्मारकम्, and, in the larger of the two, he illustrates it thus:—"यथा हस्तिपददर्शनं हस्तिस्मारकं तथा नद्यादिज्ञानस्य कुशकाशजलतुंबिकाजलूकानां तत्सम्बन्धिनां स्मरणहेतुत्वम्." Tārānātha (s. v. न्याय) quotes the saying in the form एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानं &c. He reverses the above illustration by saying that the elephant reminds one of the driver; and adds that a word reminds one of its meaning, a statement which, in these degenerate times, is not universally true!

कपिञ्जलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Kapinjalas* [a kind of partridge]. In *Vājasaneyi-Samhitā* xxiv. 20, we read "वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभते," and the question arises, *how many* of these birds are to be sacrificed? Jaimini devotes eight sūtras [11. 1. 38-45] to the discussion of this point, and finally decides that *three*, the lowest figure representing *plurality* (two being merely duality), will satisfy the requirements of the s'rutī. S'abara's lengthy argument is very concisely summed up in the *Nyāyamāla-vistara*, as follows:—

“कपिञ्जलेषु त्रित्वाद्या ऐच्छिकास्त्रित्वमेव वा ।

आद्यो बहुत्वसाम्यान्न त्रित्वेनैव कृतत्वतः ॥

अथमेधे 'वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभते' इति त्रित्वचतुष्टादिसंख्यानां बहुत्वसाम्यादिच्छया या काचिद्बहुत्वसंख्या स्वीकार्येति चेत् । न । त्रित्वेनैव शास्त्रस्य कृतत्वात् । यो हि चतुष्टादिसंख्यामुपादत्ते तेन न तदन्तर्भूतं त्रित्वं वर्जयितुं शक्यं त्रित्वमुपाददानेन त्वनन्तर्भूतं चतुष्ट्वादिकं वर्जयितुं शक्यते अतोऽवश्यंभावित्वेन प्रथमभावित्वेन लाघवेन च त्रित्व उपात्ते शास्त्रार्थसिद्धौ ततोऽधिकपक्षिहिंसायां प्रत्यवायात् । तस्मात्त्रित्वमेवोपादेयम् ॥

I have met with the *nyâya* in *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 12 (page 394), in 3. 5. 26 (page 1049), and in *Vedântakalpataruparimâla*, page 550, line 3; and the abridged St. Petersburg Lexicon gives a reference to Kullûka on *Manu* viii. 105, where certain offerings are directed to be made to Sarasvatî. In accordance with the *kapinjalanyâya*, Kullûka decides that three are sufficient; and Medhâtithi is of the same opinion. This maxim is manifestly akin to *सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः*, and in accord with the Marâthî phrase *शास्त्रापुरता* as defined by Molesworth.

कंबलनिर्णेजनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the cleansing of a coarse blanket* [by beating it on the feet, and so dusting them at the same time]! One of the numerous examples of the accomplishment of two objects by one operation;—"killing two birds with one stone." It is found in S'abara 2. 2. 25:—"अपि च दधि उभयमसमर्थं कर्तुं फलं साधयितुं होमं च । ननु कंबलनिर्णेजनवदेतद्भविष्यति । निर्णेजनं हि उभयं करोति । कंबलशुद्धिं पादयोश्च निर्मलताम्" ॥ The कंबल (the कांबळ of the Marâthas) is made of extremely coarse and rough material, and generally black or black and grey. In the case of the very poor, it is often their sole garment by day as well as their only covering at night.

करिवृंहितन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the trumpeting of an elephant*. The word करि is really redundant, since the whole meaning is conveyed by वृंहित alone—वृंहितं करिगर्जितमित्यमरः—but the addition, in this and similar cases, is made for some special purpose. Raghunâtha defines it thus:—"विशिष्टवाचकानामपि पदानां सति पृथग्विशेषणवाचकपदसमबधाने विशेष्यमात्रपरतायां करिवृंहितन्यायः प्रवर्तते." This principle may be exemplified by the following verse from *Kavyaprakâśa* vii. 10:—

“सौन्दर्यसम्पत्तारुण्यं यस्यास्ते ते च विभ्रमाः ।

षट्पदान्पुष्पमालेव कान्नाकर्षति सा सखे” ॥

Here the author of the *Kāvya-pradīpa* remarks (page 295):—

“मालाशब्दो यद्यपि पुष्पस्यैव स्रजि शक्तस्तथापि न पुष्पपदमप्युद्धार्यम् ।
लक्षणयोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अयमेव करिवृंहितन्यायः” ॥ So, too, the
Uddāharanacandrikā:—अत्र निरुपपदान्मालाशब्दादेव पुष्पस्रजप्रतीतेः
पुष्पपदमुत्कृष्टपुष्पत्वे संक्रमितवाच्यम् । एवमेव करिवृंहितादिष्वपि बोध्यम्.”

The following additional nyāyas are cited by Raghunātha as belonging to the same class:—गजघटान्याय, नीलेन्दीवरन्याय, पर्वताधिका-
न्याय, पर्वतोपत्यकान्याय, वाजिमन्दुरान्याय, मृगवागुरान्याय. In each
case the first word might be omitted without affecting the
meaning.

कलञ्जन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [abstention from] *the flesh of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow*. It is deduced from Jaimini 6. 2
19, 20,—an *adhikarāṇa* designed to teach the evil result of
doing forbidden things. The words “न कलञ्जं भक्षयितव्यं न लशुनं
न गृञ्जनं च” are discussed, and the question arises as to whether
this is an instance of *पर्युदास* or of *प्रतिषेध*,—whether it means
अभक्षणं कर्तव्यम् or *भक्षणं न कर्तव्यम्*. The subtle intellect of the
Mīmāṃsaka sees a great difference between these two, the
former being something to be done, and the latter being some-
thing to be avoided! The *siddhāntin* decides in favor of
the latter. I would advise my readers to study pages 39–41 of
Dr. Thibaut's excellent translation of *Arthasaṅgraha*, in order
to get, if possible, to a clear understanding of this irrational
tenet. Many years ago, when in India, I heard a statement
made by a Brahman, to the effect that the words “put no oil in
the lamp” did not mean “don't put oil in the lamp,” but rather
“put in the lamp” some “no-oil”; in other words, it was not a
prohibition of an act but an injunction to do something! This

is just the position of the *Mīmāṃsaka*. The above *nyāya* is quoted by *Ānandagiri* on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 4. 28, and 4. 1. 13.

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

Like the building of a temple on the summit of which [at its consecration] an earthen vessel [filled with water] has been placed. Used ironically of one who considers that he is doing something as meritorious as the building of a temple. This explanation was given me by the Principal of the Sanskrit College, Benares. The illustration occurs in S'ārngadhara's tīkā on Udayana's definition of dravya in his Lakṣanāvalī (page 4). The definition is—"तत्र गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणं द्रव्यम्," and, whilst explaining it, the commentator attacks the views of Citsukha Muni as follows:—"यत्तत्र तत्त्वप्रदीपिकाकारेणोत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणे अव्याप्तिमुद्भाव्य गुणवत्त्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वे च परिहारमाशङ्क्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरक्षणविशिष्टे कदाचिदपि गुणानुदयात्पुनरव्याप्तेस्तदवस्थत्वाच्चैवमिति परिहृतम् । तत्कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम्." It is necessary here to bear in mind the tenet of the logicians—"उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं तिष्ठति." The *Tattvapradīpikā*, better known as *Citsukhī*, is described by Hall as "a confutation of the *Nyāya* philosophy, on the basis of the *Vedānta*." The wrath of the logicians would of course, therefore, be kindled against it. The passage complained of above is the *s'loka* ii. 4 with the *vṛitti*. The former stands thus:—"अव्याप्तेरप्यतिव्याप्तेर्द्रव्यं नैव गुणाश्रयः । आद्ये क्षणे गुणाभावाद्गुणादावपि वीक्षणात्." See *Addenda*.

काकदधिघातकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a crow as a destroyer of curds. An example of *upalakṣaṇa*, where one represents many, or a part stands for the whole. So if any one were warned to keep the crows off the curds, it would imply that all other possible raiders were also to be warded off. It is thus put by *Bhartṛihari* in *Vākya-padīya* ii. 314:—

“काकेभ्यो रक्ष्यतां सर्पिरिति बालोऽपि चोदितः ।

उपघातपरे वाक्ये न श्वादिभ्यो न रक्षति” ॥

This is reproduced, with slight variations, in *Tantravārtika*, page 731. Raghunātha's application of the maxim is as follows:—“तदुक्तमीश्वरगीतायाम् । ‘ये त्विमं विष्णुमव्यक्तं मां च देवं महे-
श्वरम् । एकीभावेन पश्यन्ति न तेषां पुनरुद्भवः’ इति । अत्र हरिहरयोर्ग्रहणं
काकदधिघातकन्यायेन विधेरप्युपलक्षणम्.” The *Īśvaragītā* forms part
of the *uttarabhāga* of the *Kṛma Purāṇa*, and the verse here
quoted is xi. 8. In the *ग्रहैकत्वन्याय*, too, a part represents the whole.

काकाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *something on which a crow is perched*. This illustration seems to have originated with Patanjali, and is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 26 (vārtikas 3 and 4):—“अनुबन्धो-
ऽन्यत्वकर इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । लोपात् । लुप्यतेऽत्रानुबन्धः । लुप्ते-
ऽत्रानुबन्धे नान्यत्वं भविष्यति । तद्यथा । कतरदेवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ
काक इति । उत्पतिते काके नष्टं तद्गृहं भवति । एवमिहापि लुप्तेऽनुबन्धे नष्टः
प्रत्ययो भवति । यद्यपि लुप्यते जानाति त्वसौ सानुबन्धकस्येयं संज्ञा कृतेति ।
तद्यथा । इतरत्रापि कतरदेवदत्तस्य गृहम् । अदो यत्रासौ काक इति । उत्पतिते
काके यद्यपि नष्टं तद्गृहं भवत्यन्ततस्तमुद्देशं जानाति.”

It occurs in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (page 195) in the course of a discussion on Bādarāyaṇa's second sūtra:—“ततः
कारणसंबन्धिनो जन्मादेरलक्षणत्वमिति चेन्मैवम् । काकाधिकरणत्ववदुपपत्तेः ।
काकाधिकरणत्वं हि न गृहेऽन्तर्भवति । तथा च सति काकविगमे गृहैकदेश-
भङ्गबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अतो गृहस्याधिकरणत्वं नामौपाधिको धर्मः स च परि-
शेषालक्षणे एवान्तर्भवति । तन्निरूपकस्य काकस्य यथा लक्षणत्वं तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि
कारणत्वमौपाधिको धर्मो लक्षणान्तःपाती.” Similarly in *Saṅkṣepa-
s'āstraka* i. 206:—“यत्रैष काक इदमेव तु देवदत्तवेशमेति लाक्षणिकवृत्ति-
रिहाभ्युपेता । काकास्पदत्वमवधीर्य तथापि वेशममात्राकृतिर्भवति लाक्षणिकी तु
बुद्धिः” ॥ With slight modifications it is found also in *Tantra-*

vārtika, page 277, line 8:—“यथानभिधीयमानमपि काकनिलयनं देव-
दत्तगृहशब्दस्य स्वार्थमभिदधतश्चिह्नभूततां प्रतिपद्यते तद्वदाकृतिश्चिह्नं व्यक्त्य-
भिधाने भविष्यति.”

काण्डानुसमयन्यायः ॥

The maxim of “the performance of all prescribed acts of ritual in orderly succession for a particular object before performing the same acts in the same order for a second object.” This is Sir Monier-Williams’ definition based on the commentary on Āśvalāyana’s *Gr̥hyasūtra* 1. 24. 7 which prescribes certain gifts commencing with विष्टरं and ending with गो. The commentator says “ऋत्विजां मधुपर्कदाने द्वे गती संभवतः । पदार्थानुसमयः काण्डानुसमय इति । तत्र पदार्थानुसमयो नाम सर्वेषां वरणक्रमेण विष्टरं दत्त्वा ततः पाद्यं ततोऽर्घ्यमिति । काण्डानुसमयो नाम एकस्येव विष्टरादिगोनिवेदनान्तं समाप्य ततोऽन्यस्य सर्वं ततोऽन्यस्येति.” In a case of this kind, where there is merely a bestowal of gifts, and not the performance of sacrificial ritual, the definition given by Molesworth is more suitable:—“The order, when a suit or set of things is to be given, to each individual of a multitude, *of giving at once* all the articles composing the suit or set, as distinguished from पदार्थानुसमय.”

The nyāya represents the purport of Jaimini 5. 2. 3. Kunte says that the word अभ्यावृत्ति used in the sūtra means *kāṇḍānu-samaya*. His notes on sūtras 1-3 contain some very interesting items of information, of especial value to us of the West. See पदार्थानुसमयन्याय, below.

किं चक्षुषा समैतेन दृष्टं दीपेन यन्मया ॥

What do I want with eyes when I can see by means of a lamp! This bit of wit—worthy of an Irishman—is not a nyāya, but its inclusion here may help to show that even such a solid work as the *Śukavārtika* contains an element of amusement. The quotation is from page 508:—

“उद्विग्नो ह्यन्धकारेण कश्चिदेवं ब्रवीत्यपि ।
 किं चक्षुषा ममैतेन दृष्टं दीपेन यन्मया ॥
 नित्यवृत्तो तु नान्धानां दृष्टिर्दीपशतैरपि ।
 रूपादिदर्शने यस्मात्तस्माच्चक्षुः प्रकाशकम्” ॥

कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *laying down of a water-course for irrigation*. An example of a thing made for one purpose subserving other purposes also. It is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 118, line 9:—“अतो न विधेयप्रत्यये तात्पर्यमिति कुल्याप्रणयनन्यायेनोभयार्थत्वाविधेयत्वात् । यथा शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते ताभ्य एव पानीयं च पीयते तद्वत् ॥”

For the source of this nyâya, see अन्यार्थं प्रकृतमन्यार्थं भवति.

कूटकार्षापणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the unwitting employment of] *base money* [in one's business]. It is used by Kumârila (in *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 3, page 95) in the course of an argument on the relative value of S'ruti and Smṛiti. He maintains that if any teaching of the latter is found to be in opposition to that of the former, it must be given up; just as a man who finds that he has been using counterfeit coins must at once abstain from so doing. The portion containing the nyâya is as follows:—“यो हि कूटकार्षापणेन कंचित्कालमज्ञो लोकमध्ये व्यवहरति न तेन विवेकज्ञानजनितव्युत्पत्तिनापि तथैव व्यवहर्तव्यम्.” The word कार्षापण here evidently means money in general, and not a coin of a certain value. Some-s'vara, however, in his commentary *Nyâyasudhâ* (page 145, line 12), seems to take it in the latter sense. He says:—“यो हीति । द्वात्रिंशत्कृष्णलरजतपरिमाणं कार्षापणः । कूटाकूटविलक्षणविवेकज्ञानेन जनिता व्युत्पत्तिः कूटत्वनिश्चयो यस्य स तथोक्तः ॥”

In *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 8 (page 149, line 3 from bottom), Kumârila compares words to coins which can be tested by in-

telligent people. He says:—"शब्दापभ्रंशवदेव गौणभ्रान्त्यादिप्रयोग-
निमित्ता अर्थापभ्रंशा भवन्ति ते शास्त्रस्थैरेवाविदुस्तार्थक्रियानिमित्तपुण्यार्थिभिः
शक्यन्ते साध्वसाधुकार्पापणमध्यादिव तत्परीक्षिभिर्विवेक्तुम्."

The nyâya is found in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 162, as follows:—"नापि बाधकाभावपरिच्छेदात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स हि तात्कालिको वा
स्यात्कालान्तरभावी वा । तात्कालिको न पर्याप्तः प्रामाण्यपरिनिश्चये । कूटकार्पा-
पणादौ किञ्चित्कालमनुत्पन्नबाधकेऽपि कालान्तरे तदुत्पाददर्शनात्." It occurs
again on page 169, line 3, on page 187, line 4 from bottom, and
on page 531, line 1.

कूपखानकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the well-digger*. It is applied by Raghunâtha as follows:—"यथा कूपखानके पतितं पंकादि कूपान्निःसृतेनाम्भसा प्रक्षाल्यते
तथा तत्तद्विग्रहावच्छिन्नशेभेदबुद्धिजो दोषस्तदुपासनाजन्यसुकृतमहिम्नोत्पन्नेना-
द्वैतबोधेन समूलं निवर्त्यत इति ज्ञेयम् ॥" This illustration is as old
as Patanjali who made use of it in the introductory chapter
of the *Mahâbhâṣya* (vol. i. page 11):—"अथवा कूपखानकवदेतद्ग-
विष्यति । तद्यथा कूपखानकः कूपं खनन्यद्यपि मृदा पांसुभिश्चावकीर्णो भवति
सोऽप्सु र्जजातासु तत एव तं गुणमासादयति येन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते भूयसा
चाभ्युदयेन योगो भवत्येवमिहापि &c."

कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा ॥

This is identical in meaning with मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम्
for which see the Second Handful. It occurs in *Nyâyaman-
jarî*, page 164:—"अनिश्चितप्रामाण्यस्य तु प्रवृत्तौ पश्चात्तन्निर्णयो भवन्नपि
कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षावदफल एवेत्युक्तम्." Lower down on the same
page, there is another nyâya of similar import, in the following
verse:—

"समर्थकारणज्ञानाद्योऽपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चयम् ।

ब्रूते सोऽपि कृतोद्वाहस्तत्र लक्षं परीक्षते." ॥

कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

The maxim that "whenever it may appear doubtful whether an operation has reference to that which is expressed by the technical or to that which is expressed by the ordinary meaning of a particular term, the operation refers (only) to that which is expressed by the technical meaning of the term in question." This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in Nāgojibhaṭṭa's vṛitti to Paribhāṣā ix:—"ननु संख्याग्रहणे बह्वादीनामेव ग्रहणं स्यात्प्रकरणस्याभिधानियामकत्वसिद्धात्कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति न्यायात्" ॥ The maxim is taken from the Mahābhāṣya where it appears several times. In 1. 1. 23 (vārt. 3), it is followed by the example "लोके गोपालकमानय कटजकमानयेति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते न यो गाः पालयति यो वा कटे जातः".

केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून् भ्रामयन् ॥

Like an impecunious debtor deceiving the money-lenders with empty promises. This occurs in *Ātmatattvavivēka*, page 20, as follows:—"अवस्तुत्वादिति चेन्नन्वेतदपि कुतः सिद्धम् । सर्वसामर्थ्य-विरहादिति चेत्सोऽयमितस्ततः केवलैर्वचनैर्निर्धनाधमर्णिक इव साधून्भ्रामयन्प-रस्पराश्रयदोषमपि न पश्यति".

क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्तु ॥

Action may vary, but substance cannot. This is plainly set forth in *S'āṅkarabhāṣya* 1. 1. 2 (page 37) as follows:—"कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म । यथाश्वेन गच्छति पञ्चामन्यथा वा न वा गच्छतीति । न तु वस्तुत्वं नैवमस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते". Similarly in 2. 1. 27 (page 471):—"क्रियाविषये हि..... विकल्पाश्रयणं.....इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः संभवत्यपुरुष-तत्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः".

Then, in Ānandagiri's comment on 1. 4. 1 (page 325), we find the expression "क्रियायामिव वस्तुनि विकल्पाभावात्," and on

page 359, “न हि वस्तुनि विकल्पोऽस्ति.” It occurs also on the first page of the Rāmānuja chapter of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*:—“न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्चयासंभवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यं क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात्.” Nor should any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence, there being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates?” This rendering is Professor Gough’s. The nyāya is found, too, in *S’āstrādīpikā* 1. 3. 8 (page 154, line 6), and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 82.

क्षामेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *scorched offering* [*i. e.* the Puroḍāś’a-cake]. This is the topic of Jaimini 6. 4. 17-21, and deals with the question of the penance to be performed when the whole of a sacrificial cake is burnt. A partial scorching needs no penance.

गर्गशतदण्डन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *infliction of a fine of one hundred on the Gargas*. There are two paribhāṣās which are frequently found together in the Mahābhāṣya, *viz.* “प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः” and “समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः”. Professor Kielhorn (in his translation of Nāgojibhaṭṭa) renders them (the latter slightly modified) thus:—“What is stated (in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of each of them separately.” And “sometimes (it) also (happens that what is stated in grammar of several things) must be understood (to have been stated) of all of them collectively.” Patanjali’s illustration of the former is “देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रा भोज्यन्ताम्,” where, of course, each separate person is to be fed; and his illustration of the latter is “गर्गाः शतं दण्ड्यन्ताम्” where the Gargas collectively are to be fined a hundred. The passages where these occur are 1. 1. 1 (vârt. 12); 1. 1. 7 (vârt. 1); 2. 1. 4; 2. 3. 46; 6. 1. 5 (vârt. 2); 8. 3. 58; and 8. 4. 2 (vârt. 3).

The two paribhâṣās and examples are quoted by S'abara on Jaimini 3. 1. 12 (page 223), and the second one is referred to as follows by Kumârila in his vârtika on the same passage (page 712):—"परः पुनराह सत्यमेष न दोष इति । क्रियाप्राधान्ये तु तद्व-
शीकृतविशेषणसमुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः । गर्गशतदण्डनहोमाभिषवभक्षवदिति
परिहारः । न तु दण्डस्य दण्ड्यसंस्कारत्वाद्भोजनादिवत्प्रतिगर्गमावृत्तिः प्राप्नोति ।
नैष दोषः ।

शारीरो निग्रहो यत्र तत्र प्रत्येकभिन्नता ।

हिरण्यादानदण्डस्तु समुदाये समाप्यते ॥

This paribhâṣâ occurs also in *Tantravârtika* 1. 4. 3 (page 294, line 15), and in 1. 4. 8 (page 300); whilst the former one is quoted in 1. 4. 18 (page 314).

गार्हपत्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Gârhapatya-fire* [one of the three sacred fires perpetually maintained by a householder, and from which fires for sacrificial purposes are lighted]. It represents Jaimini 3. 2. 3, 4, where the topic of the application to this fire of mantras relating to Indra is discussed. The question is raised whether, since the mantras refer to Indra, he should be worshipped rather than the Gârhapatya fire. Jaimini's decision is in favour of the latter as the more important. On account of the mantras this nyâya is also called the ऐन्द्रीन्याय. See the Nyâyamâlâvistara 3. 2. 2.

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *milk-pail*. It is laid down that a sacrificer who wishes for cattle must bring the water for his sacrifice in a milk-pail. The *godohana* is therefore used as an illustration of something which is *occasionally*, and not universally, connected with an act or performance as an essential part of it. It occurs in *S'âṅkarabhâṣya* 3. 3. 42, as follows:—
“सन्ति कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयाणि विज्ञानानि ‘ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत’

इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यान्येव स्युः कर्मसु पर्णमयीत्वादिवदुत्तानित्यानि गोदोहनादिवदिति विचारयामः". Then, at the close of the same:—"तस्माद्यथा कृत्वाश्रयाण्यपि गोदोहनादीनि फलसंयोगादनित्यान्येवमुद्गीथा-
द्युपासनानीत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्." It appears again in 3. 3. 65; 3. 4. 45, and in 4. 1. 6. Sures'vara quotes it also in his *vārtika* on the *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3. 3. 51:—"न च गोदोहनन्यायः काम्य-
कर्मसु युज्यते । तेषां मुक्तिफलत्वे हि न मानं विद्यते यतः" ॥

गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्ययः ॥

When a word has both a primary and a secondary meaning, an operation takes effect (only) when the word conveys its primary meaning. This is an abridgment of Professor Kielhorn's rendering of Nāgojībhāṭṭa's fifteenth *paribhāṣā*; and the following extracts from the *vṛitti* may help to explain it:—"A word which is employed in a secondary sense is so employed (only) because (the character of that which it denotes in) its primary sense is ascribed (to that which it denotes in a secondary sense)." "For example, the word गो 'ox' conveys the secondary meaning 'one who is only fit for bearing burdens, an unintelligent person,' because (such a person has) certain qualities such as stupidity &c. (in common with an ox)".

The maxim appears in the above form in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; but in 1. 4. 108, and in 8. 3. 82, the word कार्य is omitted. In this shortened form it is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1. 2. 13 (page 185), and 1. 3. 14 (page 246). Then in 4. 3. 12, S'ankara says "परं हि ब्रह्म ब्रह्म-
शब्दस्य मुख्यमालंबनं गौणमपरम् । मुख्यगौणयोश्च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्ययो भवति". In *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 346, line 3, we read:—"ननु सन्दिग्धं
वस्तु प्रायदर्शनान्निर्णीयते । गौणमुख्यग्रहणविशये च मुख्ये सम्प्रत्ययः".

In S'abara's *bhāṣya* on Jaimini 3. 2. 1 we have a very interesting discussion on गौण and मुख्य, in the course of which he

says “नह्यनभिधाय मुख्यं गौणमभिवदति शब्दः.” The conclusion arrived at is thus expressed:—“तस्मान्मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम्”.

ग्रहैकत्वन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the mention of] *one cup only*. This summarizes Jaimini 3. 1. 13, 14, the topic of which is the Vedic passage relating to the washing of the soma-cups. The passage in question is “दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि”, “he cleanses the cup with a fringed filtering-cloth.” But there are many such *grahas* in use; is he to cleanse only one of them? The decision is that one represents the whole number, and that all may be cleansed. Kumârila explains this in the following *kârikâ*, under 3. 1. 14:—“व्यक्तीरुद्दिश्य यत्कर्म स्वजात्याद्युपलक्षिताः । विहितं गुणभावेन तत्सर्वार्थं प्रतीयते” ॥ See also *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 1, page 339, line 4 from bottom; and again under 2. 2. 26, page 551. The latter passage is as follows:—“न हि तस्यार्थप्रत्यायनमात्रमेवैकं प्रयोजनमिति वक्तव्यम् । ननूच्यमानेऽपीति प्रत्ययानुग्रहार्थं धातुरुच्चार्यमाणः स्वार्थं प्रत्याययतीति । न चास्य ग्रहैकत्ववदविवक्षाकारणं किञ्चिदस्ति”. This *nyâya* may be compared with काकदधिघातकन्याय.

The use of the ग्रहैकत्वन्याय is not confined to the *Mimâmsâ*. It appears in the *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 287, in a discussion on मन्त्रप्रामाण्य, as follows:—“किं मन्त्रेभ्योऽर्थप्रतीतिरेव नास्ति किं वा भवन्त्यपि निर्निमित्तासावुत सन्निमित्तापि ग्रहैकत्वप्रतीतिवदविवक्षितेति..... नापि संभवन्त्यपि मन्त्रेभ्योऽर्थप्रतीतिर्ग्रहैकत्वप्रतीतिवदविवक्षिता भवितुमर्हत्यविवक्षानिबन्धनस्य क्वचिदप्यभावात्.” The passage from which this is extracted is full of matter drawn from the *Mimâmsâ*, and is unintelligible apart from the latter.

चन्दनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Sandal-oil*. Bâdarâyana uses this as an illustration in sûtras 2. 3. 23, 24. As the application of a drop of

the oil to one part of the body produces a pleasant sensation in the whole of it, so soul, abiding in one part, namely in the heart, is yet perceived as present in the entire frame. S'ankara's exposition of the former sūtra is as follows:—

“यथा हरिचन्दनबिन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसंबद्धोऽपि सन्सकलदेहव्यापिनमाह्लादं करोत्येवमात्मापि देहैकदेशस्थः सकलदेहव्यापिनीमुपलब्धिं करिष्यति । त्वक्संबन्धाच्चास्य सकलशरीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते । त्वगात्मनोर्हि संबन्धः कृत्स्नायां त्वचि वर्तते । त्वक्च कृत्स्नशरीरव्यापिनीति” . This gives a very materialistic notion of *ātman* !

चित्राङ्गनान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a woman in a picture*. An illustration of that which has only an appearance of reality. Raghunātha connects with this the चित्रानलन्याय and चित्रामृतन्याय, and, in his larger work, quotes भगवान्वसिष्ठः as follows:—“चित्रामृतं नामृतमेव विद्धि चित्रानलं नानलमेव विद्धि । चित्राङ्गना नूनमनङ्गनेति वाचाविवेकस्त्वविवेक एवेति” . Like his other quotations from Vasīṣṭha, this, too, is doubtless from the *Yogavāsīṣṭha*, though I do not remember having met with it there.

जलतुंबिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *a gourd in water*. The idea is that of a gourd, thickly covered with mud, and therefore sinking in the water, but gradually resuming its buoyancy as the mud is washed off. The Digambara Jains use the figure to illustrate the release of the soul from the encumbrance of the body. Raghunātha puts it thus:—“यथा पंकलिप्ता तुंबिका नदीसमुद्रादौ मज्जन्ती पंके क्षीणेऽवकाश आगत्य तिष्ठति तथा जीवो देहादिपंके क्षीणेऽलोकाकाशे गत्वा तिष्ठति । अयमेव तस्य मोक्ष इति दिगम्बराः । इति जलतुंबिकान्यायः” ॥

This description, without mention of the *nyāya*, is found in very similar language in the Jaina chapter of *Sarvādars'ana-sangraha* (page 48 of Jivānanda's edition), and also in *Velān-*

takalpataruparimāla, for which see the पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्याय below. The former passage is as follows:—“यथा वा मृत्तिकालेप-कृतमलाबुद्ध्यं जलेऽधःपतति पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डवीजवच्चोर्ध्वगतिस्वभावाच्चाग्नि-शिखावत्.” The figure of the castor-oil seed is found in the latter passage also. The term अलोकाकाश which appears in Raghunātha's definition, is the name of a subdivision of one of the five categories (*astikāya*) of the Jaina system. It is explained as follows by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 33 (page 563):—“आकाशास्तिकायो द्वेधा लौकिकाकाशोऽलौकिकाकाशश्च । लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशः । तदुपरि मोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशः.” This is referred to in a verse quoted by Mādhava in the immediate context of the passage already cited from the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, namely:—“गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः । अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वालोकाकाशमागताः” ॥ Professor Cowell's rendering is:—“However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest; but never to this day have returned any who have gone to Ālokākāśa.” I think, however, that we must say Alokākāśa, and regard the long vowel as including the preposition आ ‘up to,’ ‘as far as,’ “those who have reached Alokākāśa” (आ अलोकाकाशम्).

जातेष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the oblation on the birth of a son*. This is the subject of Jaimini 4. 3. 38, 39. The question arises whether the offering is for the benefit of the father or the son (तत्र सन्देहः किमात्मनिःश्रेयसाय उत पुत्रनिःश्रेयसाय), and the answer is that it benefits the latter.

ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् ॥

Knowledge [of Brahma] abolishes nothing but the ignorance [which obscures that Impersonality]. This is a bit of Vedantism pure and simple, and has scant claims to a place amongst

popular maxims. It is admitted solely because Raghunâtha includes it in his list. His explanation is as follows:—“अस्मिन्श्चाध्यासेऽज्ञानं कारणम् । तत्त्वज्ञानेन वातदीपन्यायेन तन्निवृत्तावस्त्रेहदीपन्यायेन तदध्यासोऽपि निवर्तते । न च ज्ञानेनैवोभयनिवृत्तिः । कुतो न स्यात् । ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति न्यायविरोधात् । द्विविधा हि निवृत्तिः । विरोधिना सामग्रीनिवृत्त्या च । यथा वातादिना दीपनाशो यथा च तैलवर्त्यादिनिवृत्त्या दीपनिवृत्तिः । तत्राद्या निवृत्तिरज्ञानस्य द्वितीया कार्यवर्गस्येति बोध्यम् ” ॥

The so-called nyâya is found in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 8, line 9, and in *Pancapâdikâ*, page 1.

तत्कतुन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *meditation on that* [*viz.* Brahman]. Or, *one who meditates on that*. This is taken from *Brahmasûtra* 4. 3. 15, “अप्रतीकालंबान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्कतुश्च”. The bhâṣya on the last term is as follows:—“तत्कतुश्चोभयथाभावस्य समर्थको हेतुर्दृष्टव्यः । यो हि ब्रह्मकतुः स ब्राह्ममैश्वर्यमासीदेदिति श्लिष्यते ‘तं यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवति’ इति श्रुतेः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्मकतुत्वमस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वादुपासनस्य । नन्वब्रह्मकतुरपि ब्रह्म गच्छतीति श्रूयते यथा पञ्चाग्निविद्यायां ‘स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति [छा० ५. १०. २] इति । भवतु यत्रैवमाहस्यवाद उपलभ्यते तदभावे त्वैत्सर्गिकेण तत्कतुन्यायेन ब्रह्मकतूनामेव तत्प्राप्तिर्नेतरेषामिति गम्यते”. I subjoin Dr. Thibaut’s rendering, with a few additions of my own in parentheses. “The words, ‘and the meditation on that,’ state the reason for this twofold relation [*viz.* of those who meditate on Brahman with qualities, and those who worship by means of symbols or images]. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, ‘In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.’ In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge [rather, the *doctrine* (*vidyâ*)] of the five fires, ‘He leads them to

Brahman.'—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that, where there is no such declaration, the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman [*i. e.* whose mind is fixed on B.] go to it, not any others." This is a noteworthy passage. It practically condemns the use of symbols, or images, in worship, by declaring that the mind of the upāsaka is directed to the *pratīka*, and not to Brahman (or Īśvara). The s'ruti, "तं यथा यथोपासते &c.," which is quoted also in 3. 4. 52, may mean much more than S'ankara sees in it; for it is an undoubted fact that, *in the present life*, the worshipper becomes assimilated to the object of his worship; that the characteristics of that object, as conceived by him, become his own characteristics; and that a man never rises above the moral or spiritual level of that which he worships. This was clearly set before the Jewish nation in the teaching of Psalms CXV and CXXXV, where, with reference to the making and worshipping of images, we read "They that make them shall be like them, every one that trusteth in them" (Revised version).

The तत्कृत्यन्याय, which, in its full form seems to be तत्कृतुस्तद्वति (as in Ānandagiri on the closing part of 4. 3. 15), is constantly quoted in the *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla*. It will be found on pages 229 (three times), 230 (line 9), 235 (line 11), 246 (line 6), 478 (line 1), 591 (line 4 from bottom), 669 (line 10), and 730 (lines 9 and 15).

तत्प्रख्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the existence of another scriptural passage] *declaratory of it*. This is the name given to Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 4 (तत्प्रख्यं चान्यशास्त्रम्), and the above is Dr. Thibaut's rendering of the nyāya in the following passage from Laugāk-sibhāskara's *Arthasaṅgraha*, page 4:—"कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधि-रूपत्तिविधिः । यथाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति । ... ननु यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च । तथा रूपाश्रवणेऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः । अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न । रूपाश्रवणेऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात्" ॥

“That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called *originative injunction*, as for instance the passage ‘he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation.’..... But it may be objected, the two forms (aspects) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage ‘he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation,’ in which neither of these two forms is mentioned, be considered an originative injunction, the word ‘agnihotra’ (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice, namely agni) being merely a name (and not, indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it.” Page 7.

The following is M. M. Kunte’s note on sūtra 1. 4. 4:—

“The principle enunciated in this sūtra is known among the Mīmāṃsakas as *Tatprakhyanyāya*—a name which can be best rendered in English by *the principle of conventionality*. A description elsewhere given shows that a sacrifice is known by a particular name, that is, the conventional name is wellknown. For instance, ‘He who wishes for happiness sacrifices an Agnihotra-sacrifice.’ Another independent Vaidika text determines the word Agnihotra in the above Vaidika text to be the name of a sacrifice.”

The nyāya is found in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 150, line 7.

तत्स्थानापन्न तद्धर्मलाभः ॥

One who takes the place of somebody else takes upon himself also the functions of the latter. This is Professor Kielhorn’s rendering of the maxim as found in Nāgajībhāṭṭa’s comment on *paribhāṣā* CXVI. Can this be regarded as the equivalent of *Noblesse oblige*?

तदन्तापकर्षन्यायः ॥

This nyāya, which is found in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 581, line 9, and again in line 8 of the next page, is taken

from the तदादितदन्तन्याय of Jaimini 5. 1. 23, 24, the अनुयाजाद्युत्कर्ष-
प्रयाजान्तापकर्षाधिकरण, which Kuntè renders "The subject of the
forward transference of acts which follow the Anuyâja-offerings,
and the backward transference of acts which precede Prayâja-
offerings together with the offerings themselves." Regarding the
तदादितदन्तन्याय he says:—"Tadâdi signifies the first part of
that; the Tadanta signifies the last part of that. These are
Bahuvrîhi compounds, and therefore signify that of which the
first part is taken, and that of which the last part is taken.
When forward transference is to be made, the Tadâdi is taken,
and when backward transference is to be made, the Tadanta is
taken. The following illustration will explain this. When the
Anuyâja-offerings are to be transferred in point of time, the
Sûktavâka and the Shanyuvâka which follow it, are to be
transferred along with it, because the Anuyâja is the first part.
Again, when Prayâja-offerings are to be transferred in point of
time, the Âghâra and the Sâmîdheni which precede it, are to
be transferred along with it, because the Prayâja is the last
part."

तद्व्यपदेशन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [a name indicating] *resemblance to something*.
The principle of giving a person or thing the name of some
other thing because of his or its resemblance to the latter; for
example, likening a man to a lion because of his courage and
strength. The nyâya is the subject of Jaimini 1. 4. 5, where
the sentences "अथैष श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेत", "अथैष सन्दंशेनाभिचरन्य-
जेत" and "अथैष गवाभिचरन्यजेत" are discussed; and it is decided
that *s'yena*, *sandams'a*, and *go* are not the *material* of the
various sacrifices, but are merely their names. This is well put
in Colebrooke's Essay on the Mîmâmsâ:—"It is a question
whether the hawk-sacrifice (*s'yena-yâga*) which is attended
with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual
immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a
maxim, that 'a term intimating resemblance is denominative'.

Hawk, then, is the name of that incantation: 'it pounces on the foe *as* a falcon on his prey'. So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation, 'which seizes the enemy from afar *as* with a pair of tongs'; and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations." Laugākṣibhāskara (on page 20) gives उपमान as the equivalent of व्यपदेश, whilst Kumārila employs सादृश्य.

तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यते ॥

Hot goes with hot. Like loves like. This is found in the following passage of *Bhāmati* 3. 3. 25 (page 620):—"न च सन्निधानमपि संबन्धकारणम् । अयमेति पुत्रो राज्ञः पुरुषोऽपसार्थतामित्यत्र राज्ञ इत्यस्य पुत्रपुरुषपदसन्निधानाविशेषान्मा भूद्विनिगमना । तस्मादाकांक्षा निश्चय-हेतुर्वक्तव्या ।सत्यपि सन्निधाने आकांक्षाभावादसंबन्धः । तथा चाभाणकः । तप्तं तप्तेन संबध्यत इति । तथा चाकांक्षितमपि न यावत्सन्निधाप्यते तावन्न संबध्यते" ॥ It might be used as the equivalent of "Birds of a feather flock together"?

तमःप्रकाशन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the co-existence of] *light and darkness*. The use made of this by writers on Vedānta will be seen from the following passage from *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, pages 9 and 10:—"ननु सूत्रसूचितोऽप्यध्यासो न युक्तिसहः । तथा हि । आत्माना-त्मानावितरेतरतादात्म्याध्यासरहितौ क्वापीतरेतरभावरहितत्वात्तमःप्रकाशवत् । ...कथं तर्हि तमःप्रकाशयोर्द्वैष्टान्तत्वं तयोः सहावस्थानसामर्थ्याभावलक्षण-विरोधस्य प्रसिद्धत्वादिति चेन्मैवम् । मन्दप्रदीपे वेश्मनि तमसो दीपेन सहावस्थानात्" ॥ See also *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, page 9.

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमः ॥

The certainty of the non-appearance of shoots from grains of rice spoilt by [contact with] oil. It occurs in *Vedānta-kalpataru*, page 545, line 17:—"क्रियाभोगशक्तयोः सत्योरपि तत्प्रति-बन्धात्कार्यानुदयः संभवति तैलकलुषितशालिबीजादङ्कुरानुदयनियमवत्". In

S'āṅkarabhāṣya 2. 3. 31, we read:—"यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति नाविद्यमानान्युत्पद्यन्ते षण्ढादीनामपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्." Of the आदि in षण्ढादीनाम् Ānandagiri says:—"तैलकलुपितबीजादिग्रहार्थमादिपदम्." This nyāya resembles the मूपिकभक्षितबीजादावङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थना, in Second Handful. See Addenda.

दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ॥

Curds and cucumber are fever personified! This is found in Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 59 (vārtika 6), and 6. 1. 32 (vārt. 6), as follows:—"दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः । ज्वरनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । नङ्गलोदकं पादरोगः । पादरोगनिमित्तमिति गम्यते । आयुर्वृतम् । आयुषो निमित्तमिति गम्यते"॥ This closely resembles Raghunātha's दधिपयसी प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः which I have not yet met with anywhere. See आयुर्वृतं and लाङ्गलं जीवनम् in Second Handful.

दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च ॥

The forest-fire which destroys the seeds of the Ratan is also [by that means] the promoter of the growth of another form [namely, the plantain]. This is found in *Citsukhī* i. 15, as follows:—"यथा च दवदाहस्य वेत्रबीजविनाशकत्वं रूपान्तरजनकत्वं च तथा दोषाणामपि यथार्थज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वमयथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वं च किं न स्वात्." The same idea, with the express mention of the plantain tree, is found under i. 14, and also in the following passage of the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, page 57:—"दष्टं च दुष्टानामपि कारणानामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रतिबन्धेन कार्यान्तरोत्पादकत्वम् । तद्यथा वेत्रबीजानां दावाग्निदग्धानां कदलीप्रकाण्डजनकत्वं भस्मकदुष्टस्य चौदर्यस्य तेजसो बहुतरान्नपानपात्रकत्वम्." Perhaps the Indian farmer could tell us whether the ashes of cane-seeds promote the growth of the plantain-tree? Citsukha Muni informs us, under i. 14, that the growth of rice is aided by the seed having been smelt by mice! For the above, see also *Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 75.

दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायः ॥

This is taken from the large work *Laṅkānyāyaratnākara*, page 219 a, where it forms maxim 62 of the second part. Maxim 60 is the क्षीरनीरन्याय with which Raghunātha seems to connect it. He says:—“अस्मिन्विषये दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्यायोऽपि प्रवर्तते स्वरूपेणावभासमानानेकविवेकाग्रहस्यात्रापि सत्त्वात्.” I hope this sentence may convey more meaning to others than it does to me; but this is all the light that the author throws on it. I conjecture that the nyāya is based on a verse quoted (or composed) by S'abara in his bhāṣya on Jaimini 4. 3. 11 which forms part of the विश्वजिदधिकरण. The gist of the argument is that though no reward is directly connected with that sacrifice, yet a man must use his intelligence in inferring one from elsewhere; just as, for example, a man must do in order to grasp the sense of a verse like the following in which the words are scattered about disconnectedly:—

“इतः पश्यसि धावन्तं दूरे जातं वनस्पतिम् ।

त्वां ब्रवीमि विशालाक्षि या पिनक्षि जरद्वयम् ” ॥

The context preceding and following this verse is absolutely necessary to make it intelligible, and I must refer the reader to S'abara himself. If I am right in connecting Raghunātha's nyāya with this verse and with the क्षीरनीरन्याय, then the idea must be that the verse is a mixture of vocables almost as inseparable as that of milk and water!

देवदत्तशौर्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Devadatta's bravery*. Equivalent to Horace's “Cælum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt.” The illustration is used by S'ankara in his bhāṣya on *Brahma-sūtra* 3. 3. 10:—“एकस्यामपि शाखायां श्रुता गुणाः श्रुता एव सर्वत्र भवन्ति गुणवतो भेदाभावात् । न हि देवदत्तः शौर्यादिगुणत्वेन स्वदेशे प्रसिद्धो देशान्तरं गतस्तद्देश्यैरविभावितशौर्यादिगुणोऽप्यतद्गुणो भवति । यथा च तत्र परिचयविशेषादेशान्तरेऽपि देवदत्तगुणा विभाव्यन्ते” ॥ The देवदत्तशौर्यनिदर्शन is

mentioned again in the bhâsya on the next sūtra. Compare with this the following from *Tantravârtika*, 3. 6. 41 (page 1108):—“यथैव देवदत्तस्य स्थानोपवेशनगमनशयनाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि देवदत्तत्वं नापैति &c.”

देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *slaying of the murderer of Devadatta*. The point is that the death of the murderer does not bring his victim to life again. It is applied by Raghunâtha as follows:—“नन्वज्ञानबाधके ज्ञाने विनष्टे पुनरज्ञानोदयेन बन्धप्रसङ्ग इति शंकायां देवदत्त-हन्तृहतन्यायावतारः । यथा देवदत्तहन्तरि हतेऽपि न देवदत्तस्य जीवनं तथा प्रकृतेऽपि.” He probably took it from Nâgojibhaṭṭa's comment on *paribhâṣā* LXIV [उपसंजनिष्यमाणनिमित्तः &c., which see above] where it reads thus:—“अत्र देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्योन्मज्जनं नेति न्यायस्य विषय एव नास्ति । हते देवदत्त उन्मज्जनं न । देवदत्तहननोद्य-तस्य तु हनने भवत्येवोन्मज्जनम्” ॥ Nâgoji, on the other hand, derived it from the *Mahābhāṣya*, where (in l. 1. 57, vârtika 4) it appears as “न हि देवदत्तस्य हन्तरि हते देवदत्तस्य प्रादुर्भावो भवति.” So, too, in 6. 1. 86 (vârt. 3).

धारावाहिकबुद्धिः ॥

A persistent state of cognition. This is Mr. Arthur Venis' rendering of the expression as it occurs in *Vedântaparibhâṣā* (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv., page 105), and he elucidates it in a foot-note as follows:—“It may be described as a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. Each state of consciousness lasts only for a moment, a *kṣaṇa* or unit of appreciable time, and perishes. A second state then succeeds and is lost, and so on.” We find the expression (in the plural) in the *Prakaranapaneikā*, page 127, and as धारावाहिकज्ञानानि on page 40; whilst, on page 56, the author refers to it as the धारावाहिकन्याय. I have met with it elsewhere also. Yet, strange to say, the Vâcaspatyam is the only Sanskrit

dictionary that contains it. The term धारावाहिन् (with वाहिक also) is there defined as “सन्तत्या पातुके क्रमेणाविच्छेदेन जायमाने च,” and then follows a quotation from Vedântaparibhâṣâ which immediately succeeds that referred to above:—“किञ्च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः [किन्तु यावद्धटस्फुरणं तावद्धटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेकैव न तु नाना”]. “Moreover, according to (Vedântic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various” (Venis). As found in Marâṭhî, it has the meaning “Closeness or intentness of thought; undiverted and unintermitting prosecution (of any subject of meditation or study)” (Molesworth). Strictly speaking, I ought not to include this expression in my pages; but as Böhlingk, Monier-Williams, and Apté have ignored it, I admit it in the hope that it may assist some perplexed student of Indian philosophy. And let me add that readers of Mr. Venis’ excellent translations will find there many valuable explanations of technicalities, which they will search for in vain elsewhere.

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ॥

Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind. This is the first line of a verse in Kumârilâ’s *S’loka-vârtika* (page 710), the context of which is as follows:—

“न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।

चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुक्ते छेदनं प्रति ॥

सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव मृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।

राजा सन्निधिमात्रेण विनियुक्ते कदाचन ” ॥

A remark of S’ankarâchârya’s in his comment on *Mundaka-Upanishad* 3. 1. 1, closely resembles this. He says:—“स त्वन-
श्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति पश्यत्येव केवलम् । दर्शनमात्रेण हि तस्य प्रेरयितृत्वं राजवत्.”

नडलोदकं पादरोगः ॥

Water in a bed of reeds is disease of the feet. That is, it causes disease in the feet. See under दधिन्नपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः ।

नर्तकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a dancer. One dancer gives pleasure to many spectators, just as one lamp gives light to many persons. It occurs in *Jaiminīyanyāyamaḍvīstara* 11. 1. 10 as follows:—

“प्रत्यङ्गि कार्याण्यङ्गानि तन्नेणोताङ्गिनो यतः ।
एकैकस्योपकारत्वं तस्मात्प्रत्यङ्ग्यनुष्ठितिः ॥
विधानवदनुष्ठानं सकृदेवोपकारकम् ।
तद्देशकालकर्तृणामेकत्वान्नर्तकादिवत्” ॥

The last pāda is thus explained:—यथा बहूनां पुरतो नृत्यन्नर्तकः सर्वेषां सुखं युगपन्निर्वर्तयति तद्वत् ।

Of the same kind, apparently, is the following expression of the *Nyāyavārtika* i. 10 (page 70):—“कृतसंकेतानां वृद्धानामेकस्मिन्नर्तकीभूक्षेपे युगपदनेकप्रत्ययवत्”, which is reproduced in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭīkā*, page 354 (line 9 from bottom) in these words:—“उक्तमेतद् यथा नर्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन्बहूनां प्रति-सन्धानमिति.”

न हि करकंकणदर्शनायादर्शापेक्षा ॥

One does not need a looking-glass in order to look at a bracelet on the wrist. The nearest approach to this that I have met with is in the Karpūramanjarī, page 17, line 2:—“अहवा हृत्थकंकणं किं दर्पणेन पेक्खीअदि,” which is, in Sanskrit, “अथवा हस्तकंकणं किं दर्पणेन दृश्यते.”

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते ॥

If a man has lost a cowrie he does not spend a kārshāpana

in the search for it. That would be like expending a sovereign in order to recover a farthing! It occurs in the following portion of S'abara's bhâshya 4. 3. 39:—"न हि कपाले नष्टे तदन्वेषणार्था इष्टिर्युक्ता । नहि काकिन्यां नष्टायां तदन्वेषणं कार्षापणेन क्रियते" ॥

नहि कचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते ॥

A thing's not being heard in one place does not get rid of the fact of its being heard elsewhere. This is applied by S'ankara in *Brahmasûtrabhâsya* 2. 4. 1 (page 681) as follows:—"ननु केषुचित्प्रदेशेषु न प्राणानामुत्पत्तिः श्रूयत इत्युक्तं तदयुक्तं प्रदेशान्तरेषु श्रवणात् । न हि कचिदश्रवणमन्यत्र श्रुतं निवारयितुमुत्सहते." It is quoted as a nyâya in *Vaiyâsikanîyamâlâ* 2. 3. 2 (sûtra 8). Compare with it *S'lokavârtika* iv. 161:—"न कचित्संकराभावात्सर्वत्रैव निवर्तते । कचिच्च संकरं दृष्ट्वा संकरोऽन्यत्र कल्प्यते." In explaining the previous verse, Pârthasârathi says, "न हि यदेकत्र दृष्टं तदन्यत्रादृष्टमपि भवति."

नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ॥

An Iguana creeping along does not on that account become a snake. This is found in *Mahâbhâsya* 1. 1. 23 (4) as follows:—"न खल्वप्यन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति ।यदप्युच्यते न खल्वन्यत्प्रकृतमनुवर्तनादन्यद्भवति नहि गोधा सर्पन्ती सर्पणादहिर्भवति भवेद्द्रव्येष्वेतदेवं स्यात् । शब्दस्तु खलु येन येन विशेषेणामिसंबध्यते तस्य तस्य विशेषको भवति." The same passage reappears in 1. 3. 12 (5), and in 6. 1. 50.

न हि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते ॥

A man who is already in a village does not express a longing to get there, such as a man might who was out in the jungle! This is found in *Bṛihadâraṇyakabhâsya* 2. 3. 28, page 87:—"नहि प्राणात्मन्युत्पन्नात्माभिमानस्य तत्प्राप्त्याशंसनं सम्भवति । नहि ग्रामस्थः कदा ग्रामं प्राप्नुयामित्यरण्यस्थ इवाशास्ते । असंनिकृष्टविषये ह्यनात्मन्याशंसनं न तत्स्वात्मनि सम्भवति."

न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्र इति कथ्यते ॥

A man who has three sons could not be designated as a man with two sons. Therefore, if an order were given to bring the father of two sons, it would not do to bring one who had three! This nyâya of Raghunâthavarman's, taken from the *Kâs'ikâvṛitti* (with the substitution of कथ्यते for व्यपदिश्यते), is based on the words “न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते,” which form part of Patanjali's comment on Pāṇini's sūtra 6. 4. 96 (छादेवैऽबुपसर्गस्य). The meaning of that sūtra is that when the affix व (i. e. the kṛit-affix अ) follows, the root (technically described as) छादि is shortened to छद् when there are not two upasargas. So we say प्रच्छद्, and दन्तच्छद्; but समुपच्छद् because there are two upasargas. But would the root vowel be shortened if there were more than two upasargas? No; for we say समुपाभिच्छद्. Yet the sūtra seems to make no provision for this. Patanjali comments on it as follows:—“अद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम् । इहापि यथा स्यात् । समुपाभिच्छद् इति । तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । यत्र त्रिप्रभृतयः सन्ति द्वावपि तत्र स्तस्त्राबुपसर्गस्येत्येव सिद्धम् । न वा एष लोके सम्प्रत्ययः । न हि द्विपुत्र आनीयतामित्युक्ते त्रिपुत्र आनीयते । तस्मादद्विप्रभृत्युपसर्गस्येति वक्तव्यम् ” ॥

Patanjali was fond of this kind of illustration. The following one is employed again and again in various parts of the bhâṣya, and always in connection with the *paribhâṣâ* नञिव्युक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगतिः । It reads thus:—“अब्राह्मणमानयेत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणसदृश आनीयते नासौ लोष्टमानीय कृती भवति.” It occurs in 3. 1. 12 (vârt. 4); 3. 3. 19; 6. 1. 45; 6. 1. 71 (vârt. 7); 6. 1. 135 (vârt. 12); 6. 3. 34 (vârt. 7); 7. 1. 37 (vârt. 7). The words अब्राह्मणमानय appear also in 2. 2. 6. The *paribhâṣâ* just quoted is rendered by Prof. Kielhorn thus:—“(An expression) formed by the addition of the negative नञ् or (of the particle of comparison) इव (to some word or other) denotes something which is different from and yet similar to (what is denoted by the

latter), because it is so that (such expressions) are (generally) understood (in ordinary life).” With the paribhâṣâ, Nâgojî has also taken the illustration.

**न हि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनोऽप्रसिद्धगोश्रवणात्कु-
दादिमदर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति ॥**

From hearing the unfamiliar word ‘cow,’ an inhabitant of Cocanut Island would gain no perception of an object possessed of a hump &c. This sentence is found in the Nyāya-vārtika on sūtra 3. 1. 67. Again, in Pras’astapâda’s Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya, page 182, we read :—“अनुमानविषयेऽपि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनः सास्त्रामात्रदर्शनात्को नु खल्वयं प्राणी स्यादित्यनध्यवसायो भवति.” The commentator, S’rīdhara, remarks on this :—“नारिकेलद्वीपे गवाम-भावात्तत्रत्यो लोकोऽप्रसिद्धगोजातीयः.”

With some hesitation I have admitted the above into my collection of ‘inferences from familiar instances,’ on account of the reference to the unfamiliar Cocanut Island, and its cow-less condition ! The following passage from Professor Beal’s translation of Hīuen Tshang’s work (Vol. ii. page 252) is supposed to refer to this island :—“The people of this island are small of stature, about three feet high; their bodies are those of men, but they have the beaks of birds; they grow no grain, but live only on cocoa-nuts.” The editor and translator of Itsing’s Record thinks that the island in question is one described by that pilgrim as lying to the north of Sumatra, and therefore probably one of the Nicobar group. See page xxxviii of that work.

Jayant Bhaṭṭa refers more than once to the ignorance of these islanders. See *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 118, line 5; page 121, line 23; and page 391. Also *Tātparyatīkā*, p. 66.

न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति॥

It is not likely that a man who could flee on his feet would crawl on his knees. This is a part of S’ankara’s argument on

Brahmasūtra 3. 1. 10:—“तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारणमिति कार्ष्णाजिनेर्मतम् । न हि कर्मणि संभवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पञ्चां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हतीति.” “It is, therefore, the opinion of Kârṣṇājini that the remainder of works only—which is connoted by the term ‘conduct’—is the cause of the soul’s entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees.” This is Dr. Thibaut’s rendering.

नहि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ धृतम् ॥

Even cow’s milk would cease to be pure if placed in a vessel made of dogskin. This nyāya of Raghunātha’s is found in the following passage of *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*, 1. 3. 4:—

“शाक्योक्ताहिंसनं धर्मो न वा धर्मः श्रुतत्वतः ।

न धर्मो न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ धृतम् ॥

ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसां चापरिग्रहं च सत्यं च यत्नेन रक्षेदिति श्रुतावाहिंसादिधर्मत्वोक्तः । स एव धर्मः शाक्येनाप्युक्तः । तस्माच्छाक्यस्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । स्वरूपेण धर्मस्यापि गोक्षीरन्यायेन शाक्यसंबन्धे सत्यधर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदीयग्रन्थेनाहिंसादिर्नावगन्तव्यः । तस्मान्न सा स्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणम्” ॥

Mādhava, no doubt, took it from Kumārila’s vārtika on sūtra 7 of the same adhikaraṇa, where he speaks of the moral teaching of S’ākyas and others as “श्वदतिनिक्षिप्तक्षीरवदनुपयोग्यविसंभगीयं च.” The simile in this form is found, too, in Yāmuna-cārya’s *Āgamaprāmānya*, page 11, line 8, in a context of the same import. Colebrooke’s excellent summary of the teaching of this part of the Mīmāṃsādarśana, given in his *Essays* (i. 337), may be usefully quoted here:—“Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*śruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded

on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents....The *S'âkyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *Ârhatas*), as Kumârila acknowledges, are considered to be Kshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation* for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the *S'âkyas* are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, tainting what else is virtuous." Raghunâtha uses the *nyâya* as a warning to a *guru* to be careful in the selection of his disciples; for "असत्पात्रे सदुपदेशोऽप्यपवित्रतां याति."

न हि भिक्षुको भिक्षुकान्तरं याचितुमर्हति सत्यन्य-
सिन्नभिक्षुके ॥

A beggar ought not to ask alms of another beggar, so long as there is any one [to beg from] who is not a beggar ! The saying appears in this form in *S'âstradîpikâ* 8. 3. 5; but *S'âbara*, in the same *adhikaraṇa* (*sûtra* 11), puts it thus:—"न च भिक्षुका भिक्षुकादाकांक्षन्ति सत्यन्यसिन्नप्रसवसमर्थेऽभिक्षुके." See, also, the *Nyâyamâlâvistara* on the same portion. The following, from *Ivanhoe* (Chap. xi), runs parallel with the *nyâya*:—"He is too like ourselves for us to make booty of him, since *dogs should not worry dogs where wolves and foxes are to be found.*"

न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि
तदवभासते ॥

Not even to a man whose sight is defective does a lotus on the ground appear to be in the sky ! It appears in *Citsukhî* i. 17 (*Pandit*, vol. iv, page 594):—"न च देशान्तरे सत्त्वादत्रासत्त्वाच्च

ख्यातिबाध्योरन्यथाप्युपपत्तिः । अन्यत्र सत्ताया इह प्रतीत्यहेतुत्वात् । न हि भूमावम्भोरुहं सदिति दुष्टाक्षस्यापि नभसि तदवभासते.”

न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवति ॥

The position occupied by Devadatta when eating is not that which he occupies when fighting! The force of this dṛṣṭānta is best seen from the dārṣṭāntika in Tantravārtika, p. 575:—

“एकत्वेऽपि हि शब्दस्य शक्तिभेदः प्रयोजने ।

तत्र कार्यान्तरस्थानं न स्यात्कार्यान्तरेष्वपि ॥

न शब्दैकत्वेन यत्किञ्चित्कार्ये स्थानं दृष्टसामर्थ्यं तदेवान्यत्रापीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । न हि यद्देवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य स्थानमवगतं तदेव भुञ्जानस्यापि भवतीति गम्यते । कार्यप्रयुक्ता हि स्थानविशेषादयो न स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताः” ॥

न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन ॥

Not even a hundred injunctions could move a man to action as readily as the desire for gain does. This is found in Tantravārtika 3. 4. 34 (page 999):—

“ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां दद्यादिति दानं विधीयते ।

लोभादेवार्जनाङ्गत्वात्प्राप्तस्तेषां प्रतिग्रहः ॥

न हि दद्यादित्यस्य प्रतिगृह्णीयादित्ययमर्थो भवति । भवेदपि सामर्थ्याद्यदि तदाक्षेपमन्तरेण दानविधिर्नोपपद्यते । स तु लोभप्राप्तप्रतिग्रहबलेनोपपद्यमानो न शक्नोत्याक्षेप्तुम् । न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा पुरुषः प्रवर्तते यथा लोभेन” ॥

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥

If a power is not of itself present [in a person or thing], it cannot be supplied by another. In Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2. 1. 24 we have part of a discussion as to Brahman's ability to produce the world without extraneous aid. It is urged that he

has this power in himself, just as the power to produce curds resides in milk. The objection is then raised that since curds are not produced without the action of heat, milk is not independent of other agencies, and so the argument breaks down. The reply is as follows:—“यदि स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यान्नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्धिभावमापद्यते । नहि वायुराकाशो औष्ण्यादिना बलाद्धिभावमापद्यते । साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता संपाद्यते.” On this last clause Ânandagiri says:—“साधनेति । नहि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तु-मन्येन शक्यत इति न्यायाद्विद्यमानैव क्षीरादिशक्तिः साधनसामग्र्योपचीयत इत्यर्थः” The nyâya is taken from *S'lokavârtika* ii. 47 (page 59), of which verse it forms the second line. The first line is “स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम्.” Mr. Gangânâth Jhâ's rendering of the verse is as follows:—“You must understand that authoritativeness is inherent in all means of right notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency.” Compare with the above maxim the following from *Brahmasûtrabhâsya* 2. 2. 29:—“नहि यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति.”

नह्यन्धस्याज्यावेक्षणोपेते कर्मण्यधिकारोऽस्ति ॥

A blind man is not qualified for work involving the examination of butter. This is found in *Vaiyâsikaniryamâlâ* 3. 4. 2 (sûtras 18-20), where it is followed by “नापि पङ्गोर्विष्णुकमाद्युपेते कर्मण्यधिकारः.” It was doubtless taken from *Tantravârtika* I. 4. 24 (page 332), where we read:—नन्वेनैव न्यायेन यथा शक्त्यादिति वाक्यशेषादन्धादीनामाज्यावेक्षणादिरहितः कर्माधिकारः स्यात्.” This sûtra 24 is Jaimini's sûtra 30, under which we have S'abara's “आख्यातशब्दानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी” which see above.

नह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति ॥

The falseness of one person does not prove somebody else to be false. This is from S'abara 1. 1. 2 (page 5, line 6):—“ननु

सामान्यतोदृष्टं पौरुषेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसाम्यादिदमपि वितथमव-
गम्यते । न अन्यत्वात् । नह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति ।
अन्यत्वादेव । नहि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति” ॥
See the same in verse in *S'lokavārtika*, page 100; on which
Pârthasâraṭhi says:—“नह्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य वैतथ्ये सत्याप्तवाक्यस्यापि वै-
तथ्यम्.” That Kumârila, however, had a poor opinion of human
veracity in general, is shown from the following verse on
page 88:—“सर्वदा चापि पुरुषाः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः । यथाद्यत्वे न विश्वं-
भस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने.” Again, on page 178:—“न च पुंवचनं सर्वं स-
त्यत्वेनावगम्यते । वागिह श्रूयते यस्मात्प्रायादनृतवादिनी.” Compare with
this nyâya “नहि खदिरगोचरे परशौ पलाशे द्वैधीभावो भवति,” and
“अन्यवेशमस्थिताद्भूमाश्च वेदमान्तरमग्निमत्.”

न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति ॥

It is not the fault of the post that a blind man cannot see it. Vâcaspatimis'ra quotes this on page 87 of his *Tât'paryā-
tîkā*, prefacing it with the words “यथाहुर्निरुक्तकाराः.” It will
be found on page 112 of the second volume of the *Nirukta*.
We meet with it again in the opening sentence of *Kusumân-
jali* v. :—“नन्वीश्वरे प्रमाणोपपत्तौ सत्यां सर्वमेतदेवं स्यात्तदेव तु न पश्याम
इति चेत् । न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यति.”

नागृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्टबुद्धिरुदेति ॥

*Particular [or, distinguishing] knowledge does not arise
until that which particularizes [or defines, the object in
question] has been grasped.* It is in this form that the nyâya
is found in *Kusumânjali* iii. 21 (page 527), but that it is
much older than Udayana is clear from its use by Kumârila
(in *Tantravārtika*, page 258) in the contracted form “नागृही-
तविशेषणेतिन्यायेन,” whilst, on page 287, he gives it in full as
“अगृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिर्न दृष्टा.” In Mâdhava's *Nyâyamâlā-
vistara* 3. 1. 6, it is quoted as “नागृहीतविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिः,” and

in *Saptapadârthâ*, page 2, line 6, as “नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्य-
बुद्धिः.” In his commentary on *Târkkikaraksâ*, Mallinâtha twice
(namely, on pages 47 and 107) cites the maxim in the con-
tracted form adopted by Kumârla, whilst Raghunâthavarman’s
version of it is “नाज्ञातविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिविशेष्यं संक्रामति.”

In Sir Monier Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit Dictionary विशिष्टबुद्धि
is defined as “differenced or distinguishing knowledge (*e. g.* the
knowledge of ‘a man carrying a staff’ which distinguishes him
from an ordinary man)”; whilst Molesworth explains विशिष्टज्ञान
as “knowledge of an object distinguished or characterized by
something (whether a property or an accident) standing out in
some speciality (inherent or attached).”

Identical in meaning with the above, though differing some-
what in form, is S’abara’s “नह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतु-
मर्हन्ति” (1. 3. 33, page 82). See Addenda.

नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलकर्षणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *pulling the root of the ear with the tip of
one’s nose!* It occurs in Sures’vara’s *Brihadâraṇyakavârtika*
4. 3. 1184, as follows:—

“समस्तव्यस्ततामेवं सति व्याचक्षतेऽत्र ये ।

कर्षन्ति नासिकाग्रेण कर्णमूलं सुखेन ते” ॥

On which Ânandagiri remarks:—“असंभावितार्थवादिनां भ्रान्तत्वं
दृष्टान्तेनाह कर्षन्तीति.” It may be compared with the acrobat’s
sitting on his own shoulders, and with the edge of a sword’s
cutting itself.

निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा ॥

What need has a healthy man of one skilled in the science
of medicine? “They that are whole need not a physician, but
they that are sick.” In the *Prabandhacintâmani* (pages
106-7) there is a story about the poet Bâṇa and his brother-in-

law the poet Mayûra, who were favourites of the king Bhoja. The former, owing to the curse pronounced by his sister (the wife of the latter), was attacked by leprosy; but being healed by the intervention of the Sun, he appeared at court—to quote from Mr. Tawney's translation—"with his body anointed with golden sandal-wood, and clothed in a magnificent white garment. When the king saw the healthy condition of his body, Mayûra represented that it was all due to the favour of the Sun-god. Then Bâna pierced him in a vital spot with an arrow-like speech. 'If the propitiating of a god is an easy matter then do you also display some wonderful performance in this line.' Mayûra replied as follows:—

“ निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा तथापि तव वचः सत्यापयितुं निजपादौ पाणी च क्षुर्या विदार्य त्वया षष्ठे काव्ये सूर्यः परितोषितोऽहं तु पूर्वस्य काव्यस्य षष्ठेऽक्षरे भवानीं परितोषयामीति प्रतिश्रुत्य सुखासनमासीनश्चण्डिकाप्रासाद-पश्चाद्भागो निविष्टो 'मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमम्' इति षष्ठेऽक्षरे प्रत्यक्षीकृतचण्डिकाप्रासादात्प्रत्यग्रप्रथमानवपुःपल्लवः स्वसन्मुखं च तत्प्रासादमालोक्याभिमुखागतैर्नृपति-प्रमुखराजलोकैः कृतजयजयारवो महता महेन पुरं प्राविक्षत्.”

निषादस्थपतिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a king who is a *Niṣâda* by caste. This forms the subject of Jaimini 6. 1. 51, 52, and is thus expounded by Kunte (in *Saḍdars'anacintanikâ*, page 1788):—"The term *Nishâdasthapati* occurs in the Veda. The question is—how is it to be interpreted? Is the term *Nishâdasthapati* a Karma-dhârâya compound or Tatpuruṣa compound? The Karma-dhârâya overrules the Tatpuruṣa; because, in the latter, a case not directly seen has to be understood, and because metonymy is thus involved. A direct statement is always to be preferred to metonymy. The Karmadhârâya makes a direct statement and therefore does not involve metonymy. He who is a *Niṣâda* is a *Sthapati*; and therefore a superior *Niṣâda* is entitled to perform the Raudra sacrifice." In other words, the compound when dissolved is not निषादानां स्थपतिः but निषाद एव स्थपतिः.

In explaining the term ब्रह्मलोक in S'ankara's bhāṣya on *Vedāntasūtra* 1. 3. 15, Vācaspatimis'ra says (on page 213, line 3 from bottom):—"अत्र तावन्निषादस्थपतिन्यायेन षष्ठीसमासात्कर्मधारयो बलीयानिति स्थितमेव तथापीह षष्ठीसमासानिराकरणेन कर्मधारयस्थापनाय लिङ्गमप्यधिकमस्तीति तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण " । This nyāya is also explained in full in *Vedāntakalpataru* on this passage, and again in *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla*. It is quoted by Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 24. For the origin of the Nisāda, see Manu x. 8.

पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a bird let loose from its cage. Used to illustrate the upward flight of the soul when released from the body. It occurs in *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla*, page 443, as follows:—"उर्ध्वगमनं जीवस्य स्वभावः । देहे स्थितिस्तत्प्रतिबन्धककर्माधीनेति मतमाश्रित्योक्तम् । केचित्तु चिरकालशरीरावस्थितप्रयुक्तबन्धमुक्तावूर्ध्वगमनं मन्यन्ते । ते खल्वेवमाहुः । बन्धमुक्तस्योर्ध्वगमनं दृष्टं यथा पञ्जरमुक्तशुकस्य यथा वा वारिनिर्भिन्नपरिणतैरण्डबीजस्य यथा वा दृढपंकलिसजलनिमज्जनप्रक्षीणपंकलेपशृङ्खलालावूफलस्य." It will be noticed that there are three illustrations in the last clause,—the third being really the जलतुंबिकान्याय, which see above.

पदार्थानुसमयन्यायः ॥

Sir M. Monier-Williams defines it thus:—"The performance of one ritual act for all objects in orderly succession before performing another act for all objects in the same order." When it is not a matter of sacrificial ritual, but merely of the bestowal of gifts, the definition given by Captain Molesworth is more suitable; namely—"The order or method (when a set or number of things is to be given to each individual of a multitude) of giving first one article of the set to each person all round; going round again with another article; and again with a third; and thus, until all the articles composing the set

shall have been received by each person." The nyâya summarizes the teaching of Jaimini 5. 2. 1, 2. See काण्डानुसमन्याय, and Karkâcârya on Kâtyâyana's *S'rautasûtra* i 114.

परतत्रं बहिर्मनः ॥

As to externals, mind is dependent on others. This is used as a nyâya by Citsukha Muni in his vṛitti on kârikâ i. 12 (Paṇḍit vol. iv. page 513), so I include it here. He says:—"न च मनसो बहिरर्थैः संबन्धः परतत्रं बहिर्मन इति न्यायात्." This is doubtless derived from a verse half of which is quoted in the first chapter of *Sarvadarsanas'angraha*, namely, "चक्षुराद्युक्त-विषयं परतत्रं बहिर्मन इति." Professor Cowell rendered it thus:—"The eye &c. have their objects as described, but mind externally is dependent on the others."

परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः ॥

This is the first line of *Kusumânjali* iii. 8, the second being "नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः" ॥ The following is Professor Cowell's translation of the verse and of a portion of Haridâsa's explanatory comment:—"In the case of contradictories, there can be no middle course; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted." "There can be no middle course,' i. e. you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they *are* contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true]; nor can you assume them to be identical." Raghunâtha's explanation of the first line, in his larger work, coincides with this. He says:—"न प्रकारान्तरस्य ताभ्यामन्यस्य प्रकारस्य स्थितिः किन्तु तदन्यतरस्येत्यर्थः" ॥ The nyâya is quoted in the last sentence of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-lhâdya* iii (page 561), and the whole verse in the commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇâvali*, page 47, and in the second chapter of *Sarvadarsanasangraha*.

पर्जन्यवत् ॥

Like the rain [which falls on all places alike]. It is found in the following passage of *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 9 and 6. 1. 127:—
 “कृतकारि खल्वपि शास्त्रं पर्जन्यवत् । तद्यथा । पर्जन्यो यावदूनं पूर्णं च सर्व-
 मभिवर्षति” । This is quoted by Nāgajibhāṭṭa under *paribhāṣā* cxi—“पर्जन्यवलक्षणप्रवृत्तिः,” which Professor Kielhorn translates thus:—“The rules of grammar are like the rain [in this that they are] applied [both where they produce a change and where they do not; just as the rain falls upon that which already is full of water as well as upon that which is empty].”

There is another example of this in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—“प्रकृत्यादिविभागकल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलंभाच्च.” “And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots &c., (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words.” The translation is Prof. Cowell's. We meet with it again in a most interesting passage of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 42, where S'ankara tells us that just as the rain causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, &c., by its action on the seeds, so God, making use of men's previous works, impels them to either good or evil! There can be little doubt that the mischievous saying, “कर्ता आणि करविता ईश्वर आहे,” current among the Marāṭhās, was derived from this source.

The use of the illustration of the rain was not confined to India. Here is an example of it from Palestine:—“As the rain cometh down, and the snow, from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater; so shall My word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto Me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.”

पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥

Seeing resemblance to an elephant in a heap of straw. An illustration of mere semblance of resemblance (सादृश्याभासता). A real likeness is said to be that which stands the test of a close examination. The figure is contained in Kumârila's S'lokavârtika, page 446.

“यत्र त्वसदृशादेव कल्पयित्वोपजायते ।

सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्तत्र तदाभासत्वकल्पना ॥ ४० ॥

बाधकप्रत्ययाच्चैषा सादृश्याभासता मता ।

यथा पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यं कुञ्जरादिना ॥ ४१ ॥

समीपस्थोऽपि जानाति सादृश्यं नेति तत्र हि ।

न बाध्यते समीपादौ यत्तु सादृश्यमेव तत्” ॥ ४२ ॥

Mr. Gangânâth Jhâ renders the passage thus:—

“40. In a case where a notion of similarity is brought about by means of objects that are not really similar, we have only a (false) semblance of similarity.

41-42. This is said to be a false semblance of similarity, because it is subsequently set aside by an idea to the contrary, e. g. the similarity of an elephant in a stack of hay; in which case when one is sufficiently near the stack, he realizes that there is no real similarity between the stack and the elephant. That notion of similarity which is not set aside even on close proximity to the object, is a case of real similarity.”

पश्यस्यद्रौ ज्वलदग्निं न पुनः पादयोरधः ॥

Thou seest the fire burning on the mountain, but not that which is under thy very feet! “Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thy own eye?” The above is the first line of Hema-candra's Parisiṣṭaparvan i. 382, the second line being “यत्परं शिक्षयस्येवं न स्वं शिक्षयसि स्वयम्.” The next verse continues the rebuke:—“का हि पुंगवना तेषां येऽन्यशिक्षाविचक्षणाः । ये स्वं शिक्षयितुं

दक्षास्तेषां पुंगवणा नृणाम्.” The teaching here is akin to that of the भूलिङ्गन्याय, namely “Practise what you preach.”

पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः ॥

Poisoned wounds will not heal without the use of the lancet. This is found in *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* 3. 8. 4, as follows:—“न हि दुःखरूपं तपो विना दुःखप्रदं पापं नश्यति । यथा लोके पाटनमन्तरेण विषव्रणानां नोपशान्तिः” ॥ This is, perhaps, the source of Raghunātha's व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायः which he makes use of thus:—“निरन्तरं दुःखमयसंसारपरिवृत्तिभ्रान्तानां जीवानां कंचित्कालं विक्षेपविगमसमुल्लसदात्मानन्दानुभवेन विश्रान्तिं संपादयितुकामस्य तस्य संहाराय तमोग्रहणस्य दुश्चिकित्सव्रणपीडितानां व्रणं शिशमयिषोः शस्त्रग्रहणन्यायेन

‘निदानज्ञस्य भिषजो रुग्णहिंसां प्रयुञ्जतः ।

न किंचिदपि नैर्घृण्यं घृणैवात्र प्रयोजिका’ ॥

इति शिवपुराणे व्याख्यातेन निरतिशयकरुणाम्बुधित्वलिङ्गात्” ॥ To understand this very involved sentence, it is necessary to bear in mind that संपादयितुकामस्य refers to Śiva, whose benevolent intentions towards humanity are the subject of the immediate context. Contrast with the above the following saying of Sures'vara's (in *Brhadāraṇyakavārtika* 4. 3. 176), “न दाहज्वरतुत्यर्थमग्निना स्याद्विषक्रिया.”

पाठक्रमन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *textual sequence*. It forms the subject of Jaimini 5. 1. 4-7. According to the Mīmāṃsā, there are six kinds of sequence; namely, (1) *S'rutikrama*, or ‘direct sequence,’ which is treated of in the first sūtra of this chapter. It is known as the श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्याय, and is regarded as the strongest of the six. Then (2) *Arthakrama*, or ‘logical sequence,’ which is discussed in sūtra 2, and in which the sequence is determined by the sense rather than by the order of the text. For example, take the sentence “अग्निहोत्रं जुहोत्योदनं पचति,” where

the boiling of the rice must necessarily precede the offering of the agnihotra, although the former is mentioned first. Again, when we read “जाते वरं ददाति, जातमञ्जलिना गृह्णाति, जातमभि-प्राणिति,” the logical sequence, as S’abara shows, is in the reverse order of the textual. Then comes (3) *Pāṭhakrama*, as above, which S’abara illustrates by the following Vedic passage:—“समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इडो यजति बर्हिर्यजति स्वाहाकारं यजति इति.” To quote Kunte:—“These are what are called the five Prayāja oblations; and the sequence in which these texts occur shows the order in which they are to be offered. This is the application of what is called *Pāṭhakrama*, or textual sequence.” The next is (4) *Pravṛttikrama*, which forms the subject of sūtras 8-12. Kunte calls it ‘practical sequence.’ “In a series of acts to be performed upon a series of objects, a beginning is made from some one object; then, in performing all the acts, the same object is acted upon first. This sequence is called *Pravṛttikrama*, which signifies sequence determined by the conduct of the individual.” It is known as the प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय. The remaining two varieties are the स्थानक्रम and मुख्यक्रम.

Kunte’s notes on this portion are well worth a reference; and much help, too, is to be had from Dr. Thibaut’s translation of the *Arthasangraha*, where (on pages 11-15) the six forms of *krama* are explained under ग्रयोगविधि.

The use of these technical terms is not confined to the Mīmāṃsakas, but is very common amongst writers on Vedānta also. Four of the above varieties of *krama* are mentioned in *Bhāmati* 1. 1. 1, pages 47-49, beginning with the words “मा भूदग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकवदार्थः क्रमः &c.,” and enlarged upon in *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 32-34; then, in *Bhāmati* 4. 3. 6, we read “पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलवानिति यथार्थक्रमं पठ्यन्ते सूत्राणि,” and so sūtra 12 is next explained, and afterwards sūtra 7. For the *pāṭhakrama* only, see Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 3. 15 (page 620).

पुरस्तादपवादा अनन्तरान्विधीन्बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

This grammatical nyāya is *paribhāṣā* LIX in Nāgojībhaṭṭa's treatise, and is taken from *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 89 (under *vārtika* 2). Professor Kielhorn translates as follows:—"Apavādas that precede [the rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the Apavāda-operations] supersede only those rules that stand nearest to them, not the subsequent rules." It is found also in Patanjali 1. 1. 28; 3. 2. 1 (6); 3. 3. 95; 3. 4. 85; 4. 1. 55 (4); 4. 3. 132 (6); 4. 3. 156 (7); 6. 1. 102 (6); 6. 4. 163 (2); and 8. 3. 112. In not one of these examples, however, do the words "नोत्तरान्" appear.

पूर्वं ह्यपवादा अभिनिविशन्ते पश्चादुत्सर्गाः ॥

Special rules are taken into consideration first, and afterwards general rules. "The meaning is this that he who is guided solely by the rules (of grammar) first looks about to find out where the *Apavāda* applies, and having thus ascertained that a particular form does not fall under that (*Apavāda*), he employs for its formation the general rule." See Dr. Kielhorn's translation of Nāgojī's *paribhāṣā* 62. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (*vārt.* 11); 3. 1. 3 (*vārt.* 10); 3. 2. 124 (*vārt.* 10); 4. 1. 89 (*vārt.* 2); 6. 1. 5 (*vārt.* 2); 6. 1. 161 and 186.

प्रकल्प्य वापवादविषयं तत् उत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते ॥

This is another of Raghunātha's samples of grammatical rules, and is closely connected with *पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः* &c., to which it forms an alternative. Dr. Keilhorn's translation of it, in the *Paribhāṣendruśekhara*, is as follows:—"Or (we may say that) first all forms which fall under the *Apavāda* are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in the formation of the remaining forms)." It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 4. 85 (*vārt.* 11); 3. 1. 3 (*vārt.* 10); 3. 2. 124 (*vārt.* 10); 6.

1. 5 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 161; and 6. 1. 186. In each case it is immediately preceded by the paribhâṣā पूर्व ह्यपवादाः &c., the latter standing alone only in 4. 1. 89 (vârt. 2).

प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः ॥

The base and the suffix jointly convey the meaning which is recognized [or arrived at]. The sense of the term प्रत्ययार्थं here is a real difficulty; and I am indebted to Dr. Kielhorn for the explanation that it is regarded as equivalent to प्रतीयमानार्थं. The nyâya (for it is quoted as such) is taken from Patanjali 3. 1. 67, vârtika 2, and is reproduced in the same form in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 4. 13 (page 320), and 10. 8. 24 (page 677); also in *Tantravârtika* 3. 1. 12 (page 686). It is quoted, however, with a slight addition in *Vivaranaprameyasangraha*, page 4, line 14, where we read “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्राधान्येनेति न्यायेन”; and, almost identically, in the Râmânuja chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 69 of Jivânanda's edn.) we have “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं प्राधान्येन सह ब्रूतः”, which Prof. Gough renders “The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead.” It is not clear how the latter part of this rendering was arrived at; but the missing link is supplied by Mâdhava in *Nyâyamâlâvistara* 3. 4. 8, where we read “प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतस्तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येनेति शाब्दिकैरुद्घोषणात्”. Here we have, perhaps, a hit at the grammarians and also a hint of the difference which exists between them and Mîmâṃsakas in regard to the means by which the sense of a word is arrived at. In a note on Jaimini 3. 4. 13, Kunte says:—“The grammarians state that both the material part (*dhātu*) and the determinative part (*pratyaya*) of a verb convey notions of their own. The notions of the agent of an action, of its object, of its being performed by one or many, that is, its singular and plural numbers, are conveyed by the *pratyaya* of a verb. The *dhātu* of a verb has invariably one sense which it

retains in all its modifications.” With the Mīmāṃsaka, on the other hand, “the complete verb—the enunciated (*ākhyāta*)—conveys the notion of a mere action and not of its means, such as its agent, its object, or its instrument.” In view of this we can understand Mādhava’s statement that the grammarians lay especial stress on the suffix. I feel sure, however, that the presence of the word *prādhānya* in the *nyāya*, is due to the influence of the following verse of Kumārila’s in *Tantravārtika* 2. 1. 1 (page 348), which forms part of a lengthy disquisition on that difficult word भावना. It stands thus:—“शास्त्रे तु सर्वत्र प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेति व्यवहारः । तत्रायमभिप्रायः ।

प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सदा ।

प्राधान्याद्भावना तेन प्रत्ययार्थोऽवधार्यते” ॥

Then, further on, he again says “तस्मात्प्रत्ययार्थो भावनेत्युपपन्नम्”. Does प्रत्ययार्थ in this verse mean प्रतीयमानार्थ ?

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानेन ॥

When there is sense-perception, what is the use of inference? As Kumārila says in *Tantravārtika*, page 87:—“वेदवाक्यानुमानं हि तावदेव प्रवर्तते । तदर्थविषयं यावत्प्रत्यक्षं नोपलभ्यते ॥ प्रत्यक्षे श्रूयमाणे तु न विद्येतानुमानिकम् । नहि हस्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि तत्पदेनानुमिष्यते” ॥ Amalānanda, too, in *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 368:—“प्रत्यक्षे च यागविधावानुमानिकविधिकल्पनाऽनुपपन्ना”.

In S’abara 3. 1. 12 (page 216) we read प्रत्यक्षमनुमानाद्वलीयः, but Patanjali points out (in *Mahābhāṣya* 3. 2. 124) that this is not always the case. He says:—“भवति वै प्रत्यक्षादप्यनुमानबलीयस्त्वम् । तद्यथा । अलातचक्रं प्रत्यक्षं दृश्यतेऽनुमानाच्च गम्यते नैतदस्तीति”. There are two references to this in *Nyāyamanjari*. On page 461 (line 7 from bottom) we read:—“यद्यपि च नैष नियमः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इति त्वरिततरपरिभ्रमितचक्रीभवदलातग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाधितत्वदर्शनादिति &c.”. And on page 609 (line 6 from bottom):—“अथ मनुषे नियम एवैष प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्ष-

मेव बलीय इति तदेवानुमानस्य बाधकमुचितं नानुमानान्तरमिति । तदसत् । अलातचक्रादौ प्रत्यक्षमप्यनुमानेनानन्यथासिद्धेन बाध्यत एव । ननु भ्रमणविरतौ परिमितपरिमाणोलुमुकग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमेव तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकं नानुमानमिति । मैवम् । अनवरतपरिभ्रमणसमुद्भूतचक्रावभाससमय एवानुमानेन तद्भ्रान्ततानि-
श्रयात्” ॥ For अलातचक्र see also *Nyāyasūtra*, 3. 2. 59; *Bhāmātī*, page 373, line 15; and *S’ālikā*, page 36.

प्रपानकरसन्ध्यायः ॥

The maxim of *sherbet*. Used to illustrate the production of some new thing by the union of others, just as sherbet is the result of the commingling of various ingredients. It appears in *Sāhityadarpana*, 46, as follows:—“प्रतीयमानः प्रथमं प्रत्येकं हेतु-
रुच्यते । ततः संवलितः सर्वो विभावादिः सचेतसाम् । प्रपानकरसन्ध्यायाच्चर्च्यमाणे
रसो भवेत् ॥ यथा खण्डमरिचादीनां सम्मेलनादपूर्वं इव कश्चिदास्वादः प्रपानकरसे
सञ्जायते विभावादिसम्मेलनादिहापि तथेत्यर्थः ”. This is meant to show how Flavour is single, though spoken of as resulting from a composition of causes. Dr. Ballantyne translates thus:—“First each reason is mentioned separately as being perceived; and [then we say] let all this commingled—the Excitants and the rest—constitute, like the [composite] flavour of sherbet, the Flavour tasted by the intelligent. As from the commingling of sugar, pepper &c., a certain unprecedented relish is produced in the shape of the flavour of the sherbet, so is it here also, from the commingling of the Excitants &c., such is the meaning.”

The same illustration is found in *Nyāyamanjarī* (page 372) with पानक instead of प्रपानक. “पदार्थेभ्योऽन्य एव वाक्यार्थः पानकादिवत् । यथा पानकं शर्करानागकेशरमरिचादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव यथा च सिन्दूरहरिताललाक्षादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव चित्रं...तथा पदेभ्यो वाक्यं पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थः ” ॥ Also *Tātparyatīkā*, page 219, line 26.

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ॥

Even a stupid person does not adopt a course of action

without a motive. This is the first line of a verse in *S'loka-vârtika*, page 653, the second being “एवमेव प्रवृत्तिश्चेत्तन्येनास्य किं भवेत्”. In *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 2. 1, we read:—“तद्विगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्तत इति”. On which Ânandagiri remarks:—“चेतनस्येति । अर्थशब्दो भोगापवर्गार्थः । अचेतनस्य प्रयोजनपरिज्ञानाभावादप्रवृत्तिः । प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तत इति न्यायादित्याशङ्क्याह स्वभावेनेति ”.

We find the following in *Nyâyamamjarî* (page 191) in connection with the discussion on Is'vara as creator:—

“किं किमपि प्रयोजनमनुसन्धाय जगत्सर्गे प्रवर्तते प्रजापतिरेवमेव वा । निष्प्रयोजनायां प्रवृत्तावप्रेक्षापूर्वकारित्वादुन्मत्ततुल्योऽसौ भवेत्”.

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the throwing into the sacrificial fire of a handful of Darbha grass. Kunte says:—“The Prastarapraharananyâya is well known among the Mîmâṃsikas. Prastara is a handful of Darbha-grass ready for use before a sacrifice is begun. It is spread on the sacrificial ground (Vedi) and serves as a seat for the sacrificial vessels. When a sacrifice is finished it is thrown into the sacrificial fire as an offering. A Vaidika text states.—‘ The handful of grass is to be thrown into the fire with the Sûktavâka.’” The nyâya forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 11-14 which is otherwise termed “सूक्तवाकस्य प्रस्तरप्रहरणाङ्गताधिकरणम्.” The question which has to be decided is thus put by the author of the *S'âstratîpikâ*:—“दर्शपूर्णमासयोः श्रूयते सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं प्रहरतीति । तत्र संशयः । किं प्रस्तरप्रहरणस्य सूक्तवाकस्य च कालार्थः संयोगोऽथवाङ्गिभिभावः” । The decision is that the Sûktavâka mantra is subordinate to the act of offering up the grass, whilst the latter serves the double purpose of a resting-place for the vessels and an offering to the gods.

The term प्रतिपत्ति which is found in sūtra 14 is thus explained by Kunte:—“The rule is that all things connected with a

sacrifice are somehow or other to be used in performing the same; nothing is to be thrown away, nothing is to be preserved. The final disposal of sacrificial things for the sake of getting rid of them is called Pratipatti."

प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

फलवत्सहकारन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *fruitful mango-tree*. Such a tree not only produces luscious fruit, but also affords shade and shelter for the weary traveller in the hot season. Some of us know from experience how charming a camping-ground a mango-grove is ! Raghunātha's explanation of the nyāya is as follows:—"एकफलाकांक्षायां तदाराधनमन्यदपि फलं प्रयच्छतीति विवक्षायां तु फलवत्सहकारन्यायः । यथा सहकार 'आम्रश्चूतो रसालोऽसौ सहकारोऽतिसौरभ' इत्यभिधानादतिसौरभ आम्रवृक्षोऽतिमधुरपक्वफलनमितशाखः स्वमुपसन्नाय छायाथिने जनाय फलं परिमलं चाप्रार्थितमपि ददाति तथा प्रकृतेऽपीत्यर्थः ॥ The quotation here is from *Amarakoṣa*.iv. 33 (page 87). The thought expressed in the above seems to be present in *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* 5. 43. 32, as explained by the commentator:—"नित्याभ्यासविवेकाभ्यां चित्तमाशु प्रसीदति । आम्र एव दशमेति साहकारीं शनैः शनैः" ॥ ३२ ॥ "आशुग्रहणं प्रसादावश्यंभावद्योतनार्थम् । सहकारः पुष्पफलाद्यतिसौरभस्तद्भावलक्षणां दशाम्."

बर्हिर्न्यायः ॥

The maxim of *Kus'a grass*. This is based on the sentence "बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि," "I cut grass as a seat for the gods," which forms the subject of Jaimini 3. 2. 1, 2. The question is whether the word बर्हिस् is to be taken in its primary sense or in a secondary one; and the conclusion is "मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंग्रहयः," which see above in the form गौणमुख्ययोः &c.

बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

The mind of even those who are highly educated is distrustful of itself. This is the second line of the second verse in *S'akuntalânâtalâ*. In *Târkhikarakṣâ* (page 208), in an exposition of वाद, we find the following:—“वादे तु दैवादागताः सदस्या वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां संप्रतिपत्त्या ग्रामादिककथाभासशंकाव्यावर्तनायाङ्गीक्रियन्ते न जल्पवितण्डयोरिव प्रमेयादिव्यवस्थापनार्थमङ्गत्वेनोपादीयन्ते ” ॥ On which, Mallinâtha comments as follows:—“वादे विशेषमाह वादे त्विति । दैवादागतायां वा किं प्रयोजनमत आह ग्रामादिकेति । बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेत इति न्यायादिति भावः ” ॥

For the benefit of any who may consult the original, I may add that the quotation from the *Nyâyavârtika* which immediately follows in Varadarâja's text, is found on page 161 of that work; and that from Vâcaspatimis'ra's *tîkâ*, on page 224.

बहूनामनुग्रहो न्याय्यः ॥

It is good policy for several to combine in a friendly way. Raghunâthavarman quotes *Pancatantra* i. 331 by way of illustration:—“बहूनामप्यसाराणां मेलनं कार्यसाधकम् । तृणैः संपाद्यते रज्जुस्तया नागोऽपि बध्यते” ॥ For the many variants of this verse see *Indische Sprüche* 4425, and Peterson's *Subhâshitâvali* 2742. The maxim is found in *Jaiminiyanyâyamâlâvistara* 7. 1. 5.

बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः ॥

The burning of a city just by a child's playing with the wick of a lamp. “Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth.” I assume that कलिका means the bud-like charred excrescence which often forms on the top of a wick in an open oil-light. The saying is found in *Kusumânjali* v. 3, page 89:—“ननु तस्य सर्वदा सर्वत्राविशेषे कार्यस्य सर्वदोषप्रसंग इति निरपेक्षधरपक्षे

दोषः, सापेक्षे उपेक्षणीय एवास्त्विति बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव नगरदाहः
परन्तु तत्र स्थेमभाजो जगत एवाकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्.”

Udayana seems to use the phrase ironically, but I do not quite grasp the drift of this.

बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारव- श्रावणम् ॥

What need has a hungry man of a pressing invitation [to eat]; why direct the attention of a longing one to the cry of the peacock ? In the Kumârapâla chapter of *Prabandhacintâmani*, page 212, we are told that that king having given Hemacandra (a Jain) a pressing invitation to join him in a pilgrimage to the temple of Somanâtha (dedicated to S'iva), the hermit replied as follows:—“बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमन्त्रणाग्रह उत्कण्ठितस्य किं केकारवश्रावणमिति लोकरूढेस्तपस्विनामधिकृततीर्थाधिकाराणां को नाम नृपतेरत्र निर्बन्धः ” ॥ “ What need is there to show much zeal about inviting one who is hungry ? Why make one who is longing, listen to the cry of the peacock ? So runs the popular proverb, and, in accordance with it, I ask, why does your Majesty exert yourself to press hermits, whose very profession is the visiting of sacred places ? ” This is Mr. Tawney's rendering, on page 130 of his translation. Indian writers often tell us that the cries of the peacock intensify the longings of separated lovers ! For example, *Raghuvams'a* xiii 27 :—“स्निग्धाश्च केकाः शिखिनां बभूवुर्यस्मिन्नसह्यानि विना त्वया मे.”

ब्राह्मणग्रामन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a village in which Brâhmanas abound. In *Vedântakalpataruparimala*, page 188, a distinction is drawn between the expression प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्रामः and ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्रामः, the meaning, in the former case, being a village in which Brâhmanas are more numerous than in some other village, and, in the latter, a village in which the Brâhmanas outnumber the other castes.

The passage is as follows:—"प्राचुर्यस्य धर्मिविशेषणत्वेन निर्देश एव व्यधिकरणसजातीयाल्पत्वस्य निरूपकत्वं दृष्टम् । यथा प्रचुरब्राह्मणो ग्राम इत्यत्र प्राचुर्यस्य ग्रामान्तरगतब्राह्मणाल्पत्वं निरूपकं दृष्टमिति । तस्य स्वधर्मिविशेष्यत्वे तु समानाधिकरणविजातीयाल्पत्वमेव निरूपकमत एव ब्राह्मणप्रचुरो ग्राम इति प्रयोगे तद्ग्रामगतशूद्राल्पत्वापेक्षं प्राचुर्यं प्रतीयते." See also *Tantravārtika*, p. 1066 line 2. Akin to this is the *मह्यग्रामन्याय*.

भस्मन्याज्याहुतिः ॥

Offering clarified butter on ashes [instead of on the sacrificial fire]. An illustration of wasted, or misdirected, effort. *Upamitibhavaṇaprapaṇcā Kathā*, page 240:—"अकार्यवारणोद्युक्तो मूढे यः परिखिद्यते । वान्विस्तरो वृथा तस्य भस्मन्याज्याहुतिर्यथा ॥ नोपदेशशतेनापि मूढोऽकार्यान्निवर्त्यते । शीतांशुग्रसनात्केन राहुर्वाक्यैर्निवारितः" ॥ There is another instance in Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* i. 58:—"दध्यौ चैवं स राजर्षिरहो तेषां कुमन्निणाम् । सन्मानो यो मयाकारि स भस्मनि हुतं ध्रुवम्."

भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् ॥

The simile of [a remnant of] *oil adhering to* [the sides of] *a vessel* [out of which oil has been poured]. In the *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 1. 8, there is a lengthy and important discussion as to whether, on returning to earth, in some new birth, after a residence in the moon, a man brings with him a remnant of the works which took him there,—this remnant being technically styled *anus'āya*. S'ankara affirms that he does, and says:—"कः पुनरनुशयो नामेति । केचित्तावदाहुः । स्वर्गार्थस्य कर्मणो भुक्तफलस्यावशेषः कश्चिदनुशयो नाम भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् । यथा हि स्नेहभाण्डं रिच्यमानं न सर्वात्मना रिच्यते भाण्डानुसार्यैव कश्चिस्नेहशेषोऽवतिष्ठते तथानुशयोऽपीति" ॥ The question is then asked, why does he not remain in that blissful region until the whole of his merit is exhausted? The answer is, that, just as a servant who has long served in a king's household, finds his wardrobe at last reduced to the

slender proportions of a pair of shoes and an umbrella, and is therefore unfit to continue in that exalted position, so, too, a man is unworthy of a residence in the moon who has only a small balance of merit remaining to his credit! Here is this unique reply in S'ankara's own words:—"ननु निरवशेषकर्मफलोपभोगाय चन्द्रमण्डलमारूढाः । बाढम् । तथापि स्वल्पकर्मावशेषमात्रेण तत्रावस्थातुं न लभ्यते । यथा किल कश्चित्सेवकः सकलैः सेवोपकरणै राजकुलमुपसृप्तश्चिरप्रवासात्परिक्षीणबहूपकरणशृङ्खलापादुकादिमात्रावशेषो न राजकुलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोति । एवमनुशयमात्रपरिग्रहो न चन्द्रमण्डलेऽवस्थातुं शक्नोतीति."

This is a portion of the system which is regarded as the highest flight of the Indian mind, and to which some restless folk in Europe and America are betaking themselves, in order to find rest for their souls! There are not a few in India to-day, however, who have found that rest by turning from these gropings in the dark, to the midday light afforded by an accredited revelation.

भूमिरथिकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the man who* [in order to become proficient] *makes drawings of a war-chariot on the ground.* This nyâya is found in S'abara's bhâshya on Jaimini 7. 2. 15, and again (in conjunction with शुष्केष्टिन्याय) in 9. 2. 13. The latter passage is as follows:—"यत्तावदुपाध्यायः शिष्यसन्निधावधीते तद्ग्रहणार्थम् । यच्छिष्यस्तद्धारणार्थम् । ग्रहणधारणे प्रयोगार्थे भूमिरथिकवत् शुष्केष्टिवद्वा । तद्यथा भूमिरथिको भूमौ रथमालिख्य शिक्षां करोति संग्रामे प्राशुभावो भवितेति यथा च छात्रः शुष्केष्टीः प्रयुक्ते प्रयोगे प्राशुकर्मा भवितासीति एवमेतद्द्रष्टव्यम्" ॥

In his *Lankikanyâyaratnâkara* (page 186 b of India Office MS. 582) Raghunâthavarman applies these two nyâyas and the शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्याय as follows:—"परमतनिराकरणं च शिष्याणामभ्यासदार्ढ्येनासंभावनादिसमुच्छेदाय न तु परद्वेषेणेति विवक्षायां भूमिरथिकन्यायः शुष्केष्टिन्यायः शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायश्च प्रवर्तते" ॥ His explanations of the three are taken from *Jaiminînyanyâyamâlâvistara* 9. 1. 6 and 9. 2. 2.

अष्टावसरन्यायः ॥

The maxim that [something does not take place] *when the occasion* [for its taking place] *has once gone*. This is Professor Kielhorn's rendering of the nyâya as it occurs in Nâgojibhatta's *paribhâṣā* lxiv. The sentence is as follows—"अत एव निर्देशाद्वावसरन्यायस्यात्र शास्त्रे नाश्रयणम् । ध्वनितं चेदमिको गुण इति सूत्रे भाष्य इति भाष्यप्रदीपोद्घोते निरूपितम्" ॥

There is an instance of it in *Tantravārtika*, 3. 5. 46 (page 1060) :—"यदपि यजमानस्य अष्टावसरं क्रियमाणं विगुणं भवतीति तदपि गुणलोपे मुख्यस्येत्यनेन विरुद्धम्." The nyâya is expressive of a *lost opportunity*.

मक्षिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the bees*. Used to illustrate the many following their leader, as bees follow their queen (in Sanskrit, *king*). The oldest example of the simile is found in *Pras'na Upanishad* ii. 4 :—"तद्यथा मक्षिका मधुकरराजानमुत्क्रामन्तं सर्वा एवोत्क्रामन्ते तस्मिंश्च प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्वा एव प्रातिष्ठन्त एव वाङ्मनश्चक्षुःश्रोत्रं च ते प्रीताः प्राणं स्तुन्वन्ति." I have met with it also in the last part of *Sārvadars'anasaṅgraha* :—"यदा चित्तं निरुध्यते तदा चक्षुरादीनां निरोधे प्रयत्नान्तरं नापेक्षणीयम् । यथा मधुकरराजं मधुमक्षिका अनुवर्तन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि चित्तमिति."

Raghunātha includes this nyâya in both his works, but, so far as I can discover, does not explain it.

मज्जनोन्मज्जनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the sinking and rising* [of one who has fallen into deep water]. Applied to the pitiable condition of one who, in the ocean of existences, is without the knowledge of Brahman. It occurs in *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 6. 6. 46-7 :—

“जरामरणमभ्येति मूढस्यैव पुनः पुनः ।

जगज्जीर्णारघटेऽस्मिन्नज्जवा संसृतिरूपया ॥

मञ्जनोन्मज्जनैरज्ञो यन्ने कलशतां गतः ।

यदेव गोष्पदापूरं ज्ञधियः पेलवं जगत् ॥

The comment on the above is the following :—“आरवटे यन्ने घटीयन्ने । गोष्पदमापूरयतीति गोष्पदापूरम् अल्पजलप्रायमित्यर्थः” ॥ Here, the man who is ignorant of Brahman is likened to the pots attached to a water-wheel, which alternately rise and fall in the water of a well!

मदशक्तिवत् ॥

The simile of *the power of an intoxicant*. It is employed by S'ankara in his bhâsya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 3. 53 :—“अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहुः” ॥ Ânandagiri comments on the latter part thus :—“मदेति । यथैकैकस्मात्ताम्बूलादेरदृष्टापि मदशक्तिः संघाते दृश्यते तथेदं ज्ञानमेकैकस्मिन्नदृष्टमपि देहाकारपरिणतभूतेषु संघतेषु भवतीति चाहुरिति योजना.”

The illustration is found also in *Nyâyamanjarî* (page 439, line 4 from bottom) :—“यत्तु मदशक्तिवदित्युक्तं तत्र मदशक्तेर्दृष्टत्वादभ्युपगमो न तु ज्ञानस्य तत्र दर्शनम्.”

मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं नानुपश्यसि ॥

O foolish one! thou seest the honey but dost not see the precipice. This is the second line of *S'ântiparva* cccxi. 7. (cccx Bombay edn.), the first being “स्वादुकामुककामानां वैतृण्यं किं न गच्छसि.” Ânandabodhâcârya quotes it in his *Nyâyamakaranda* (page 77) as “मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे प्रपातं किं न पश्यसि.” The editor of that work was apparently unaware of the existence of the passage in the *Mokṣadharma*, for he considered the *आभाणक* to be based on the following verse of the *Devîbhâgavata* :—“मधु पश्यति मूढात्मा प्रपातं नैव पश्यति । करोति निन्दितं कर्म नरकान्न बिभेति च.”

Thanks to the St. Petersburg Lexicon, we can refer to five other passages of the Mahâbhârat where the same illustration is found. In *Vanaparva* cxxxv. 21 (Calc.), we read:—“मधु प्रपश्यन्ति न तु प्रपातं यद्यूतमालंब्य हरन्ति राज्यम्.” In *Udyogaparva* L. 27:—“विषमं नावमन्यन्ते प्रपातं मधुदर्शिनः । संयुगं ये गमिष्यन्ति नररूपेण मृत्युना.” In *Dronaparva* LI. 11:—“न लुब्धो बुध्यते दोषान्मोहाल्लोभात्प्रवर्तते । मधुलिप्सुर्हि नापश्यं प्रपातमहमीदृशम्.” Again in cxxxiii. 10:—“धनं धनेश्वरस्येव हत्वा पार्थस्य मे सुतः । मधुप्रेप्सुरिवा-
बुद्धिः प्रपातं नावबुध्यते.” Lastly, in *Strîparva* i. 37:—“मधु यः केवलं दृष्ट्वा प्रपातं नानुपश्यति । स अष्टो मधुलोभेन शोचत्येवं यथा भवान्.” We, in this enlightened age, may well ponder these wise sayings; for infatuated humanity still rushes headlong after evil disguised as good. “There is a way that seemeth right to a man, but the end thereof is . . death.”

मध्येऽपवादाः पूर्वान्विधीन्वाधन्ते नोत्तरान् ॥

In the *Paribhâṣendus'ekkhara*, this paribhâṣâ stands between *पुरस्तादपवादाः* &c., and *अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा* &c., which see above. Professor Kielhorn's translation of the present one is as follows:—“*Apavâdas* that are surrounded (by rules which teach operations that have to be superseded by the *Apavâda*-operations), supersede only those rules that precede, not those that follow, them.” “The reason for (the validity of) this Paribhâṣâ is this that (an *Apavâda*, when it has become effective) by superseding the rule which presents itself first, no longer wants (to supersede something else).” It appears in *Mahâbhâṣya* 3. 2. 1. (vârt. 6); 4. 1. 55 (vârt. 4); 4. 1. 114 (vârt. 4. and 6); 4. 3. 132 (vârt. 6); 4. 3. 156 (vârt. 7); 6. 1. 102 (vârt. 6); 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vârt. 5); 6. 4. 148 (vârt. 5); and 7. 2. 44 (vârt. 4). In no case, however, are the words नोत्तरान् found in the paribhâṣâ.

मन्दविषन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *slow-poison*. It forms maxim 150 of the *pûrvabhâga* of *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara*, and is used in opposition to तीव्रविषन्याय as follows:—“एवं हि संशयादिनिवृत्तिर्मन्द-विषन्यायेन सुकरा । बोधादाढ्ये प्रतिवाद्यापादितं तु संशयादि तीव्रविषन्यायेन दुष्परिहरं स्यात् । सद्योभुक्तं विषं मन्दमन्यथा तीव्रम्.” It occurs in *Sâstradîpikâ* 1. 3. 4 (page 148, line 2 from bottom):—“इत्थं च संभवति ग्रामाण्ये नाग्रामाण्यं युक्तमिति भवति केषांचिदाकांक्षा सापि मन्द-विषन्यायेन निराकर्तव्येत्येवमर्थमिदमधिकरणम्.”

महतापि प्रयत्नेन तमिस्रायां परामृशन् । कृष्णशुक्ल-
विवेकं हि न कश्चिदधिगच्छति ॥

Not even by the most thorough examination, could one distinguish between black and white, in intense darkness. The verse is Kumârila's, and is used by him (in *Tantravârtika* 1. 3. 1) to illustrate the impossibility of tracing the sources from which Manu and other Smṛiti-authors derived their laws. Just before the s'loka he says:—“न च तद्विज्ञायते कीदृशाद्वाक्यादिदं मन्वादिभिः प्रतिपन्नं किं विधिपरादुत्तार्थवादरूपादिति.” Then, immediately after the verse:—“न च मन्वादिवचनाद्वेदमूलत्वं निश्चिनुमः.” This latter clause, as the *Nyâyasudhâ* points out, is with reference to Manu's own statement, in chapter ii. 7, to the effect that every precept of his was deduced from the Veda.

य एव करोति स एव भुङ्क्ते ॥

He who performs an action will himself reap the fruit thereof [whether in the form of reward or retribution]. This doctrine, common to all the orthodox schools, is found in *Nyâya-vârtika* 3. 1. 4, and is directed against the belief that the body is the soul, and that when the body is cremated, the man, with all his deeds, ceases to exist. The emphasis, therefore, here is not so much on the fact that *whatsoever* a man soweth that shall he also reap, as that *whosoever* soweth the same shall also

reap. This, of course, implies that the reaper will be *conscious* of the fact that he was the sower, for otherwise the precept would be of no moral value. It is difficult to see how any one can hold with the above, and at the same time be a believer in the doctrine of transmigration; the advocates of which are compelled to admit that the subjects of those repeated births have absolutely *no consciousness* of previous existences. I am not unmindful of the fact that the followers of the Yoga system [sūtra iii. 16] profess to attain to a knowledge of the past and the future by means of संयम (that is, by धारणा, ध्यान, and समाधि collectively); but, even if that were so, would it affect as many as one out of every quarter-million of the population ?

यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निबध्यते ॥

That for which there is no room on a camel's back is tied to his neck! Illustrates the piling up of misfortunes almost beyond endurance. Perhaps akin to our "It is the last straw which breaks the camel's back." It occurs in *Upamitibhava-prapanca Kathā*, page 394:—"मया चिन्तितम् । अहो हता दैवेन वयं मन्दभाग्याः । तदिदमाभाणकमायातम् । यदुत यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति तत्कण्ठे निबध्यत इति । तथाहि वैश्वानरपापमित्रयोगेणैव कुमारस्य गादमुद्वेजिता वयं यावतेयमपरा कृत्येवास्य भार्या सम्पन्नेति." Kṛityā is a female deity who is invoked for evil purposes.

यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणाः ॥

Where there is a good outward appearance, there also are good qualities. This is found in Hemacandra's *Paṇḍita-parvan* iii. 233:—"अस्याकृत्यनुसारेण गुणानपि हि निश्चिनु । यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा इति लोकेऽपि गीयते." It is contained also in verse 5076 of *Indische Sprüche*, but whether as a quotation or not, I cannot say:—"यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणा वसन्ति नैतद्धि सम्यक्कविभिः प्रणीतम् । येनातिचार्वङ्ग्यपि मे हृदिस्था दुनोति गात्रं विरहे प्रियासौ." Professor Böhtlingk took it from Kosegarten's edition of the *Pancatantra* (i. 208), but I cannot find it in the Bombay edition. Some work on शृङ्गाररस is a much more probable source.

यद्गृहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते ॥

That on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the nyâya as it appears in the Aulukya chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 126, Jivânanda's edn.):—"न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद्रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येषितव्यं । यद्गृहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षते इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहे आलोकापेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावत्वं." "And you need not assert that this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour [i. e. light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark], as we see in the case of a jar's absence; because, by the very rule on which you rely, namely, that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence."

यववराहाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

In Ânandagiri on *Brahmasûtrabhâsya* 2. 3. 45 we read:—"यववराहाधिकरणन्यायेन लोकप्रसिद्धिः शास्त्रीयप्रसिद्ध्या बाध्येत्याह." There is no *adhikarâṇa* of this name in *Mīmāṃsâ* or *Vedânta*, but the reference is probably to the शास्त्रप्रसिद्धार्थप्रामाण्याधिकरण, otherwise styled the आर्यम्लेच्छाधिकरण, which comprises Jaimini's sûtras 1. 3. 8 and 9, where the words यव, वराह, and others having a double meaning, are discussed. These two sûtras are quoted by S'ankara on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 4. 42, and explained by Ânandagiri. The matter is well put in Colebrooke's *Essay on Mīmāṃsâ* (page 339):—"A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the *Mīmāṃsâ*, on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in

Sanskrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu*; *varâha*, in the one a hog, and in the other a cow [or, rather, a crow]; *pîlu*, a certain tree, but among barbarians an elephant; *vetasa*, a rattan cane and a citron [or, rose-apple, *jambu*]. The *Mīmāṃsâ* concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*Âryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mlechha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings." The above is of importance to students of *Vedânta*; for, in addition to the passages named above, it is discussed in *Bhâmati* 3. 3. 52, and enlarged upon in *Vedântakalpataru*, pages 461, 462. The brief allusion, too, to the same thing, in *Bhâmati* 1. 3. 22, in the words:—"न हि गावो वराहमनुधावन्तीति कृष्णविहङ्गा-नुधावनमुपपद्यते गवामपि तु तादृशसूकरानुधावनम्," is quite unintelligible alone. See, too, *Nyâyamanjari*, page 288, line 26.

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवति ॥

When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone. This is Professor Cowell's rendering of the *nyâya* as it occurs in the Pāṇini chapter of *Sarvadar'sanasangraha* (page 142, Bib. Ind., and 161 *Jivânanda*). The real origin of the *nyâya* must be the words "यश्चोभयोर्दोषो नासावेकस्य वाच्यः," which are found in S'abara's *bhâṣya* 8. 3. 14; but Mâdhava may have deduced it immediately from the well-known verse:—"यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि तादृशः । नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे." It appears in this form in Aniruddha's comment on *Sāṅkhyasûtra* i. 6; but in *Tarkabhâṣâ*, page 88, and in *Laukikanyâdyasangraha*, page 64 (Benares edition), the reading of the second pāda is "परिहारोऽपि वा समः". The first part of the verse is quoted in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhâdyâ*, page 531, and ascribed to Bhaṭṭa. This is doubtless Kumârila, but I have not found the verse in the *S'loka-vârtika*, or in the published portion of the *Tantravârtika*. I was in hopes that it might be discovered in the *vârtika* on Book eight;

but on examining a manuscript in the India Office Library, I failed to find it there. The nearest approach to it is the second line of a verse on page 947 of *Tantravârtika*, namely “न चोभया-
श्रयं दोषमेकश्चोद्यो विचारयेत्.” See, too, *Nyâyamanjari* 95.

यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुत्रस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते ॥

Toys are not made for the son of a man who has no son!
This is used by S'abara to illustrate Jaimini's sūtra 10. 3. 5—
“न चाङ्गविधिरनङ्गे स्यात्.” He says:—“न ह्यनङ्गे कर्मण्यङ्गस्य विशेष-
विधिः स्यात् । भवति च विशेषविधिः ‘आश्ववालः प्रस्तर’ इति । न ह्यसति प्रस्तरे
प्रस्तरविशेषः शिष्येत यथा यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते.”

यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वम् ॥

He who is bent on destroying another must be stronger than he. This is contained in an extract (given by Prof. Kielhorn) from Bhairavamisra's comment on Nāgajī Bhaṭṭa's paribhāṣā cxii, namely निषेधाश्च बलीयांसः (=प्रतिषेधाश्च बलीयांसो भवन्ति of Patanjali 1. 1. 63, vârtika 6), which runs thus:—“इयं च परि-
भाषा लोकसिद्धन्यायमूलिकेत्याह । विध्युन्मूलनायेति । प्राप्तस्य विधेर्निवर्तनाये-
त्यर्थः । एतेन येन नाप्राप्तन्यायेन विधिशास्त्रस्य निषेधशास्त्रेण बाध इति दर्शि-
तम् । लोकेऽपि यस्योन्मूलनाय यस्य प्रसक्तिर्भवति ततस्तस्य बलवत्त्वं कंसा-
त्कृष्णस्येव.” The example given here, of one of superior might overcoming a less mighty one, is that of Kṛiṣṇa and the demon Kansa. The death of the latter is described in Vishṇu-Purāṇa, Book V, chapter xx. Those who are familiar with the English Bible will call to mind the words “When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.” The ‘strong man,’ here, is the Prince of this world—“that old Serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world”—his ‘goods’ are human

souls and bodies; the 'stronger than he' is Christ, the Prince of Peace,—to whom has been given the commission "to bring out the prisoners from the prison."

येन नाप्राप्ते यो विधिरारभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति ॥

Here is another of Raghunâtha's grammatical nyâyas. It forms paribhâṣâ 57 in Nâgojîbhaṭṭa's work, and is rendered by Professor Kielhorn as follows:—"A rule which is given (in reference to a particular case or particular cases) to which another (rule) *cannot but apply* (or, in other words, which all fall already under some other rule), supersedes the latter." "The meaning of the words येन नाप्राप्ते is 'while another rule is *necessarily* applying,' for the two negatives (न and अ) import more force to the word (प्राप्ते, than this word would possess without them)." The Professor adds the following in a footnote:—"This paribhâṣâ teaches us the meaning of the term *apavâda*, and in doing so tells us the reason why an *apavâda* possesses greater force than *antaranga* and other rules. An *apavâda* is a *special* rule; it is given in reference to particular cases which all fall under some *general* rule (*utsarga*); as it is not applicable in any case which does *not* fall under the general rule, it must necessarily supersede the latter, because it would otherwise not serve any purpose whatever." Under this paribhâṣâ Nâgojî introduces and discusses the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय, namely "ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय." The paribhâṣâ is found in the following passages of the *Mahâbhâṣya*:—1. 1. 6. (vârt. 1.); 1. 1. 28; 3. 4. 85 (vârt. 2); 6. 1. 2 (vârt. 4), where the तक्रकौण्डिन्यन्याय is brought in; 6. 1. 166; 6. 3. 68 (vârt. 5); 6. 4. 163 (vârt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य again; 7. 2. 44 (vârt. 4); 7. 2. 117 (vârt. 2), with तक्रकौण्डिन्य; 8. 2. 23 (vârt. 5); 8. 2. 72; and 8. 3. 112.

रथकारन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Rathakâra*. There is a Vedic text which says, "In the rainy season a Rathakâra ought to establish a

sacred fire." The question then arises, what is meant by the word Rathakâra? Does it mean a chariot-maker, or a member of the mixed caste produced by the marriage of a Mâhiṣya (the offspring of a Kshatriya and a Vais'ya-woman) with a Karani (the offspring of a Vais'ya and a S'ûdra-woman), which is called Rathakâra? The question is discussed in Jaimini 6. 1. 44-50, and is decided in favor of the latter. The discussion is thus summarized in *Jaimintyanîyânyâyamâlâvistara*:—"आधाने श्रूयते । वर्षासु रथकार आदधीतेति । तत्र रथं करोतीति व्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिको रथकार इति चेत् । नैवम् । संस्कीर्णजातिविशेषे रूढत्वात् । वैश्यायां क्षत्रियादुत्पन्नो माहिष्यः । शूद्रायां वैश्यादुत्पन्ना करणी । तस्यां करण्यां माहिष्यादुत्पन्नो रथकारः । तथा च याज्ञवल्क्यः । 'माहिष्येण करण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायत' इति । तस्य च रथकारस्याधानकालो वर्षर्तुः" ॥

The nyâya is quoted by Nâgojibhaṭṭa in his *vṛitti* on the ninety-eighth paribhâṣâ (अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी), which Prof. Kielhorn renders thus:—"The (conventional) meaning which a word conveys when taken as a whole, is stronger than the (etymological) meaning derived from (a division of the word into) its parts." In other words, रूढिर्योगमपहरति, which Raghunâtha exemplifies by this word Rathakâra. The vidhi on which this is based is quoted in full in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 140, line 3.

रात्रिसन्न्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *night-sacrifice*. This is the topic of Jaimini 4. 3. 17-19, and is largely used by writers on Vedânta as a type of scripture-passage conveying no direct promise of reward, and therefore dependent on an arthavâda-passage for such promise. Though S'ankara does not mention this nyâya in his bhâṣya on *Brahmasûtra* 3. 3. 38, it is evident that he has it in view, and Ânandagiri, and Amalânanda (in the *Kalpataṛu*), expressly connect his remarks with it. So also the *Kalpataṛuparimala*. The last-mentioned work quotes the maxim again on page 255 (in connection with *Brahmasûtra* 1. 2. 24):—"तथा सर्वपापप्रदाहोऽपि

ब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रश्नोत्तराभ्यां प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादयिषिततयोपक्रान्तस्योपासनस्य फला-
कांक्षया रात्रिसन्न्यायेनार्थवादिकफलविपरिणामे कर्तव्ये प्रधानार्थवाद इवाङ्गार्थ-
वादे श्रुतस्यापि फलस्य ग्रहणौचित्यात्.”

The nyāya is found also in *Pancapādikāvivarana*, page 122, line 8 from bottom, and again on page 134, line 9 from the bottom. The latter passage is as follows:—“ननु रात्रिसन्न्यायेनार्थ-
वादगतमेव मोक्षं ब्रह्मज्ञानं वा प्रयोजनं साध्यत्वेन परिणमस्य मोक्षकामो ब्रह्म-
ज्ञानकामो वा विचारयेत् &c.” See, too, *S'ālikā*, p. 7 and 157.

राधा वेधोपमा ॥

The simile of *piercing the central figure of a target*. That is, hitting the bull's eye. It is used of something difficult of accomplishment, and requiring great skill. “In Prākṛit the *rādhā* is generally called *puttaliyā*, literally ‘a little figure’, as apparently a little human figure was painted in the middle of the butt.” This note, contributed by Professor Leumann to Mr. Tawney's translation of Merutunga's work, is probably a correct explanation of the word राधा, rather than the dictionary meaning, “an attitude in shooting.” The illustration appears on pages 412, 420, and 434 of *Upamitibhavaprapançā Kathā*, as follows:—“सा चेयती भवेत्कस्य सामग्रीयं सुदुर्लभा । राधावेधोपमानेन धर्म-
प्राप्तिः प्रकीर्तिता ” ॥ “एनं संसारविस्तरं विलंघ्य कथमप्यदः । मानुष्यं प्राप्य
दुष्प्रापं राधावेधोपमं जनः” ॥ “भो भव्याः प्रविहाय मोहललितं युष्माभिरा-
कर्ण्यतामेकान्तेन हितं मदीयवचनं कृत्वा विशुद्धं मनः । राधावेधसमं कथंचिदतुलं
लब्ध्वापि मानुष्यकं हिंसाक्रोधवशानुगैरिदमहो जीवैः पुरा हारितम्.”

The above meaning of *rādhā* fully explains the epithet *rādhābhedin* as applied to the renowned archer Arjuna.

रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसम्पदः सम्पन्नाः ॥

On acquiring the mountain Rohana [Adam's Peak] one acquires the wealth of gems contained in it. This occurs in the Pratyabhijnâ-section of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*, page 106

(of Jivānanda's edn.):—"परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः सम्पदस्तन्निव्यन्द-
मय्यः सम्पन्ना एव रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसंपद इव । एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किम-
न्यत्प्रार्थनीयम् । तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः । 'भक्तिरक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचि-
तम् । एनया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदुपयाचितमिति.' " Professor Gough
renders it thus:—"For when the nature of the Supreme Being
is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are
overtaken; as if a man acquired the mountain Rohana (Adam's
Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man
acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask
for? Accordingly Utpalācārya says—'What more can they
ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion? What else can
they ask who are poor in this?'"

This is noble sentiment, and should awaken a responsive echo
in the heart of a follower of Christ; for, in receiving Him, he
has received one in whom are "all the treasures of wisdom and
knowledge hidden,"—in whom "dwelleth all the fulness of the
Godhead bodily."

वटे यक्षन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *Yakṣa* in a *Banyan tree*. The popular be-
lief, based solely on the tradition of the fathers, that a *Yakṣa*,
or goblin, lives in every *Banyan tree*. It is used as an illustra-
tion of ऐतिह्य ('tradition'), which some regard as a *pramāṇa*, but
which Gautama rejects as such. See *Nyāyasūtra* 2. 2. 1. The
Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa expounds the term thus:—"ऐतिह्यमिह वृक्षे
यक्षः प्रतिवसतीति लोकप्रसिद्धिः । तत्र मूलवक्रनिर्देशेनासौक्तवानिश्चयेन तादृश-
निश्चयस्य शब्दबोधहेतुतया नास्य शब्दप्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावः" ॥ This is the
position of the objector who maintains that tradition is a dis-
tinct *pramāṇa*; the refutation is contained in *sūtra* 2. In
Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of Nyāya Philosophy*, Book ii, page
66, we have the following rendering of a portion of the *Nyāya-
sūtravṛtti*:—"A rumour (*aitihya*) is what is expressed in this
way—'thus indeed people say' &c. for it is an assertion which
has come from one to another, without any first assertor being
indicated;—for example, 'In every Bengal fig-tree there is a

goblin,' and the like." In a foot-note to page 329 of Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol i, Professor Cowell gives to *aitihya* the meaning of "fallible testimony (as opposed to infallible *s'ruti*)", whilst Colebrooke himself, on page 427, renders it by 'tradition.' In *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 194, the *nyāya* is applied in the following way by the disbeliever in the existence of God:—"न च प्रसिद्धि-मात्रेण युक्तमेतस्य कल्पनम् । निर्मूलत्वात्तथा चोक्तं प्रसिद्धिर्वैयक्षवत्." And, at the top of page 64, there is the following, forming the second half of a verse:—

“ऐतिह्यं तु न सत्यमत्र हि वटे यक्षोऽस्ति वा नेति वा
को जानाति कदा च केन कलितं यक्षस्य कीदृग्वपुः” ॥

In '*S'lokaṇṭarīka* (page 492) we read “जगति बहु न तथ्यं नित्य-मैतिह्यमुक्तं भवति तु यदि सत्यं नागमाद्विद्यते तत्” which Mr. Gangā-nātha Jhā renders by “Much of what is known in the world as ‘Tradition’ is not always true; and whatever happens to be true that does not differ from ‘Valid Testimony.’” Pārtha-sārathi's comment on this is—“पुरुषवचनपरंपरा ऐतिह्यं वटे वटे वैश्रवण इत्यादि । तच्चानिर्णायकत्वात्प्रमाणमेव न भवति । तद्भवेऽप्यागमान्तर्भावात्.” See, too, *Tārīkarakṣā*. page 117.

वर्चोन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *glory* [or splendour]. This forms the topic of Jaimini 3. 8. 25-27. The point discussed is whether in using the mantra “ममाग्ने वर्चो विहवेष्वास्तु,” “Fire! let there be glory for me in the offerings”, the officiating priest (at the new and full moon sacrifices) is to enjoy the fruit, or whether it falls to the sacrificer. The *pūrvapakṣin* holds the former view, but the decision is that it goes to the latter. In this *adhikaraṇa* there is mention of *karana-mantras*, but the term is not explained. Kunte says that a *karana-mantra* is that which regulates sacrificial operations; and that one which is merely chanted in the course of a sacrificial operation is called *akarma-karana-mantra*.

विभक्तधनेषु भ्रातृषु विभक्ता भ्रातरः ॥

When brothers divide wealth they themselves become divided. This is assumed as a matter of course,—as something which goes without saying! The *Vedāntakalpataru* explains as follows a passage in *Bhāmati* 3. 3. 26:—“अवधूत इत्यादौ त्यागे धुनोते: प्रयोगदर्शनादित्यर्थः । अश्चो यथा जीर्णानि रोमाणि विधुनुते त्यजत्येवं पापं विधूय यथा चन्द्रो राहोर्मुखात्प्रमुच्य भास्वरो भवत्येवं धृत्वा शरीरं स्वच्छो भूत्वा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामि प्राप्नोमीत्यन्वयः” ॥ On this, the *Vedānta-kalpataruparimāla* (page 589) comments thus:—“अवधूतेति । लोके त्यक्तसकलकर्माणमवधूतमाहुस्तत्र धूननस्य त्यागार्थत्वं प्रसिद्धमित्यर्थः । यद्यप्यवधूतशब्दस्योक्तार्थपरतायामवधूतकर्मेति प्रयोक्तव्यं तथापि विभक्तधनेषु भ्रातृषु विभक्ता भ्रातर इतिवद्गम्यमानत्वादुत्तरपदस्याप्रयोगः” ॥

विलूननासिकस्यादर्शदर्शनम् ॥

Showing a looking-glass to a man whose nose has been cut off! An incitement to wrath! It occurs in Prabandhacintāmani, page 291, as follows:—“प्रायः सम्प्रतिकोपाय सन्मार्गस्योपदेशनम् । विलूननासिकस्येव यद्वादादर्शदर्शनम्.” “As a general rule, pointing out the right way leads to immediate wrath, as the showing of a mirror to one whose nose has been cut off.” This is Mr. Tawney’s rendering, and I have adopted the reading of his manuscripts in the first line. In the second line, the Mss. read विशुद्धादर्शदर्शनम्.

विश्वजिज्ञ्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Vis’vajit-sacrifice*. It forms part of the great sacrifice called *Gavām ayana* which lasts for a year; for a description of which see Dr. Eggeling’s translation of *S’atapatha-Brahmana*, vol. 2, page 427. The *Vis’vajit* is discussed in Jaimini 4. 3. 10-16, and 6. 7. 1-20. In the former, the question is raised of the reward which is to follow the offering of the sacrifice, since none is mentioned in the scripture prescrib-

ing it; and the decision is that in this, and in all similar cases, heaven is to be understood to be the reward. This is somewhat quaintly put by S'abara under sūtra 16:—"अनादिष्टफले कर्मणि स्वर्गः फलम् । इति प्रत्ययो लोके । एवमुच्यते । आरामकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्गः । तडागकृद्देवदत्तो नियतोऽस्य स्वर्ग इति । इत्थमनेन न्यायेन स्वर्गे संप्रत्ययो भवति यस्मात्स्वर्गफलेषु कर्मसु कर्तव्येषु फलवचनं नैवोच्चारयन्ति गम्यत एवेति । तस्मादप्यवगच्छाम एवंजातीयकेषु स्वर्गः फलमिति." The offerer of the Vis'vajit is required to surrender all his property to the sacrificing priests, a point which gives rise to a very curious discussion in the Sixth Book. Is he then to give away his father and mother; or, if a reigning monarch, is he to part with all the lands of his kingdom? These and many other interesting points are fully argued out by S'abara; and, for some of them, the English reader may with advantage refer to Colebrooke's Essay on the Mīmāṃsā, vol. i., page 345.

This nyāya is very frequently quoted by writers on Vedānta and Nyāya. The following are examples. *Bhāmati*, page 86:—"न च ब्रह्मभूयादन्यदमृतत्वमार्थवादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति येन तत्काम उपासनायामधिक्रियेत, विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन तु स्वर्गकल्पनायां तस्य सातिशयत्वं क्षयित्वं चेति न नित्यफलत्वमुपासनायाः" । *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 430:—"सन्निहितकरणोपकारे संभवति न विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन स्वर्गकल्पना नापि दर्शपूर्णमासफलस्वर्गस्यानुषङ्गः" । See, too, *Pancapādikāvivarana*, pages 134 (line 9), 137 (line 13), and 164 (line 6 from bottom). *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 524, line 13 from bottom:—"परप्रकरणपरिपठन-विरहाच्च नास्य संपदादिविधिवत्प्रधानाधिकारनिवेशित्वमतो विश्वजिदधिकरण-न्यायेन स्वर्गकाममधिकारिणमिह यावदुपात्तमध्यवसामस्तावदेव च न पुनरावर्तते &c." There is another good example of it in the early part of the Jaimini chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha*.

विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम् ॥

A bowl of poison with milk on the surface. A wolf in sheep's clothing. The illustration is found in Merutunga's work

the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 153:—“परोक्षे कार्यहन्तारं प्रत्यक्षे प्रियवादिनम् । वज्रयेत्तादृशं मित्रं विषकुंभं पयोमुखम्.” “The friend who behind one’s back tries to impede one’s business, but in one’s presence speaks kindly, such a friend one should avoid, a bowl of poison with milk on the surface.” This is Mr. Tawney’s rendering (on page 92), and he points out in a footnote that the verse is quoted in Böhlingk’s *Indische Sprüche*, and ascribed by him to Cāṇakya.

व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिः ॥

This highly technical *nyāya* is found in both of Raghunātha-varman’s works. I have taken it from a passage in the *Bauddha* section of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (page 11 in Jivānanda’s edition), and subjoin Professor Gough’s rendering (italicizing the words which represent the maxim):—“तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादि-क्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यम् । यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरपटलम् । सन्तश्चामी भावा इति । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादि-क्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिन्यायेन व्यापकक्रमा-क्रमव्यावृत्तावक्षणीकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च.”

“Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth, is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever *is* is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things *are*. Nor may any one object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that *exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained*.” In *S’ālikā* page 119, line 14, we find the *nyāya* as “व्यापकनिवृत्तिर्हि व्याप्यनिवृत्त्या व्याप्ता”, and, on page 67, line 2 “व्यापकाभावे व्याप्यं नास्ति.”

शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of, *the movements of a bird-catcher*. It is found in S'abara on Jaimini 9. 1. 22, as follows:—"यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य शकुनिं जिघृक्षतश्चञ्चना गतिर्भवति शनैः पदन्यासो दृष्टिप्रणिधानमशब्दकरणञ्च कथमनवबुद्धः शकुनिर्गृह्येतेति एवमिहाप्यनवबुद्धमिव ग्रहीतुं यज्ञं प्रच्छन्नगति-रुपांशुत्वं नाम । यथा शकुनिग्राहकस्य यस्मिन्देशे शनैः पदन्यासो न स तद्देशा-र्थोऽपि तु तद्देशाभिगतस्य शकुनेरर्थेन क्रियत एवमिहाप्युपांशुत्वं न तद्देशानां पदार्थानामर्थेन क्रियते तद्देशाभिगतस्य यज्ञस्यार्थेन गम्यते" ॥ See also भूमिरथिकन्याय.

शंखन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the time for sounding] *the conch-shell*. An offering called उपांशुयाज, or 'low-voiced offering', is performed *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Agni-Soma at the full-moon, and *between* the cake-oblation to Agni and that to Indra-Agni at the new-moon (Dr. Eggeling's trans: of S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa, vol. i. page 192). Sometimes, however, the second oblation is omitted; and then the question arises how is the Upâms'uyāja to be offered, since that comes *between* the two? The subject is discussed in Jaimini 10. 8. 62-70, and the above question is answered by S'abara as follows:—"यो हि द्वयोः पुरोडाशयोर्मध्य इति कालोऽवगम्यते स एव पूर्वस्मादुत्तर इति । एवं चेद्वद्यप्येकपुरोडाशयां द्वौ पुरोडाशौ न स्तस्तथापि स पूर्व आग्नेयोऽस्ति तस्मादुत्तरः स एव कालो योऽसावन्तरालेन लक्षितः । यथा 'नागवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यं,' 'पटहवेलायामागन्तव्यं' इति यस्मिन् ग्रामे न नागा न शंखा न पटहस्तस्मिन्नपि स एव कालस्तत्र ह्यागमनं क्रियते । एवमिहापि दृष्टव्यम् । तस्मादेकपुरोडाशायामुपांशुयाजः कर्तव्य इति."

The maxim might well be called शंखध्वनिवेलायान्याय, but I have adopted the name given in the Nyāyamâlāvistara on this *adhi-karana*, which also explains it more fully:—"शंखन्यायेनोपलक्षक-स्याग्नीषोमीयपुरोडाशस्यैवाभावेऽप्युपलक्ष्ये काले यागोऽस्ति । यथा शंखध्वनि-वेलायां राजसेवार्थं प्रतिदिनमागन्तव्यमित्युक्ते कस्मिंश्चिद्दिने तं शंखं धमतः

पुरुषस्याभावेनोपलक्षकस्य ध्वनेरभावेऽप्युपलक्षिते तस्मिन्काले सेवकाः समागच्छन्ति तथात्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्.”

This is very clear, but what is the meaning of नागवेला? To be in harmony with the rest of the sentence it ought to indicate something which, like the sounding of the *s'ankha* or the beating of the *pataha*, takes place regularly every day; but how can any such sense be got out of *nāga*? The *S'āstradīpikā*, *Nyāyamālāvistara*, and *Jaiminīyasūtravṛtti* ignore the expression altogether.

In Appai Dikṣita's *Vidhīrasāyana*, page 22, we have an instance of the शंखन्याय as follows:— “उपलक्षणापायेऽप्युपलक्ष्यानपायस्य प्रतिदिनं शंखवेलायामागन्तव्यमित्यादौ प्रसिद्धत्वात् । न हि कालविशेषोपलक्षणतयोपात्ते शंखध्वनौ कचिद्विचसे दैवादकृते सति तदुपलक्षितः कालो नास्तीति नावगम्यते.”

शलभन्यायः ॥

The illustration of *the moth*. The destruction of the silly moth by flying into a lighted lamp is a figure often met with in Sanskrit works; as for example in *S'is'upālavadhā* ii. 117, *Kumārasambhava* iv. 40, *Rājataranginī* vii. 375. According to Merutunga, however, the poor moth is moved with envy at the brilliance of the light, and so seeks to diminish it! He says (on page 211, at the bottom):—“उज्ज्वलगुणमभ्युदितं क्षुद्रो द्रष्टुं न कथमपि क्षमते । दग्ध्वा तनुमपि शलभो दीपं दीपार्चिषं हरति.” “The mean man cannot anyhow endure to behold the exaltation of the man of radiant merit; the moth even burns its own body to extinguish the bright flame of the candle.” (Tawney's translation, page 130).

शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयः ॥

When the [prescribed] ritual [for the removal or prevention of evil] is at an end, up comes a goblin! This implies ultimate failure in spite of effort. It occurs in Citsukha Muni's

comment on *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 16, as follows:— “ननु सोऽयं शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयोऽभेदं साधयितुं प्रवृत्तेन भेदश्चुतेरुदाहृतत्वात्.” In *Bhāmātī*, page 93, line 17, the nyāya is quoted as “शान्ति-कर्मणि वेतालोदयः”, which makes the goblin appear *during the performance* of the शान्ति, the rite to avert evil. The purport, however, is the same as in the other case. In Ās’valāyana’s *Gṛihyasūtra* 4. 6. 1, शान्तिकर्म is prescribed when a *guru* dies, or on the loss of a son or of cattle.

शाब्दाकांक्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यते ॥

Verbal expectancy is satisfied [or fulfilled] by words only. This nyāya of Raghunātha’s is very frequently met with. It occurs in the last chapter of *Sarvadarśanasangraha* (page 157 of Bib. Ind. and 177 of Jīvānanda’s edn.) with पूर्या as the last word; in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala*, page 680, line 7; in Vaidyanātha’s comment on *Kāvya-pradīpa*, page 232 (in the erroneous form शाब्दा साकांक्षा); in Haridāsa’s vṛitti on *Kusumāñjali* iii. 15 (page 35), also in Rucidatta’s commentary on the same portion (page 478); and, finally, in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* ii. 18 (with प्रपूर्यते).

In paragraph 70 of the *Tarkasangraha* we are told that there are three requisites to the intelligibility of a sentence, namely, expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*), and juxtaposition (*sannidhi*). In para. 71, the first of these is thus explained:— “Expectancy means a word’s incapacity to convey a complete meaning, this being occasioned by the absence of another word [which, when it comes as expected, will complete the construction and the sense].” Then, in para. 72, we read:— “A collection of words devoid of expectancy &c, is no instrument of right knowledge; for example, ‘cow, horse, man, elephant,’ gives no information, from the absence of expectancy; [the words having no reference one to another, and not looking out for one another].” This is Dr. Ballantyne’s translation, accompanying the text; and the same subject is explained by him in his lucid rendering of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* i. 6.

शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिह- तिर्भवति ॥

A blow with a pestle, directed towards the rice, falls instead on the s'yāmāka grain. Aiming at a pigeon and killing a crow. It occurs in *Nyāyavārtika*, page 46:—कथं पुनरन्यविषयं करणमन्य-विषयां क्रियां करोति । शाल्यादिविषयस्य मुशलादेः करणस्य श्यामाकेऽभिह-तिर्भवति । नानियमादिति यद्विषयं करणं तद्विषया क्रियेति न नियमोऽस्ति । दृष्टा हि वृक्षादिविषयस्य छेदनस्यावयवक्रियेति । वृक्षश्छिद्यतेऽवयवे क्रियेति” ॥

शिविकोद्यच्छन्नरवत् ॥

The simile of *men carrying a palanquin*. Used by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to show how all the words in a sentence *unitedly* convey the sense of the latter. It occurs in *Nyāyamanjari*, page 397, line 12:—यथा हि बाह्यानि करणानि काष्ठादीनि पाके व्याप्रियन्ते यथा च शिविकाया उद्यन्तारः सर्वे शिविकामुद्यच्छन्ति यथा त्रयोऽपि ग्रावाण उखां बिभ्रति तथा सर्वाण्येव पदानि वाक्यार्थमवबोधयन्ति.” Again, on page 400, line 11 from bottom:—“शिविकोद्यच्छन्नरवत्सर्वाणि पदानि कार्ये संहत्य व्याप्रि-यन्ते इत्येतदपि सत्यमेव.” Cf. *S'loka-vārtika*, p. 529, verse 73.

शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् ॥

The simile of *the shining-forth of a thousand lamps stand- ing in the midst of solid rock!* It occurs in *Brahmasūtra- bhāṣya* 2. 2. 28, near the end:—“किंचान्यत्प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभास-कान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवताप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तुकमित्युक्तं स्यात् । शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत्.” Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—“Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to

assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves."

शुष्केष्टिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *sham-sacrifice*. That is, the performance of sacrificial ceremonies, by a pupil, with a view to his becoming proficient in them, without the offering of a real sacrifice. This is classed with भूमिरथिक in S'abara's bhâshya on Jaimini 9. 2. 13, and an extract from the passage will be found under that nyâya. The term शुष्केष्टि, as adopted in Marâṭhî, is thus explained by Molesworth:—"Dry exercise or blank practising; performance or doing, antecedently to the occasion, of a work or matter in which the performer is ignorant or inexpert (in order that the necessary knowledge or ability may be acquired in provision for occasions anticipated)."

श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्यायः ॥

See this explained under पाठक्रमन्याय.

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत ॥

One should do to-day that which one intends to do tomorrow. Procrastination is dangerous. The verse containing this nyâya of Raghunâtha's occurs three times in *S'ântiparva*, namely in chapters CLXXV, CCLXXVIII, and CCCXXIII of Calcutta edition. It reads as follows:—

श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत पूर्वाह्ने चापराह्निकम् ।

न हि प्रतीक्षते मृत्युः कृतं वास्य न वा कृतम् ॥

It is quoted in the *Prabandhacintâmani*, page 111, and Mr. Tawney (on page 68 of his translation) renders it thus:—"One should do to-day the duty of tomorrow, and in the forenoon the duty of the afternoon, for death will not consider whether one has done one's work or not."

श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *straightening of a dog's tail*. An illustration of wasted effort. It occurs in the following verse of the *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 448:—

न चैष शक्यते कर्तुं नम्रो यत्नशतैरपि ।

को हि स्वेदशतेनापि श्वपुच्छं नामयिष्यति ॥

See also under अरण्यरोदनन्याय in the second Handful.

श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Like butter that has been licked by a dog. Used of something which has become impure and therefore unacceptable. It is found in the following verse of the last chapter of the *Sarvādars' anasangraha*:—“फलाभिसन्धेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः ।

अपि प्रयत्नसम्पन्नं कामेनोपहतं तपः ।

न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥

Compare with this the nyāya “न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं श्वदत्तौ दृतम्.”

श्वा कर्णे वा पुच्छे वा छिन्ने श्वैव भवति नाश्वो न गर्दभः॥

A dog, when an ear or its tail has been cut of, is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey! This is Patanjali's illustration of the *vārtika* एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत्, which see above. Compare also Nāgojibhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* xxxvii. Akin to this illustration is Kumārila's “न हि गोर्गण्डुनि जाते विषाणे वा मग्ने गोत्वं तिरोधीयते,” which is found in *Tantravārtika* 2. I. 34, page 418; and “न हि कवलभोजी देवदत्तोऽन्यैः सह पंक्त्यां भुञ्जानोऽन्यत्वं प्रपद्यते,” on page 617.

षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *use or omission of the Śoḍas'istotra* [at the Atirātra-sacrifice]. In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of

the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, we learn that "the distinctive feature of the Atirātra-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an 'over-night' performance of chants and recitation...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma-liquor...and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousal." Then, as to the S'odas'in, he says (page XVIII)—"As regards the ceremonies preceding the night-performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the S'odas'i-stotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirātra....Ās'valāyana (5. 11. 1) refers incidentally to the S'odas'in, as part of the Atirātra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sūtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice." There can be no doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyāya, do certainly regard the use of that stotra as optional. For example, as illustrations of option in action, S'ankara, in his bhāṣya on sūtra 1. 1. 2 (page 37), and again on sūtra 2. 1. 27 (page 471), quotes the Vedic sentences "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" "नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति." Then at the close of 1. 4. 13, he says:—"अपेक्षाभेदाच्च समानेऽपि मन्त्रे ज्योतिषो ग्रहणाग्रहणे । यथा समानेऽप्यतिरात्रे वचनभेदात्षोडशिनो ग्रहणाग्रहणे तद्वत्"; and in 3. 3. 2, "न हि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयोरतिरात्रो भिद्यते." In his comment on 3. 3. 26 (page 893, line 5 from bottom), Ānandagiri makes use of the expression "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवद्विकल्पे प्राप्ते," and repeats it three lines lower down. In *Vedāntakalpataru-parimāla*, page 539 (line 7 from bottom), we read "षोडशिग्रहणन्यायेन विकल्पो भविष्यति," and on page 656 (line 4), "षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणन्यायसञ्चारणे तथैव विरोधपरिहाराय विकल्पोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः." The optional character of this stotra is made use of by Laugākṣi-bhāṣkar also, in *Arthasangraha*, page 24, from line 14.

सकृद्गतिन्यायः ॥

This is Nāgojibhaṭṭa's shortened form of the paribhāṣā सकृद्गतौ विप्रतिषेधे यद्वाधितं तद्वाधितमेव, which Professor Kielhorn rend-

ers thus:—"When (two rules), while they apply (simultaneously), mutually prohibit each other, that which is once superseded is superseded altogether." This is illustrated by the following from ordinary life:—"यथा तुल्यबल्योरेकः प्रेप्यो भवति स तयोः पर्यायेण कार्यं करोति यदा तमुभौ युगपत्प्रेष्यतो नानादिक्षु च कार्यं तदोभयोर्न करोति यौग-पद्यासंभवात्" ॥ The paribhâsâ is found in *Mahâbhâsya* 1. 1. 56 (vârt. 25, 26, 27); 1. 4. 2 (vârt. 7); 6. 3. 42 (vârt. 5); 6. 3. 139; 6. 4. 62 (vârt. 2); 7. 1. 26; 7. 1. 54; and 7. 1. 73. The illustration is met with in 1. 4. 2 (vârt. 5), and 6. 1. 85 (vârt. 3).

सत्रन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a *sacrificial session*. For this kind of sacrifice, lasting several days, not less than seventeen sacrificers are absolutely necessary. But what if one of them should leave or die before the completion of the ceremony? In such a case he *must* be replaced by a substitute, or the whole thing becomes null and void. This, however, cannot be done when there is only one sacrificer engaged in a sacrifice. This nyâya is the subject of Jaimini 6. 3. 22. In sûtras 23 to 26 it is laid down that the substitute does not reap the benefit of the sacrifice,—but that it goes to the man whose place he has taken. It is very clear, from the above, that the mention of the सत्रन्याय on page 430, line 5 of *Vedântakalpataru*, is wrong, and that the reference is really to the रात्रिसत्रन्याय which see above.

संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयः ॥

The meaning of an ambiguous expression is to be determined from the context. In *Brahmasûtrabhâsya* 1. 3. 14 there is a discussion as to the meaning of the 'small ether' of Chhândogya Upaniṣad 8. 1. 1, and Ânandagiri makes the following comment on the closing part of it:—"समुच्चयेति । संदिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णय इति न्यायादादौ तस्मिन्त्यदन्तरिति तच्छब्दोऽनन्तरमप्याकाशमभिलंघ्य हृत्पुण्डरीकं परासृशति तत्र यदन्तराकाशं तदन्वेष्टव्यं विजिज्ञासितव्यं चेत्युपसंहरति." The nyâya is quoted again in his *ṭikâ* on 3. 3. 52. It is taken

from Jaimini's sūtra 1. 4. 29, "संदिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात्," which is quoted and applied by the author of the *S'āstradīpikā*, in his discussion, under 1. 3. 8, of such words as यव, वराह, पीलु and others, to which the Āryas attach one meaning and the Mlecchas another. We find it, too, in Kumārila's lengthy exposition of the same portion, in the words:—"संदिग्धेषु च सर्वेषु वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयम्" (page 148); and again under 3. 4. 36 (page 1003):—"संदिग्धं वाक्यशेषेण निर्णयमवधारितम् । विध्युद्देशेन निर्णीते किं तु शेषः करिष्यति." See also *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 34 (page 641).

समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः ॥

For this paribhāṣā, see under गर्गशतदण्डनन्याय.

संभवत्येकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदश्च नेष्यते ॥

When a sentence can suitably be regarded as one, it is not right to divide it. This oft-quoted line of Kumārila's was directed against an older writer, named Bhavadāsa (so Pārthasārathi tells us), who proposed to divide Jaimini's sūtra 1. 1. 4 into two parts. The line is found in *S'loka-vārtika*, page 135. It is quoted in *Bhāmatī* 1. 1. 28 (page 159), 1. 3. 13 (page 206), 1. 4. 3 (page 286), 1. 4. 16 (page 308), 3. 3. 57 (page 668), and 3. 4. 20 (page 678). In Ānandagiri on *Brahmasūtrābhāṣya* 1. 2. 15, we read—"वक्तृभेदेऽप्येकवाक्यता साक्षात्त्वात्पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकार्थत्वं वाक्यैक्यसंभवे तद्भेदस्यायोगादित्यर्थः", and, in the latter part of the bhāṣya on 1. 4. 3, S'ankara himself has a good deal to say on एकवाक्यता. Then Ānandagiri quotes the nyāya in his comment on 2. 3. 2 and 3. 3. 14.

सर्वं बलवतः पथ्यम् ॥

Everything is suitable [or proper] for the strong. "Might is right." The idea seems to be that the strong may be lawless with impunity! This doctrine is clearly laid down in *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* x. 33. 30, 31:—"धर्मव्यतिक्रमो दृष्ट ईश्वराणां च साहसम् ।

तेजीयसां न दोषाय बह्वेः सर्वभुजो यथा ॥ नैतत्समाचरेज्जातु मनसापि ह्यनी-
श्वरः । विनश्यत्याचरन्मौढ्याद्यथारुद्रोऽब्धिजं विषम्.” Kumârila employs
the saying in *Tantravârtika*, page 134, as follows:—“तेन विश्वा-
मित्रस्यापि यद्रागद्वेषपूर्वकमपि तपोबलारूढस्य चरितं तत्सर्वं बलवतः पथ्य-
मित्यनेन न्यायेन महान्ति च तपांसि कृत्वा तानि क्षयं नयत उत्तरकालं वा पाप-
विशुद्धिं प्रायश्चित्तैः प्रतिकुर्वाणस्य जीर्यत्यपि मन्दतपसां गजैरिव महावटकाद्यादि-
भक्षणमात्मविनाशायैव स्यात्.”

सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म ॥

All the different schools of a Veda acknowledge one and the same sacrificial action. The followers of the Mîmâmsâ evidently regard this as an important point, for Jaimini devotes 25 sûttras, viz. 2. 4. 8-32, to the discussion of it. Kunte's remarks on the bearings of the question, in his *Śaddars'anaśintanikâ*, are worthy of perusal. The nyâya is frequently quoted in the philosophical works. Instances of it will be found in *Tantravârtika*, page 84, line 7; in *Pancapâdikâvivaraṇa*, page 167, line 3 from bottom; in *Nyâyamanjarî*, page 256, line 16; in *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, page 169, line 17; and in *Srîbhâṣya* 3. 3. 53. Raghunâthavarman makes use of the nyâya but does not include it in his numbered list.

साकमेधीयन्यायः ॥

The maxim relating to the Sâkamedha offerings. This is the topic of Jaimini 5. 1. 19-22. The group of offerings called *Sâkam-edhâh* form the third of the three seasonal, or four-monthly (câturmâsya), sacrifices which are performed at the *parvans* (or commencement of the spring, rainy, and autumn seasons), and which, in this case, last for two days; three of the group (consisting of seven) being offered on the first day, and the remainder on the second day. An objector urges that two days are required for each of the group, but this is set aside, and the ruling is as above. For a full description of these four-monthly sacrifices, see Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *S'atapatha-Brâhmaṇa*, vol i. pages 383 and 408.

साक्षः पुरुषः परेण चेक्षीयते नूनमक्षिभ्यां न पश्यति ॥

If a man with eyes is led by somebody else, it is clear that he does not see with his eyes! This is found in S'abara on Jaimini 1. 2. 31, and is used by an objector to illustrate his argument that it is not necessary to understand the meaning of Vedic sentences employed in sacrificial rites, since the way in which they are to be used is clearly laid down in works prepared for the purpose. The illustration is quoted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in *Nyāyamanjarî*, page 286, line 12.

सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः ॥

An injunction in general terms is indefinite. This appears as a maxim in the second part of the *Laukikanyāyaratnākara* (I. O. MS, page 319 a), where Raghunātha applies it thus:—
“लोके कंचिद्देशं जिगमिषुं प्रति तत्रत्यानि वस्तून्त्यानेयानीति सामान्यतो विधा-
येदमानेयमिदमानेयमिति स्पष्टीक्रियते.” It is doubtless derived from the following verse in *Tantravārtika* 3. 4. 47 (page 1020):—

“सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः संह्रियेत विशेषतः ।

स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नान्यैरुपसंहारसंभवः” ॥

This verse is found in *Vedāntakalpataruparimāla* (page 253), where the second line reads “स्पष्टस्य तु विधेर्नैवमुपसंहार इष्यते,” and the first line is quoted by the author of the *Nyāyasudhā* in his comment on *Tantravārtika* 1. 2. 42 which defines the term परिसंख्या (‘limitation’, or ‘exclusive specification’, as Dr. Thibaut and M. M. Kunte respectively render it).

The lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to by S'abara, also, on Jaimini 10. 8. 16, where he says “न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिददति,” but Kumārila points out (on page 1027) that the विशेष requires the सामान्य. He says:— “न तु निःसामान्यः कश्चिद्विशेष उपपद्यते । ततश्च वृक्षमानयेत्युक्ते शिंशपामित्यविरोधा-
त्पश्चादुच्यमानं न विरुध्यते.”

सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयान् ॥

That [injunction] which leaves no room [for others] is stronger than one which does. For example, an injunction directing animal sacrifice, and which leaves no room for option, overpowers the more general one forbidding the taking of life. In this way one Smṛiti may prevail over another. The nyâya is found in Raghunâtha's list, and is applied by him as follows:—
 “न चानुभवेन श्रुतेर्बाधः शक्यः श्रुतेर्निरवकाशत्वात् । निरवकाशस्य च सावका-
 शनिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयानिति न्यायाद्बाधकत्वोपपत्तेः” ॥ A reference to *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 2. 1. 1 will fully explain the two terms of this expression. In his comment on it Ânandagiri quotes the nyâya twice, and again under 2. 1. 4, 6, and 13. In immediate connection with the first of the five, Ânandagiri quotes also the nyâya “सापेक्षनिरपेक्षयोर्निरपेक्षस्य बलवत्त्वम्”, and the two occur together in the following verses of Yâmunâcârya's *Âga-maprâmaṇya*, page 63:—“सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे न हि बाधस्य कारणम् । शुक्तौ रजतबोधस्य निरपेक्षस्य बाधकम् ॥ नेदं रजतविज्ञानं तत्सापेक्षमपीष्यते । सेयं ज्वालेति संवित्तेस्तैलवर्तिविनाशजा ॥ अनुमा बाधिका दृष्टा सापेक्षाप्यक्षज-
 न्मनः । अतो निरवकाशेन सावकाशं निषिध्यते” ॥

सिंहस्यैकपदं यथा ॥

Like a lion's first step. This obscure nyâya occurs in Meru-
 tunga's work, page 278:—“विचार्याविचार्य वा कृतप्रयाणोऽयं महानरे-
 न्द्रश्चालितः । सिंहस्यैकपदं यथेति न्यायाच्चलित एव राजते.” Mr. Tawney renders it thus (on page 174):—“Whether with due considera-
 tion or not, this great king has been set in motion, and has started on his expedition; on the principle of the lion's first step, he cuts a good figure on the march.” Does the illustration mean that a lion in motion presents a finer appearance than one at rest?

सिकताकूपवत् ॥

The simile of *a well [dug] in sandy soil [the sides of which*

are incessantly falling in]. Used of an argument that will not hold water. It is found in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 2. 32:—
 “किं बहुना सर्वप्रकारेण यथा यथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते
 तथा तथा सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव । न कांचिदत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः”॥

सिकतातैलन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *oil from sand*. A non-entity like a hare's horn. The following is from Bhartrihari's *Nṭis'ataka* (verse 5):—

“लभेत सिकतासु तैलमपि यत्नतः पीडयन्
 पिबेच्च मृगतृष्णिकासु सलिलं पिपासार्दितः ।
 कदाचिदपि पर्यटन्लशविषाणमासादये-
 न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत्” ॥

In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2. 1. 16, we read:—“यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते न तत्तत् उत्पद्यते यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्.” Compare with this, *Yogavāsisṭha* 2. 5. 23, “न यत्नेनापि महता प्राप्यते रत्नमश्मतः”, where तैलमश्मतः is given as a variant. American rock-oil was not known in those days! There are two good examples of this illustration in *Nyāyamanjarī*. On page 493, line 1:—तैलार्थी हि तिलसर्षपानुपादत्ते न सिकताः । असत्त्वे च तैलस्य को विशेषः सर्षपाणां सिकताभ्यः” ॥ On page 494:—“तैलार्थी सिकताः कश्चिदादादानो न दृश्यते । अदृष्ट्वा चाद्य नान्योऽपि तदर्थी तासु धावति.”

सूक्तवाकन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *Sūktavāka* [or song of praise]. This is the topic of Jaimini 3. 2. 15-18, and immediately follows the *Prastara-praharānanyāya* with which it is closely connected. Both form a part of the New and Full Moon sacrifices in connection with which there is the direction “सूक्तवाकेन प्रस्तरं ग्रहरति.” The question then arises as to whether the whole of the mantras which comprise the *Sūktavāka* are to be repeated on each of the two occasions, or only a part. S'abara's argument is thus paraphrased by Kunte:—“Though the Veda mentions positively

that certain mantras are to be used in certain sacrifices, yet they are not to be so used blindly. The mantra which serves some purpose of a sacrifice is to be used. Though the Veda prescribes the use of the whole mantra, yet it is not to be obstinately maintained that the whole is to be recited. A whole mantra like the Sûktavâka, or a part only, is to be recited according as it is necessary. This is to be ascertained by the sacrificer himself. Hence it cannot be said that the whole Sûktavâka is to be recited on the occasion either of the new or of the full moon day." Again:—"That portion of the Sûktavâka which is recited at the new or full moon sacrifice is the whole of it in reference to the sacrifice itself; because the Veda never prescribes a certain text as constituting the Sûktavâka, and because the Veda simply states that the Sûktavâka is to be recited... The Sûktavâka is not one text only, but is composed of different texts. The principal god connected with a sacrifice is mentioned in the middle of the Sûktavâka, while something connected with the sacrifice to be performed is described at its beginning and end.....All that is sought is the accomplishment of the new or full moon sacrifice. Hence there is no necessity for discussing whether the whole Sûktavâka or a portion of it is to be recited; because whatever mantras are sufficient to accomplish a sacrifice constitute the whole Sûktavâka so far as the sacrifice is concerned."

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the thread* [about to be woven into a] *garment* [and already regarded as a garment]. Raghunâtha explains it thus:—"यत्र तु भाविसंज्ञया निर्देशो यथा नारुद्रो वसेत्काश्यामित्यत्र तत्र सूत्रशाटिकान्यायावतारः । सूत्रस्य शाटिकां वापयतीत्यत्र यथा सूत्रावस्थायां भाविन्या शाटिकेतिसंज्ञया निर्देशस्तथा दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपीति बोध्यम्."

It is no doubt derived from the following passage in the *Mahâbhâṣya* 1. 3. 12 (vârtika 2):—"आत्मनेपदेषु चापि नेतरेतराश्रयं भवति । कथम् । भाविनी संज्ञा जिज्ञास्यते सूत्रशाटकवत् । तद्यथा । कश्चित्कञ्चित्तन्तुवायमाह अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेति । स पश्यति यदि शाटको न वात-

व्योऽथ वातव्यो न शाटकः शाटको वातव्यश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । भाविनी खल्वस्य संज्ञाभिप्रेता स मन्ये वातव्यो यस्मिन्नुते शाटक इत्येतद्भवतीति.” This is repeated in 2. 1. 51 (vârtika 4). Kumârila employs the illustration in *Tantravârtika* 3. 7. 33 (page 1145):—“यथैवास्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वयेत्युक्ते वानेन शाटकः क्रियत इति हि भाविसंज्ञाविज्ञानादविरोधो विज्ञायते तथैवान्न प्रत्येतव्यम्.” See Addenda.

सोपानत्के पादे द्वितीयामुपानहमशक्यत्वान्नोपादत्ते ॥

A man does not [attempt to] put a second shoe on a foot already shod, for it would be an impossibility. This is found in the bhâṣya on Jaimini 1. 2. 33, where the *pûrvapakshin* objects to certain Vedic texts as unnecessarily setting forth things already known.

स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *vegetable* [or mineral] *poison and animal poison* [जङ्गमविष]. An illustration of one thing being counteracted by another. In his smaller work Raghunâthavarman places this amongst the purely grammatical nyâyas, immediately after the *पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्याय*, and describes it as follows:—“स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्यायश्चेह बोध्यः । रजतादिज्ञानतद्वाधज्ञानयोः सर्पवत्सनाभादिरूपजङ्गमस्थावरविषयोश्चोत्तरेण पूर्वबाधः प्रसिद्धो यथा तथा प्रकृतेऽपि.” ॥ In the larger work, it stands amongst miscellaneous maxims, near the end of the *uttarabhâga*, and is numbered 242. I extract from it the following:—“स्थावरेण वत्सनाभादिविषेण जङ्गमस्य सर्पविषादेर्बाधो जङ्गमेन च स्थावरस्येति प्रसिद्धम् । सामान्येन परस्परबाध्यबाधकभावविवक्षायां सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायविषयेऽस्य प्रवृत्तिः । पूर्वं निवर्त्यान्यस्य स्वयमेव निवृत्तौ विवक्षितायां दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायविषयेऽस्यावतरणम् । परेण पूर्वबाधमात्रविवक्षायां पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वन्यायस्येति बोध्यम् । अपच्छेदन्यायस्त्वस्पष्टमुदाहरणमुभयत्रानियतपूर्वापरीभावेनानियतबाध्यबाधकभावात्” ॥

An example of animal poison proving an antidote to the other kind is found in *Âdiparva*, chap. CXXVIII (Calc.). The wicked Duryodhana mixed some *kâlakûṭaka* in Bhîma's food,

and, when he had eaten it and become unconscious, threw him into the water. The story then continues thus:—“स निःसंज्ञो जलस्यान्तमथ वै पाण्डवोऽविशत् । आक्रामन्नागभवने तदा नागकुमारकान् ॥ ततः समेत्य बहुभिस्तदा नागैर्महाविपैः । अदृश्यत भृशं भीमो महादंष्ट्रैर्विपोल्वणैः ॥ ततोऽस्य दृश्यमानस्य तद्विषं कालकूटकम् । हृतं सर्पविषेणैव स्थावरं जङ्गमेन तु” ॥

स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति ॥

A man who tries to burn his enemy by setting fire to his own fingers, may or may not burn the enemy but certainly burns his own fingers! This occurs in *Nyāyavārtika* 2. 1. 12 in reference to a person who denies the validity of Proof. Sūtras 8 and 12, as translated by Dr. Ballantyne, are as follows:—“[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof does not belong to sense &c, for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided].” “[If there be no such thing as Proof] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established.” On this the author of the *vārtika* says:—“यत्खलु त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न साधकं तदसाधनमिति ब्रुवता प्रतिषेधस्यासाधकत्वं स्वाचैवाभ्युपगतं भवति । यथा कश्चित्स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालया परं दिधक्षुः स च परं दहेद्वा न वा स्वाङ्गुलिदाहमनुभवति.”

स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *throwing away a garment because of a louse in it!* It occurs in *Upamitibhavaṇapraṇāṇā Kathā* (page 160, line 10):—“यतोऽहमनन्तापत्यापि दुर्जनचक्षुर्दोषभयादविवेकादिभिर्मन्त्रिभिर्वन्द्येति प्रख्यापिता लोके ममैवापत्यान्यन्यजनापत्यतया गीयन्ते । सोऽयं स्वेदजनिमित्तेन शाटकत्यागन्यायः” ॥

ADDENDA

Containing additions to the foregoing, and
several new Nyâyas.

ADDENDA.

अक्षिपात्रन्यायः ॥

The simile of *the eyeball*. An illustration of *extreme sensitiveness*—in persons or things. The following from *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 15 (page 78) is an example of its application to a person:—“एवमिदमनादिदुःखस्रोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति । कस्मात् । अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति न चान्येषु गात्रावयवेष्वेवमेतानि दुःखान्यक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लिश्नन्ति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम्.” This is very well put, also, in the *Maṇḍiprabhā* on the same sūtra. See, too, *Tātparyatīkā*, page 442, line 8. The word अक्षिपात्र is not in any of our dictionaries. In the *Yogavārtika* it is defined thus:—“अक्षः पात्रेणाधारेण गोलकेन तुल्यो विद्वानिति.”

अङ्गुल्यग्रं न तेनैव &c. ॥

The following verse is found in *Prakaranapancikā*, page 63:—

अङ्गुल्यग्रं यथात्मानं नात्मना स्पृष्टुमर्हति ।

स्वांशेन ज्ञानमप्येवं नात्मानं ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥

See also *Nyāyamakaranda*, pages 131, 183, and *S'ribhāṣya*, page 169.

अदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्चस्तनदिनभगन- न्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the merchant who was unwilling to give, and who wrote every day saying that he would give on the morrow!* It occurs in the following passage of Mallisena's *Syādvādamanjari* (page 128):—“सौगताः किलेत्थं प्रमाणयन्ति सर्वं सत्क्षणिकं यतः सर्वं तावद्दटादिकं वस्तु मुद्गरसन्निधौ नाशं गच्छद्दृश्यते । तत्र येन स्वरूपेणान्यावस्थायाम्

घटादिकं विनश्यति तच्चैतत्स्वरूपमुत्पन्नमात्रस्य विद्यते । तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टव्यमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम् । अथेदृश एव स्वभावस्तस्य हेतुतो जातो यत्कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा विनश्यति । एवं तर्हि मुद्रादिसन्निधानेऽपि एष एव तस्य स्वभाव इति पुनरप्यनेन तावन्तमेव कालं स्थातव्यमिति नैवं विनश्येदिति सोऽयमदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्चस्तनदिनभणनन्यायः” ॥

Those who, in an Indian cantonment, have ever undertaken the thankless task of the collection of *promised* subscriptions to a fund, are very familiar with the “*kal ao*”, or “*parson ke din ao*”, with which their messenger is often greeted, with perhaps stronger language superadded! Human nature is much the same everywhere. Compare *Proverbs* iii. 28.

अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

For an example of the three other kinds of *siddhānta*, see *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā*, page 36, lines 16-27.

अनधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि
महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरी ॥

The Padamanjarī would be of no use to one who had not read the Mahābhāṣya, and would be equally useless [because unnecessary] if the latter had been read! This is used by Raghunātha to illustrate the position of the Gāṇapatas who regard the worship of Gaṇapati as essential and all-inclusive. A portion of the argument is as follows:—“अतः श्रेयकामैः सर्वैरपि स एवाराध्यः । तत्पूजां विनान्यपूजाया वैयर्थ्यस्मरणेन फलजनकत्वायोगात् । अवस्थापेक्षितानपेक्षितयोरपेक्षितं स्मरणीयमिति न्यायेन कृताकृतप्रसङ्गी यो विधिः स नित्य इति न्यायेन च तदाराधनस्यावश्यकत्वात् । कृते च तस्मिन्विद्यार्थी लभते विद्वां धनार्थी लभते धनम् । पुत्रार्थी लभते पुत्रान्मोक्षार्थी परमं पदमित्यादिवचनेभ्यः सर्वेष्टलाभसंभवेनानधीते महाभाष्ये व्यर्था स्यात्पदमञ्जरी । अधीतेऽपि महाभाष्ये व्यर्था सा पदमञ्जरीति न्यायेनान्याराधने प्रयोजनाभावात्.” The second *nyāya* quoted here is a slight modification of Nāgojī’s *paribhāṣā* XLII, “कृताकृतप्रसङ्गि नित्यं तद्विपरीतमनित्यम्.” Jayanta

Bhaṭṭa has several verses of the same type as that regarding the Padamanjari. They will be found on pages 29, 39, 55, 61, 182, 447, and 448 of his *Nyāyamanjari*. I quote that on page 182 as a sample:—

कार्यं चेद्वगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ।

कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

अनिषिद्धमनुमतम् ॥

That which is not objected to is agreed to. "Silence gives consent." It occurs in *Pari'sisṭaparvan* vii. 36:—

एतस्याः संप्रदानं च श्रुत्वा संसोदवानसि ।

अनिषिद्धं ह्यनुमतमिति न्यायोऽपि वर्तते ॥

अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायः ॥

The principle of an *implied axiom* [or, dogmatic corollary]. This is taken from *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 31 which Dr. Ballantyne rendered as follows:—"A 'dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particular fact in regard to anything, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowledge of the fact coming so immediately] from what is recognized [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma]." The nyāya is applied by Udayana in *Kiraṇāvali*, page 20, line 4 from bottom. See also under अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्याय.

अयमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोटः ॥

Here is another boil on the top of a previous one! An illustration of difficulty upon difficulty; trouble upon trouble. It occurs in *Bhāmati* 2. 2. 37 as follows:—"नहीश्वराधीना जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण कपूर्यं कर्म कर्तुमर्हन्ति । तदनधिष्ठितं वा कपूर्यं कर्म फलं प्रसोतुमुत्सहते । तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रोऽपीश्वरः कर्मभिः प्रवर्त्येत इति दृष्टविपरीतं कल्पनीयम् । तथा चायमपरो गण्डस्योपरि स्फोट इतरेतराश्रयः प्रसज्येत कर्मणेश्वरः प्रवर्तनीय ईश्वरेण च कर्मेति." In the same form it is put into the mouth of Rāk-

śasa in *Mudrārākṣasa* v (page 220). The oldest examples, however, are in Prākṛit. In the opening part of *Sakuntalā* ii. we find it as “तदो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डिआ संवुत्तो” (or, in Dr. Pischel’s edition, “जदो गण्डस्स उवरि विण्फोडओ संवुत्तो”); and, in *Viddhas’āla-bhanjikā* i. (page 12), as “अवरो गण्डस्स उवरि पिण्डओ संवुत्तो.”

अरुणैकहायनीन्यायः ॥

There is a long discussion on this nyāya in Rāmānuja’s *S’rībhāṣya* 1. 1. 13, commencing on page 813 of the Benares edition. See Dr. Thibaut’s translation, page 222.

अवयवप्रसिद्धेः &c. ॥

I have met with another reference to this paribhāṣā in *Tātpuryatīkā*, page 150, line 12:—“अत्र च घ्राणादिशब्दाः पञ्चजादिपदवदवयवार्थं निमित्तीकृत्य कचित्कचित्सामान्यविशेषे वर्तन्ते अवयवार्थस्य प्रतीयमानस्यासति बाधके परित्यागायोगात् । अश्वकर्णादौ वृक्षविशेषवाचके वाजिकर्णयोगेन बाधकेनावयवार्थपरित्यागात्.” See also *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 385, line 10; and page 534, line 15.

अश्वारूढाः &c ॥

Kumārila’s simile is adopted by S’ālikanātha in *Prakaraṇa-puncikā*, page 16, verse 41:—“नन्वेवं तुरगारूढस्तुरङ्गं विस्मृतो भवान् । वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धयथमुत्थितस्तत्प्रहीणवान्.” This is what Mallinātha quoted, and not directly from Kumārila. He and Varadarāja, between them, quote the *S’ālikā* (generally by name) ten times. Under sūtra 10. 8. 4. S’abara has a hit at Kātyāyana, just as Kumārila has here at Patanjali. After quoting vārtika 9 of *Mahābhāṣya* 7. 1. 96, and Pāṇini 2. 1. 11 which contradicts it, he says “सद्वादित्वाच्च पाणिनेर्वचनं प्रमाणमसद्वादित्वान्न कात्यायनस्य । असद्वादी हि विद्यमानमपि अनुपलभ्य ब्रूयात्.” On the other hand, Patanjali’s opinion of grammarians may be seen from his remarks under 6. 3. 109. The whole passage is worth reading.

अहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरम् ॥

Heartless words get heartless answer. Like receives like. This occurs in *Vedāntatattvaviveka*, (The Paṇḍit for May 1903), page 14, line 4 from bottom:—“तत्र चाहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरमिति न्यायेन सदन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्योक्तं न तु तत्त्वाभिप्रायेण.” In the *Tātparyatīkā*, this is combined with “यादृशो यक्षस्तादृशो बलिः”, and the passage will be found under that nyāya in the second Handful.

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां &c. ॥

The verse immediately preceding that quoted from the *Sambandharārtika* is the following:—“न तु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता । दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः” ॥ The two verses are rendered as follows in a translation (by a Vakil of the Madras High Court) now appearing in The Paṇḍit:—“A wise man ought not to speak of success as depending on mere accident. Such a thing would be within the scope, not of human effort, but of destiny. It cannot be said that it is also within the scope of human effort, on the principle that injunction implies endeavour; for there is no injunction (*ākhyāta*) to that effect.” According to this, आख्यात=विधि.

आषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठा ।

When a breeze is blowing in the month Āṣāḍha, and the lordly elephant is roaming about, the sea is the only refuge for the donkey! Raghunātha's explanation of this nyāya is as follows:—“याभिर्युक्तिभिरतिप्रबलशुष्कतर्ककर्मशत्वेन प्रसिद्धोऽपि द्वैतसत्यत्ववादी वैशेषिकादिर्जय्यस्ताभिरितरे क्षुद्राश्चार्वाकादयस्तु दूरतो निरस्ता भवन्तीति विवक्षायामाषाढवाते चलति द्विपेन्द्रे चक्रीवतो वारिधिरेव काष्ठेति न्यायप्रवृत्तिः । चलतीति सप्तम्यन्तं पदं देहलीदीपन्यायेनोभयत्र संबध्यते । चक्रीवान् गर्दभः । स्पष्टमन्यत्” ॥

I shall be glad if any one can give a reference to the nyāya. It has never crossed my path.

इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी ॥

On one side a tiger, on the other a precipice! A serious dilemma! There is a good example in Hemacandra's Paris'istaparvan iii. 166:—“कुटुम्बमपि मे प्रेयः प्रेयांस्त्वमपि हे सखे । किं करोमि द्विधाचित्त इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी.” Another is found in *Syādvāda-manjarī*, page 151:—“अवास्तवत्वग्राहकं प्रमाणं सांवृतमसांवृतं वा स्यात् । यदि सांवृतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शून्यवादस्य सिद्धिः प्राप्ता । तथा च वास्तव एव समस्तोऽपि प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः । अथ तद्ग्राहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसांवृतं तर्हि क्षीणाः प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारा वास्तवत्वप्रतिज्ञातेनैव व्यभिचारात् । तदेवं पक्षद्वयेऽपीतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटीति न्यायेन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधः” ॥ I presume that this is the व्याघ्रदुस्तटीन्याय which Professor Jacobi, the present editor of the *Upamitibhavarapancā Kathā*, tells me that he has met with in a portion of that work not yet published.

उदरे भृते कोशो भृतः ॥

When his stomach is full his coffers are full. Used of a lazy fellow who has no ambition beyond his daily food. “Whose god is his belly.” It occurs in Hemacandra's Paris'istaparvan iii. 113:—“दारिद्रेण मदीयेन विभर्ष्युदरमप्यदः । उदरे च भृते कोशो भृत इत्येव मन्यसे.”

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः ॥

A much older instance is found in *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 42 (page 1113):—“यद्यपि न बाधस्तथापि विकल्पस्तावत्प्राप्नोति न हि तुल्यार्थानां क्वचित्समुच्चयो दृष्टः सेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः” ॥ There is another good example in *Nyāyamanjarī* page 436, line 16; and in *Khaṇḍana*, page 710, we read “उभयतःपाशबन्धः कथं मोचनीयः” ॥

एकसंबन्धिदर्शने &c. ॥

Without mentioning the nyāya, Vācaspatimiśra has the fol-

lowing in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 167:—"हस्तिनं दृष्ट्वा तत्संबन्धिनो
स्थूणाहस्तिपकौ स्मरति."

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादनिर्माणतुल्यम् ॥

The idea that the *kalas'a* is an earthen vessel, would seem to be a mistake. In a footnote to page 73 of his translation of *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, Mr. Tawney says:—"Dr. Burgess informs me that *kalas'a* is really the finial of the spire, which is shaped like a vase or urn." Then, on page 135, there is the following footnote:—"Mr. Cousens writes in a letter, which Dr. Burgess has kindly shown me, 'I understand that the term *kalas'adan-dapratisthâ* refers solely to the setting up of the *kalas'a* or pot-finial, the *danda* being the pole or stick which supports the finial and upon which it is set up. With a small *kalas'a* made solid, it would not be required, the neck of the same taking its place, but it is always required with the larger and more complex *kalas'as*, especially those made of hollow metal." Frequent mention is made by Merutunga of the erection of a कलश and ध्वज as the completion of a temple. The two are mentioned on pages 119 and 211, whilst on pages 219 and 222 we have the कलशदण्डप्रतिष्ठा referred to above. On pages 120 and 224, the कलश is mentioned alone. In Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* i. 14, we find कुंभ for कलश:—"तत्र चैत्येषु सौवर्णध्वजकुम्भमरीचयः". For the benefit of the uninitiated I may mention that the finial is defined as "the bunch of foliage &c, at the termination of the pinnacles, gables, spires &c, in Gothic architecture."

काकाधिकरणन्यायः ॥

Another useful example will be found in *Khaṇḍana*, page 502.

काचिन्निषादी पुत्रं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायी ॥

A Niṣādi gives birth to a son, and a Niṣāda drinks the

decoction of herbs [prepared for her]! For the context of this आभाणक see under “मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते.”

क्रोष्टुः क्व च नीराजना ॥

What connection has a camel with the lustration of arms? None at all; and the phrase is used to indicate that certain things are not connected. The नीराजनाविधि (as described in chapter 267 of the Agni Purāṇa) was a ceremony performed by kings or generals before going forth to battle, and consisted of the purification of the component parts of the army, including that of the horses, the elephants, and the weapons. The वाजिनीराजनाविधि is mentioned in *Raghuvamśa* iv. 25, on which Mallinātha remarks:—“वाजिग्रहणं गजादीनामप्युपलक्षणं तेषामपि नीराजनाविधानात्.” The illustration appears in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 522:—“नद्यादिवस्तुभेदार्थं कथितं मे कथानकम् । त्वयेदं तत्र मे भाति क्रोष्टो नीराजना क्व च ” ॥

क्षते क्षारमिव ॥

Like salt on a wound. “क्षारं क्षते क्षिप्” has become proverbial, and means ‘to aggravate the pain which is already unbearable,’ ‘to make bad worse,’ ‘to add insult to injury.’” (*Āpte’s Dictionary*). He cites *Uttararāmacarita* iv. 7:—“य एव मे जनः पूर्वमासीन्मूर्त्तो महोत्सवः । क्षते क्षारमिवासह्यं जातं तस्यैव दर्शनम्.” Also *Mṛicchakāṭikā* V. 18. I have met with it again in *Upamitibhavaprapancā Kathā*, page 5, verse 42:—“कथां कामार्थयोस्तस्मान्न कुर्वीत कदाचन । कः क्षते क्षारनिक्षेपं विदधीत विचक्षणः ” ॥

गोदोहनन्यायः ॥

For the mantra regarding the use of this pail, see *S’abara* and *Nyāyamālāvistara* on Jaimini 4. 1. 2. Other references to the nyāya are *Tantravārtika* 3. 6. 43 (page 1118); and *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 166, line 4, in connection with which a verse is quoted from *S’lokavārtika* (page 63) where reference

is made to the *godohana*. Kunte's long note on the *sûtra* of Jaimini referred to above will be found useful.

ग्राणि रेखेव ॥

Like a delineation on stone. Used of something unalterably fixed. “तन्मां वज्रकुमाराय सम्प्रदत्तान्यथा तु मे । मरणं शरणं तात ग्राणि रेखेव गीरियम्.” *Paris'istuparvan* xii. 275. Compare Job's words (xix. 23):—“Oh that my words were now writtenthat with an iron pen and lead they were graven in the rock for ever.”

जामातृशुद्धिन्यायः ॥

The maxim of the *son-in-law's revision* [of a book]. This is the original of the Marâthî जांवईशोध which Molesworth defines as “A phrase, founded on a popular story, to express the examination of a piece of composition by a shallow-witted fellow incapable of discerning its merit.” The popular story, as given on pages 6-9 of Merutunga's *Prabandhacintâmani*, is to the effect that Vararuci, having been instructed by Vikramâditya to find a suitable husband for his daughter, the princess Priyangumanjari, he, in revenge for a supposed insult offered him by her when his pupil, palmed off upon her an ignorant cowherd as a man of learning! The king accepted him, and he became his son-in-law. “In accordance with the advice of the *paṇḍit*, the herdsman preserved unbroken silence; but the princess, wishing to test his cleverness, entreated him to revise a newly-written book. He placed the book in the palm of his hand, and with a nail-parer proceeded to remove from the letters in it the dots and the oblique lines at the top indicating vowels, and thus to isolate them, and then the princess discovered that he was a cowherd. After that ‘the son-in-law's revision’ became a proverb everywhere.” This quotation is from Mr. C. H. Tawney's admirable translation of Merutunga's work; the original being as follows:—“पण्डितो-

पदिष्टं सर्वथा मौनमेवालम्बमानो [महिषीपालः] राजकन्यकया तद्वैदग्ध्य-
जिज्ञासया नवलिखितपुस्तकस्य शोधनायोपरुद्धः । करतले पुस्तकं विन्यस्य
तदक्षराणि बिन्दुमात्रारहितानि नखच्छेदिन्या केवलान्येव कुर्वन् राजपुत्र्या
महिषीपाल एव निर्णीतः । ततः प्रभृति जामातृशुद्धिरिति सर्वतः प्रसिद्धिरभूत्.”

डमरुकमणिन्यायः ॥

The डमरुक or डमरु, is a sort of small drum, shaped like an hour-glass, and held in one hand. The मणि is, I suppose, the small piece of wood attached to the string tied round the middle of the drum, which strikes each end alternately as it is shaken in the hand. The gârudis, or conjurors, use a drum of this kind; and Âpte's dictionary tells us that the Kâpâlikas carry one. For a description of the latter, see Wilson's *Religion of the Hindus*, Vol. i. pages 21 and 264. The nyâya is found in *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, page 84, where it is used in the sense of the देहलीदीपन्याय as follows:—“अन्यार्थमिति मध्यवर्तिपदं डमरुकमणिन्यायेनोभयत्रापि संबन्धनीयम्.” The word अन्यार्थ occurs in the middle of Hemacandra's eleventh kârikâ which Malli-
senâ is here explaining.

तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोतन्यायः ॥

The maxim of a young bird which [has got out to sea on a floating log and] is unable to discover the shore. Its application is obvious: It occurs in the second line of verse 19 of Hemacandra's *Syâdvâdamanjarî*, as follows:—“ततस्तटादर्शि-
शकुन्तपोतन्यायास्त्वदुक्तानि परे श्रयन्तु.” Mallisenâ explains it thus:—
“तदं न पश्यतीति तटादर्शी यः शकुन्तपोतः पक्षिशावकस्तस्य न्याय उदाहरणम् ।
तस्माद्यथा किल कथमप्यपारपारावारान्तःपतितः काकादिशकुनिशावको बहि-
र्निर्जिगमिषया प्रवहणकूपस्तंभादेस्तटप्राप्तये मुग्धतयोङ्गीनः समन्ताजलैर्कार्णवमे-
वावलोकयंस्तटमदृष्टैव निर्वेदादावृत्त्य तदेव कूपस्तंभादिस्थानमाश्रयते गत्य-
न्तराभावादं तेषां कुतीर्थ्याः प्रागुक्तपक्षत्रयेऽपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासादयन्तस्त्वदु-
क्तमेव चतुर्थं भेदाभेदपक्षमनिच्छयापि कक्षीकुर्वाणास्त्वच्छासनमेव प्रतिपद्यन्ताम्.”

तृणभक्षणन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *taking grass in the mouth* [lit. of eating grass], as a token of submission. This interesting illustration is found in *Prabandhacintāmani*, page 93:—“वैरिणोपि हि मुच्यन्ते प्राणान्ते तृणभक्षणात् । तृणाहाराः सदैवैते हन्यन्ते पशवः कथम्.” Mr. Tawney renders it thus:—“Since even enemies are let off, when near death, if they take grass in their mouths, how can you slay these harmless beasts [deer &c.] which always feed on grass?” In a note on page 210, it is stated that we have here an allusion to a most ancient custom. There is a reference to it in *Harṣacarita* (Bombay edn. 1892) page 132, line 11, on which, the translators, Cowell and Thomas, remark, “To carry a straw in the mouth was a sign of surrender; compare Acworth’s Marāṭhā Ballads, page 43:—

‘And ’twixt the teeth a straw is fit
For curs who arm but to submit.’”

These two lines are deduced from the three words “व्याघ्रे तोंडांत तृण” of the original.

Merutunga refers to this custom again on page 300:—“नाथो नः परमर्धनेन वदनन्यस्तेन संरक्षितः । पृथ्वीराजनराधिपादिति तृणं तत्पत्तने पूज्यते.” “Grass is now worshipped in Paramardin’s city, because, when taken in the mouth, it preserved our lord Paramardin from Prithvirāja, the king of men.” (Tawney’s translation, page 189).

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजात् &c. ॥

The following is from *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 60:—“न खलु शालिबीजं तैलकलुषितमपि सम्पादयति यवांकुरं किन्तु न सम्पादयति शाल्यंकुरम्.”

दग्धबीजन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the burnt seed*. An illustration of that which has for ever ceased to be an operative cause. It appears in a verse of *Syādrādamangarī*, page 208:—

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः ।

कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवाङ्कुरः ॥

The following is from the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, page 206 :—

राजप्रतिग्रहदग्धानां ब्राह्मणानां युधिष्ठिर ।

दग्धानामिव बीजानां पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

Merutunga ascribes it to a Purāṇa. Vijnāna Bhikṣu quotes from some Smṛiti another of a like kind, under *Yogavārtika* ii. 3 :—

बीजान्यग्न्युपदग्धानि न रोहन्ति यथा पुनः ।

ज्ञानदग्धैस्तथा क्लेशैर्नात्मा सम्पद्यते पुनः ॥

दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यते ॥

That which is given once is received back a thousand times. This is found in Merutunga's work, page 266, and I append Mr. Tawney's rendering :— “अथ वीरधवलस्यायुःपर्यन्ते प्रतितीर्थे प्रस्थितेन दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यत इति रुढेः श्रीतेजःपालेन जन्मसुकृतं ददे.” “Then, when Viradhavala's life was approaching its termination, Tejahpāla, who was on his way to a holy place, in accordance with the proverb that what is given once is received back a hundred (?) times, gave him the merits of his last birth.” Though the illustration is fable, the principle is true. “Give, and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom.” Among the Turks there is the saying “Who gives alms sows one and reaps one thousand.” (Rev. T. Long's *Eastern proverbs and emblems*, page 187).

दत्तर्णाधमर्ण इव स्वप् ॥

To sleep like a debtor whose debt has been paid. To sleep like a top! Dormir comme un sabot, as the French say. It occurs in Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan*, ii. 563 :—“इति सुषाया दौःशीत्यामर्षचिन्तां विहाय सः । सुध्वाप दत्तर्ण इवाधमर्णस्तत्र निर्भरम्.”

न हि क्वचिदश्रवणं &c. ॥

Compare a saying of Vācaspatimis'ra's on *Yogabhāṣya* ii. 22:—
‘न हि रूपमन्धेन न दृश्यत इति चक्षुष्मतापि दृश्यमानमभावप्राप्तं भवति.’

नहि सर्वः सर्वं जानाति ॥

Everybody does not know everything. Near the end of the *Larvikanyāyasaṅgraha* Raghunātha describes his effort in the following verse:—

“व्याख्यातं न्यायवृन्दं निजमतिमनतिक्रम्य यावन्मयाप्तं
पारं प्राप्तुं तु शक्तो न हि भवति गुरुः कः पुनर्मादृशो न ।
सर्वः सर्वं न वेत्ति प्रथितमिदमतो नास्ति मेऽत्रापराधः
शिष्टा ज्ञेयाः स्वयं वै सुविमलमतिभिः सम्यगाराधितायैः” ॥

He then connects various nyāyas with the pādas of the above; namely, यावत्तैलं तावद्वाख्यानम् and यावत्स्नाता तावत्पुण्यम् with the first pāda, and, the maxim which we are now considering, with the third. I think the second of these should read यावत्स्नानं. In the larger work the reading is यावत्स्नातं. Our present nyāya is found in *Upamitibhavaprapançā Kathā*, page 501, as follows:—“विमर्शः ग्राह नैवात्र कोपः कार्यस्त्वया यतः । सर्वः सर्वं न जानीते सिद्धमेतज्जगत्तये” ॥ On the other hand, we have the following query in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 94:—“तथापि चानुभवकल्पनायां सर्वः सर्वदा सर्वं जानाति न तु निश्चिनोतीति किं न स्यात्.”

नहि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः &c. ॥

The whole verse is quoted in *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 165.

नागृहीते विशेषणे &c. ॥

In *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* ii. 126 (= 2. 2. 58) this is quoted as नागृहीतविशेषणान्याय, and Dr. Ballantyne renders it, “Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the nature of] what is to be distinguished.” The nyāya occurs five

times in *Nyāyamanjarī*, and each time in a different form! The references are as follows:—page 320, line 19; 433, line 4 from bottom; 449, line 3 from bottom; 538, line 6; and 543, line 7.

निरामयस्य &c. ॥

As pointed out by Mr. Tawney in a footnote, the poem here ascribed to Mayūra is the *Candīś'ataka* of which Bāṇa was the author. It was published in the *Kāvya-mālā* for 1887, and the first verse commences thus:—

“मा भांक्षीर्विभ्रमं भ्रूरधर विधुरता केयमास्यास्य रागं
पाणे प्राप्येव नायं कलयसि कलहश्रद्धया किं त्रिशूलम्” ।

पर्णमयीन्यायः ॥

The maxim of [the spoon] *made of the Parṇa wood*. Various spoons are used in the sacrifices, as described in the footnote to Professor Eggeling's translation of *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1. 3. 1. 1; and, of these, the *juhū* is always made of the wood of the Parṇa (*i. e.* the Palās'a) tree. This is in accordance with *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 3. 5. 7, where the praises of this tree are sung, and blessings promised in connection with the use of the *juhū* made of its wood, as pointed out in S'abara on Jaimini 3. 6. 1-8. The पर्णमयीत्व of the जुहु employed in the sacrifices is therefore used to illustrate something *invariably* present, in contradistinction to that which is so *occasionally*, as in the case of the *godohana*. For a passage containing both of these, see under गोदोहनन्याय. Other examples will be found in *Bhāmatī* 3. 3. 61; *Parimala*, pages 624 to 626; and *S'dhikā* page 157.

प्रतिनिधिन्यायः ॥

The rule as to the *substitution* [of one material for another, in a sacrifice]. This subject is dealt with in Jaimini 6. 3. 13-

17, the five sūtras being styled “नित्यकर्मणोऽनित्यप्रारब्धकर्मणश्च प्रतिनिधिना समापनाधिकरणम्.” Other aspects of प्रतिनिधान are discussed in all the subsequent sūtras of the pāda. Kunte’s summary of the teaching of this pāda is well worth reading.

The nyāya occurs in the following passage of S’ankara’s bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 3. 3. 40, and I append Dr. Thibaut’s translation:—“भोजनलोपेऽप्यद्विर्वाच्येन वा द्रव्येणाविरुद्धेन प्रतिनिधानन्यायेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्यानुष्ठानमिति.” “Even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the prāṇas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the Mīmāṃsā principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted.” It must not, however, be supposed that the choice of the “suitable material” was left to the sacrificer; the substitute was as rigidly prescribed as that for which it might be substituted. For instance, the juice of the Pūtīka plant was the only allowable substitute for that of the Soma plant. In Ānandagiri’s comment on the bhāṣya, the nyāya is quoted as प्रतिनिधिन्याय.

प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानेन ॥

With the quotation from Kumārila compare the following from *Tātparyatīkā*, page 27 :—“न हि प्रत्यक्षेण करिणि दृष्टेऽपि चीत्कारेण तमनुमिन्वते प्रेक्षावन्तः” ॥

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यते

Who can resist a stream [of argument] flowing [steadily on] because established by proof? This seems to be the sense of the nyāya as quoted at the beginning of the Ārṇata section of *Sarvadarśanasangraha*. The passage is as follows:—“अथ मन्येथाः प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यत इति न्यायेन यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकमित्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकतायाः प्रमिततया &c.” Professor Cowell

renders it thus:—"But the opponent may maintain 'The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, whatever is, is momentary &c.'" In a footnote to page 62 of his translation of this portion of Sarvadars'anasangraha in *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has recorded Professor Leumann's comment on the above rendering which he considers inaccurate in respect of the nyâya. The criticism is just,—but, unfortunately, the printer has made a mess of the rendering which the critic proposes to substitute for Mr. Cowell's.

प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ॥

Unseen influences [springing from actions, and eventually causing certain effects], *however numerous, may be assumed* [to be the causes of those effects], *if of established credibility*. This nyâya is the first line of a verse in *Tantravârtika* 2. 1. 5, where the important dogma of the existence of *apûrva* is discussed. The second line is "अदृष्टशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो ह्यप्रमाणकः" ॥ The whole verse is quoted in Sures'vara's *Brihadâranyakavârtika*, page 1124, and again on page 1797; whilst the first line is found in *Tâtpariyatîkā*, page 437, as follows:—"न चानेकादृष्टकल्पनाभयान्मुख्यार्थपरित्यागो न्याय्यः प्रमाणसिद्धे नियोगपर्यनुयोगानुपपत्तेः । यथाहुः । श्रुतसिद्ध्यर्थमश्रुतोपलब्धौ यत्नवत्ता भवितव्यं न तु श्रुतशैथिल्यमादरणीयमिति । तथा प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि." There is another example in *Citsukhî* i. 23 (Paṇḍit, vol. v, page 27):—"एतेनोभयपदलक्षणास्वीकारे गौरवदोषो निरस्तो वेदितव्यः । बुभुत्सितार्थप्रतिपादनप्रयोजनतया गौरवस्यैवोचितत्वात्प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपीति न्यायात्." A third will be found in *Khandana*, page 74, on which the commentator says, "यत्रादृष्टे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते तददृष्टमपि...प्रामाणिकैरभ्युपगम्यते."

Raghunâthavarman gives the verse in a different form. According to him, the first line is "बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि न कल्प्यो

निष्प्रमाणकः," whilst "प्रमाणवन्ति &c." is the second. In the numbered part of his larger work it is called the बालाग्रशतभागोऽपि nyāya; but, towards the end of the volume, he quotes (without acknowledgment) the above-cited passage of *Citsukhî* (together with a good deal of the context) which contains the nyāya in its proper form.

It may be well to call attention here to this transcendental power *adrīṣṭa*, or *apūrvā*, invented by the philosophers in order to account for present things without divine intervention. In his article on Mimāṃsā (*Essays*, vol. i, page 343), Colebrooke says:—"The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mīmāṃsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A *virtue* meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect. That unseen virtue is termed *apūrvā*, being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed." Goldstücker (s. v. अपूर्व) quotes Kumārila to the effect that Mimāṃsikas apply that term *exclusively* to the unseen influence which follows a *sacrificial* act; that attending action of other kinds being styled संस्कार. The passage will be found in *Tantravārtika*, page 367. A helpful description of *apūrvā* is given also in *Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems* (pages 149 and 150), where it is rendered by Fitzedward Hall "requitative efficacy." In K. M. Banerjea's excellent work *Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy*, page 140, अदृष्ट is defined as follows:—"Technically, in the usage of philosophers, it means a power or influence inhering in things both animate and inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an unseen power, both intellectual and active; as inherent in the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly the effect of previous combinations and motions.....This unseen moving power in men is again the consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence it stands sometimes for *dharma* and *adharma* (virtue and vice) and *karma*

(works)." I imagine that it would tax the ingenuity of even a Mīmāṃsaka to produce *proof* of अदृष्ट and its working; yet they tell us that it is not to be accepted without proof!

भाण्डालेख्यन्यायः ॥

The maxim of *the picture on a jar*. Used, apparently, of something variable at will, and the presence or absence of which in no way affects the structure of a thing, or which is not an essential part of it. It occurs in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 496 (last line), under sūtra 5. 2. 4 which explains प्रतिज्ञाविरोध as one of the twenty-two forms of *nigrahasthāna*. It is found also in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, page 289, and the commentator explains it thus:—"भाण्डालेख्यमिवेति । यथालेख्यं रेखोपरेखादि सर्वभाण्डसाधारणं न भाण्डविशेषलक्षणं तथा पुरुषाधीनविवक्षापि न विशेषिकेत्यर्थः" ॥ In the Calcutta edition of Saṃvat 1905 (= A. D. 1848), by Madanamohana Tarkālakāra, page 65, the reading is भण्डालेख्यमिव, and in a footnote to the Benares edition we are told that this is the reading preferred by one 'Vidyāsāgara' (is this our old friend Jīvānanda?) who gives the following explanation of it:—"यथा भण्डस्य डिम्भकस्यालेख्यं 'पुत्रो न पुत्री' इति विवक्षावशात्पुत्रपुत्र्युभयपक्षेऽपि योजयितुं शक्यं तथेत्यर्थः" ॥ This meaning of भण्ड is not found in the dictionaries, and may have been evolved from Vidyāsāgara's inner consciousness! I should like more light on this nyāya.

महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामणु ॥

The very same face which looks large [when seen] in a large mirror, appears small [when reflected] in the pupil of the eye. This illustration is found in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 137 line 16:—"एकमपि व्यञ्जकभेदादुत्कर्षवन्निकर्षवद्दृष्टं यथा महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं तदेव कनीनिकायामण्विति."

महार्णवयुगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपमा ॥

This most puzzling simile is found in the commentary on S'ântideva's *Bodhicaryâvatâra* i. 4, the first half of which reads thus:—"क्षणसंपदियं सुदुर्लभा प्रतिलब्धा पुरुषार्थसाधनी." The *tikâ* commences as follows:—"अष्टाक्षणविनिर्मुक्तस्य क्षणस्य संपत्तिः समग्रता । इयं सुदुर्लभा । सुष्ठु दुःखेन लभ्यत इति कथंचित्प्राप्या । महार्णव-युगच्छिद्रकूर्मग्रीवार्पणोपमा." In a footnote, the editor tells us that Professor Kern was unable to get any satisfactory meaning out of the *nyâya*, but proposed the following:—"As the entering of the tortoise's neck into the hole of the yoke formed by the great ocean." The *nyâya* is clearly meant to indicate something *most difficult of accomplishment*. Can the tortoise be that on which the world is supposed to rest, with the idea of the impossibility of its placing its neck in the opening (*chidra*) between two (*yuga*) of the oceans? This seems ridiculous, but the *nyâya* itself appears to deserve the same epithet! Can any of our Indian scholars elucidate it for us?

मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते ॥

A sage meditates [on Brahman] and a fool is emancipated! An impossible sequence, which we may compare with that of *Ezekiel* xviii. 2. It forms part of an interesting passage on page 37 of *Vedântatattvarivēka*:—"एतेनेदमपास्तं मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यत इत्येतच्छास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तेरीति न्यायविरुद्धम् ॥ तथा चाभाषकः । काचिन्निषादी तनयं प्रसूते कश्चिन्निषादस्तु कषायपायीति । मुनिकर्तृकश्रवणादिविधिफलस्य साक्षात्कारस्य मूर्खेऽनभ्युपगमात् । तत्फलस्याप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्मुनिप्रत्यङ्गाग्रगततया तावन्मात्रतया मूर्खनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । दृष्टफलानां यथादर्शनमुपपत्तेश्च." For the *nyâya* शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि, see below.

यद्गृहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुः &c. ॥

Most probably Mâdhava took this *nyâya* from Udayana's *Kiraṇâvali* where it stands (on page 18) in a similar context.

वध्यतां वध्यतां बालः ॥

As Raghunâthavarman had the temerity to include this in his list of nyâyas, I introduce it in order to show its origin and its worthlessness. At the bottom of page 53 of the Benares edition of *Laukikanyâyasangraha*, it stands thus:—"तथा च 'वध्यतां वध्यतां बालो नानेनार्थोऽस्ति जीवता । स्वपक्षहानिकर्तृत्वाद्यः कुलाङ्गारतां गत' इति न्यायविषयतां नातिवर्तते." This verse, and the words which follow it, are taken bodily from *Citsukhî* i. 16 (The Paṇḍit, vol. iv, page 534); but the real source of the s'loka is *Vishṇu Purâṇa* 1. 17. 31, where it reads "दुरात्मा वध्यतामेव;" the remainder being the same as the above. I got the clue from the *Laukikanyâyaratnâkara*, where Raghunâtha apologetically says:—"इदं विष्णुपुराणे प्रह्लादमुद्दिश्य हिरण्याक्ष-वचनं पूर्वैर्न्यायवेनोदाहृतत्वात्तत्त्वेनोदाहृतम्."

शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तारि ॥

The fruit promised in Scripture [in connection with a sacrificial or other act] is for the performer [of that act]. These are the first words of Jaimini's sūtra 3. 7. 18. They are quoted as a nyâya in a passage of *Vedântatattvaviveka*, for which see "मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते." It is cited by Vâcaspati Miśra, also, in *Tâtparyaṭīkā*, page 296, line 6 from bottom, and page 403, line 4, and in his *Bhâmatî*, pages 28 and 492. Also in *S'ribhâṣya* 2. 3. 33 (p. 1688), and 3. 4. 45 (p. 2028), where Dr. Thibaut renders it, "the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent."

सूत्रशाटिकान्यायः ॥

Light is thrown upon this by the following extract from Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*, ii. 127. The sūtra so numbered is "सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यं &c." "Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed in the case of a Brâhman, a scaffold, a mat.....in consideration of association,

place, design.....‘Though it be not so and so,’ *i. e.*, though such be not the direct meaning of the word, it is figuratively employed; for example, the word ‘staff’ &c., is employed for a Brâhman &c., because of association.....In like manner..... from the ‘design’ (*tâdarthya*), ‘He makes a mat’ (*kaṭa*) implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made] can have [at the time when one is spoken of as making it] no maker.”

Again, under sūtra 4. 1. 50 [बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्], the author of the *vṛitti* says (as interpreted by Dr. Ballantyne):—“The weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, ‘In these threads [*i. e.*, constituted by these threads] there *will be* a web,’ but not with the understanding that ‘there *is* a web’; for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one’s self to work, because desire [precluded by possession] would be absent.” See also a passage in *Tâtparyatîkā*, page 254, beginning at line 14.

SUPERADDENDA

Consisting of additional references to Nyâyas
in the First and Second Handfuls.

*N. B. Those of the Second Handful are distinguished
by the addition of the figure (2).*

SUPERADDENDA.

अजाकृपाणीयन्यायः ॥

It is very strange that this nyāya is so rarely quoted. Besides the reference to it already given, in the whole course of my reading I have met with only one additional instance, namely in *Khandanoddhāra*, page 52, line 10. I do not think, as some do, that the nyāya is based on *Sabhāparva* LXVI. 8 (Bombay edn.).

अत्यन्तपराजयाद्वरं संशयोऽपि ॥ (2)

I quoted from *Nyāyamanjarî* a variant of the above in the form एकान्तपराजयात् &c., but have since met with it in the *Tât-paryatîkâ* (page 473, line 17) also, from which, doubtless, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa took it. The context is similar in both works.

अन्धदर्पणन्यायः ॥ (2)

The following example is from S'eṣānantâchârya's comment on the *Nyāyasiddhântadîpa*, page 22, line 2 (The Pandit for May 1903):—"ननु नेदानीमध्यक्षा श्रुतिरस्ति या योग्यतासंशयसहकृता मङ्गले समाप्तिसाधनतां बोधयेत् । अनुमीयमाना तु सम्प्रत्यबोधिकैवेति तत्र योग्यतासंशयसहायसम्पादनमन्वायादर्शदर्शनमेव."

अर्थी समर्थः &c. ॥ (2)

This saying is found in a more complete form in *Vaiyâsika-nyāyamâlâ* 1. 3. 9, namely, "अर्थी समर्थो विद्वान्शास्त्रेणापर्युदस्तोऽधिक्रियते," which is itself a reproduction of the following passage in *S'ânkarabhâṣya* 1. 3. 25:—"शास्त्रं ह्यविशेषप्रवृत्तमपि मनुष्यानेवाधिकरोति शक्तत्वादर्थित्वादपर्युदस्तत्वादुपनयनादिशास्त्राच्चेति वर्णितमेतदधिकारलक्षणे." Dr. Thibaut renders it thus:—"The S'âstra, although propounded without distinction (*i. e.* although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its

precepts), does in reality entitle men only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the s'âstra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the S'âstra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the *Upanayana* ceremony and so on. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of *adhikâra* (Pûrva Mîmânsâ vi. 1)." For the last-mentioned, see under अधिकारन्याय in the third Handful. This question of अर्थित्व &c. will be found also in *S'âṅkarabhâṣya* 1. 1. 4 (page 54); 1. 3. 26, 33, 34; and 2. 2. 10.

अवयवशक्तेः &c. ॥ (1. Addenda)

The remarks under this are wrong and should be cancelled. They were written under the malign influence of that base associate *avidyâ* with its two powers of *âvarana* and *viksepa*! This at length, gave way to what the poet* has called "man's third eye,"—"तृतीयं लोचनं वृणां सम्यग्ज्ञानं तदुच्यते." The nyâya is, of course, a slight modification of the oft-quoted *paribhâṣa* "अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्बलीयसी." It will be found under this heading, and under the रथकारन्याय, in the third Handful. Though not in Patanjali's work it is included in Nâgojî Bhaṭṭa's and Sîradeva's lists.

अशोकवनिकान्यायः ॥ (1. Preface)

The only example of this that I have met with is in S'eṣānantâcārya's *ṭikâ* on S'a'sadhara's *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 11, line 1 of comment. The publication of this work began in the *Pandit* for April 1903.

अस्त्रमन्त्रेण शाम्यति ॥

With this compare Kâmandakîya *Nîtisâra* viii. 67:—

* *Yas'astilakacampûkâvya*, vol. 2, page 325.

“विषं विषेण व्यथते वज्रं वज्रेण भिद्यते ।
गजेन्द्रो दृष्टसारेण गजेन्द्रेणैव बध्यते” ॥

आकाशमुष्टिहननन्यायः ॥

Much older instances of the employment of this nyāya are the following:—*Tantravārtika*, page 170, “यस्तन्तूननुपादाय तुरी-
मात्रपरिग्रहात् । पटं कर्तुं समीहेत स हन्याद्योम मुष्टिभिः” ॥ *Pāṇcapāli-
kā*, page 43, line 19, “तद्यदि नाम ज्ञानं लोके सिद्धं तथापि निरस्त-
प्रपञ्चात्मविषयमसिद्धमाकाशमुष्टिहननवन्न विधातुं शक्यम्.” Then in
Nyāyakandali, page 56, line 6, we find the cognate expression
“यथा कश्चिन्निश्चितं कृपाणमच्छेद्यमाकाशं प्रति व्यापारयन्.”

आम्रसेकपितृतर्पणन्यायः ॥ (2)

This is found twice in the *Mahābhāṣya*. In 1. 1. 1 (page 14)
as follows:—“कथं पुनरेकेन यत्नेनोभयं लभ्यम् । लभ्यमित्याह । कथम् ।
द्विगता अपि हेतवो भवन्ति । तद्यथा । आम्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च ग्रीणिता इति.”
The second instance is in 8. 2. 3.

आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे ॥ (2. Addenda).

This, too, I have traced to Patanjali. It occurs in *Mahā-
bhāṣya* 1. 2. 45 (vārt. 8), as follows:—“अन्यद्भवान्पृष्टोऽन्यदाचष्टे ।
आम्रान्पृष्टः कोविदारानाचष्टे” ॥

आयुर्घृतम् ॥ (2)

I used to think that this was originated by writers on
Alankāra, but it is found in Patanjali 1. 1. 59 (vārt. 6) and 6.
1. 33 (vārt. 6). Then, in 6. 4. 161, there is the statement
“घृतभोजनमारोग्यस्यादिः.” See under “दधिप्रपुंसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः” in
third Handful.

इषुकारन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

The second line of the verse containing this is quoted by

Citsukha Muni in explanation of the term मनोनवस्थानात् on page 78 of *Nyāyamakaranda*.

इषुवेगक्षयन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3. 3. 32 (page 906), S'ankara says:—
“प्रवृत्तफलस्य कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयान्निवृत्तिः” ॥

उपजीव्यविरोधस्यायुक्तत्वम् ॥ (2).

I had previously met with this only in the *Paribhāṣendu-s'ekhara*. Other references are the following:—*Khaṇḍana*., page 128; *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 231, and 556 (especially the latter); *Parimāla*, pages 10, 11, 12. 451; *Nyāyamakaranda-tīkā*, page 149.

उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम् ॥

This nyāya is the second line of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* ii. 35, the first line being “आगमापायिनिष्ठत्वादनित्यत्वमियादृशिः” ॥

उष्ट्रकण्टकभक्षणन्यायः ॥ (1. Preface).

Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin has kindly pointed out the following quotation found in *Bodhicaryāvatāratīkā* ix. 92, (page 330, bottom line):—“Āha ca | ahir mayūrasya sukhāya jāyate | viṣaṁ viṣābhyāsavato rasāyanam | bhavanti cānanda-vis'esaḥetavo | mukhami tudantaḥ karabhāsyā kaṇṭakāḥ | ”

ऊषरवृष्टिन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is a good example in Hemacandra's *Paris'istaparvan* viii. 417:—

कषायपक्षिवृक्षेषु कृतघ्नेषु दुरात्मसु ।
एतेषु निष्फलं दानमूपरेष्वम्बुवृष्टिवत् ॥

ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतः &c. ॥ (2).

Is found also in *S'āhikā*, page 86 (or Paṇḍit, Old Series, i. 108):—"ऋजुमार्गेणार्थसिद्धौ न वक्रमार्गमाश्रयेत्." And in *Tarka-bhāṣā*, page 48.

कदम्बकोरकन्यायः ॥

The following instance of this is from Hemacandra's *Parīśiṣṭaparva* (i. 241):—

“पित्रा स्वपाणिपद्मेन स्पृश्यमानोऽवनीपतिः ।
उत्कोरककदम्बाभो बभूव पुलकाङ्गुरैः ” ॥

कफोणिगुडन्यायः ॥

A second example is found in Udayana's *Ātmātattvarivēka*, page 26, from which Mādhava most probably took it. I have met with it nowhere else.

कांस्यभोजिन्यायः ॥ (2).

As stated in the Preface to the second Handful, this is taken from Jaimini's sūtra 12. 2. 34. In addition to the reference already given in *Tantravārtika*, other instances of it will be found on pages 577, and 907 of the same. It is explained and applied, too, in Appai Dīkṣita's *Vidhīrasāyana*, page 50. See also *Vedāntakalpataru*, pages 314, 425, 502, 517; and *Parī-mala*, pages 462, 572, 666.

काकदन्तपरीक्षान्यायः ॥

In *Nyāyamanjari*, page 7, line 5, this appears in the form वायसदशनविमर्शन्याय.

कुड्यं विना चित्रकर्मैव ॥ (2).

Compare the following:—"सति कुड्ये चित्रकर्म," and भित्ति-

चित्रकर्मवन्निराश्रयधर्मविधानायोगात्,” from Mallinātha on *Tārīkarakṣā*, pages 111 and 176. See also *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 41. Then in the commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, page 30, line 7 (The Paṇḍit for July 1903), we read “बलभद्राभिधानमभित्तिचित्रायितम्.”

क्षीरनीरन्यायः ॥ (2).

All the examples already given are from works on Alankāra. It comes however from *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 2. 32:—“क्षीरोदके सम्पृक्त आमिश्रीभूतत्वाच्च ज्ञायते कियत्क्षीरं कियदुदकं कस्मिन्नवकाशे क्षीरं कस्मिन्नवकाशे उदकमिति.”

क्षीरं विहाय &c. ॥

A second example is found in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, page 50. Mādhava probably took this also from Udayana.

खले कपोतन्यायः ॥ (2).

This is not confined to works on Alankāra. It occurs in *Nyāyamālāvistara* 11. 1. 3 (page 621).

गगनरोमन्थन्यायः ॥

In *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 453, it becomes व्योम्नि रोमन्थकेलिवत्. In *S'ālikā*, page 154, line 16, and *Nyāyamakaranda*, page 129, line 1, we have the expression गगनग्रासकल्प.

गले पादुकान्यायः ॥ (2).

I have met with two more instances of this as गले पादिका, namely in Vācaspatimiśra's *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* (now coming out in the Paṇḍit), page 7, line 7, and also in *Upamitibhava-prapañcā Kathā*, page 284. पादिका has no place in our dictionaries, however, in the sense of shoe.

गुडजिह्विकान्यायः ॥

The rendering should rather be, *The tongue* [smeared] *with treacle* [in order to disguise an unpalatable draught]. The passage of the *Kāvyaṣradīpa* to which only a reference was given in the First Handful, is the following:—“ये सुकुमारमतयो-
ऽतिसुखिस्वभावा राजकुमारादयो नीरसे नीतिशास्त्रे प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यास्तान्काव्यं
कान्तेव सरसतापादनेनाभिमुखीकृत्योपदेशं ग्राहयति गुडजिह्विकया शिशूनिवौ-
षधम् । यदाहुः

स्वादुकान्त्यरसोन्मिश्रं वाक्यार्थमुपभुञ्जते ।

प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम्” ॥

As used by Vācaspatimis'ra in *Bhāmātī*, pages 342 and 534, and again in *Tātparyatīkā*, pages 438, 441, the meaning is by no means so clear.

गोबलीवर्दन्यायः ॥

Other instances of its use by Vācaspatimis'ra will be found in *Tātparyatīkā* pages 11 (line 8), 118 (line 1), 119 (line 15), and 404 (line 3 from bottom). Also in *Bhāmātī*, 3. 1. 11. That already given, should be 2. 4. 17.

घटीयन्त्रन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

Is found in a third work of Sures'vara's, namely *Naṣkar-myasiddhi*, i. 42. Also in the Jain treatise *Prabandhacintā-maṇi*, page 62, as follows:—

“आपद्रुतं हससि किं द्रविणान्धमूढ
लक्ष्मीः स्थिरा न भवतीति किमत्र चित्रम् ।
किं त्वं न पश्यसि घटीर्जलयन्त्रचक्रे
रिक्ता भवन्ति भरिता भरिताश्च रिक्ताः” ॥

In *Upamitibhavaṣṭrapaṇcā Kathā*, pages 52, and 418, it is found as अरघटघटीयन्त्रन्यायः. In *Kīrtikāumudī* vi. 43, we have the compound अमद्धटीसंघटितारघटखाङ्गारशब्दैः. The word अरघट has become राहाट in Marāthī, as in राहाटगाडों.

चिन्तामणिं परित्यज्य काचमणिग्रहणन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is an additional example in *Upamitibhava-prapañcā Kathā*, page 420:—“निर्वाणसुखसंसारसुखयोश्च परस्परम् । चिन्तारत्नस्य काचेन यावत्तावद्गुणान्तरम्.” Then, lower down on the same page, this and eight other figures are employed to illustrate the folly of one who, though acquainted with the Jaina creed, still clings to evil. The whole passage is reproduced for the benefit of those who have not the book to refer to. “यो जैनमपि सम्प्राप्य शासनं कर्मनाशनम् । हिंसाक्रोधादिपापेषु रज्यते मूढमानसः ॥ संहारयति काचेन चिन्तामणिमनुत्तमम् । करोत्यङ्गारवाणिज्यं दग्ध्वा गोशीर्षचन्दनम् ॥ भिनत्ति नावं मूढात्मा लोहार्थं स महोदधौ । सूत्रार्थं दारयत्युच्चैर्वैडूर्यं रत्नमुत्तमम् ॥ प्रदीपयति कीलार्थं देवद्रोणीं महत्तमाम् । रत्नस्थाल्यां पचत्याम्लखलकं मोहदोषतः ॥ सौवर्णलाङ्गलाग्रेण लिखित्वा वसुधां तथा । अर्कबीजं वपत्येष तूलार्थं मूढमानसः ॥ छित्त्वा कर्पूरखण्डानि कोद्रवाणां समन्ततः । वृत्तिं विधत्ते मूढोऽयमहं सश्रुतिकः किल ” ॥ On page 170 there is yet another word of Siddharsi's in regard to the *Cintāmaṇi*, namely “निर्लक्षणनरो नैव चिन्तामणिमवाप्नुते.”

चौरापराधात् &c. ॥

I have no doubt that Raghunātha took this nyāya from *Āmatattvavivēka* where it appears on page 70, line 8 from bottom. The *Khaṇḍanakāra* is also its debtor, for that and a good deal more; for pages 633 to 636, together with the first four lines of page 637, of S'riharsa's work, are taken *verbatim* from page 70, line 8, up to page 72, line 1, of Udayana's.

छत्रिन्यायः ॥

This may have originated with S'abara in whose bhāṣya on Jaimini 1. 4. 28 we find the expression “यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीत्येकेन छत्रिणा सर्वे लक्ष्यन्ते.” It is quoted by Kumārila (who lived in the first half of the eighth century) as the छत्रिन्याय, in *Tantravārtika* 1. 4. 13 (last line), and in *Tup-tīkā* 4. 4. 1 (last

line but one). It was doubtless from one of these two writers that S'ankara took the nyâya. He is said to have written his famous bhâṣya on the Brahmasûtras in 804 A.D. (See Macdonell's *Sanskrit Literature*, page 289, for both of these dates).

जलकतकरेणुन्यायः ॥ (2).

There is an interesting example in Hemacandra's *Paris'isṭa-parvan* ii. 4:—

“गुरुवाक्यतत्त्वोदसंसक्तमभवत्सदा ।

प्रशान्तदुर्ध्यानमलं तन्मनोवारि निर्मलम्” ॥

Another will be found in *Nyâyamakaranda*, page 154.

ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशवत् ॥ (2).

I have discovered a second instance of this simile in *Tât-paryatîkā* (page 3, line 6) as follows:—“यदशक्यानुष्ठानोपायोपदेशकं तदनर्थकं यथा ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नाहरणोपदेशकं वाक्यं तादृशं चेदं शास्त्रमिति.”

तत्क्रकौण्डिन्यन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

I have noted down seven instances of the occurrence of this illustration in the *Mahâbhâṣya*, namely, 1. 1. 47; 6. 1. 2 (4); 6. 2. 1; 6. 4. 163 (2); 7. 1. 72 (3); 7. 2. 117 (2); and 7. 4. 61 (4). It will suffice to quote the first, as the other six are practically the same:—“लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । लोके हि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति । तद्यथा । दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तत्र कौण्डिन्यायेति सत्यपि सम्भवे दधिदानस्य तत्रदानं निवर्तकं भवति.” See, also, Nâgoji Bhaṭṭa's *pari-bhâṣâ* LVII, and Professor Kielhorn's translation of the same. Other instances of it will be found in *Vâkyapadîya*, ii. 352; *S'lokarârtika*, page 617 (verse 15); *Tantravârtika*, page 262 (last 2 verses); and *Bhâmati*, 3. 3. 26 (page 628).

तमोदीपन्यायः ॥

Prakāśānanda's couplet is perhaps based on the following verse of Sures'vara's, namely *Taittirīyavārtika* 2. 1. 177 (page 79):—

“ प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या योऽविद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्छति ।
दीपेनासौ ध्रुवं पश्येदुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः ” ॥

तुलोन्नमनन्यायः ॥ (2. Addenda).

Other good examples of this will be found in *Nyāyavārtika* 3. 2. 12 (top of page 412), the substance of which is reproduced in *Nyāyamānjarī*, page 456; in *S'lokovārtikatīkā*, page 311 (where it is found in conjunction with the पद्मपत्रशतव्यतिभेदन्याय); and in *Vivaraṇaprameya*, page 99, line 4.

दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्यायः ॥ (2).

Perhaps the oldest instance of the use of this is found in *S'vetāśvatara Upaniṣad* vi. 19, and quoted in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1. 1. 12 (page 106). Śāṅkara had previously applied it in 1. 1. 4 (page 76). See also Sures'vara's large Vārtika, page 1593, verse 1201; and page 1840, verse 724.

दण्डापूपिकान्यायः ॥

Writers on Alankāra have not the exclusive use of this illustration. For a much older instance of its use, see *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika*, page 909, verse 135.

दामव्यालकटन्यायः ॥ (2).

The story of these three Asuras, and of भीम, भास, and दह, is told in *Yogarūpīṣṭha*, Book 4, chapters xxv-xxxiv. The verse quoted by Raghunātha, in regard to them, is 4. 34. 36.

देहलीदीपन्यायः ॥

A much better example of this is to be found in *Saptapadārthī*, page 52, line 13.

धान्यपलालन्यायः ॥ (2).

Vācaspatimisra was not the originator of this illustration. It occurs four times in the *Mahābhāṣya*, namely, 1. 2. 39; 3. 3. 18; 3. 4. 21 (vārt. 2); and 4. 1. 92. The following is the passage, the substance of which is reproduced in the *Bhāmati* and *Sarvadars'anasangraha*:—"कश्चिदन्नार्थी शालिकलापं सपलालं सतुषमाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय तुषपलालान्युत्सृजति । तथा कश्चिन्मांसार्थी मत्स्यान्सकण्टकान्सशकलानाहरति नान्तरीयकत्वात् । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय शकलकण्टकानुत्सृजति." See, also, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa's *paribhāṣā* 73. The nyāya seems to have a different application in Marāṭhī literature. Molesworth's definition is as follows:—"The law of the corn and its straw. Conquer the king and you conquer his subjects; accomplish or acquire a matter and you attain all it sustains or involves."

न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य &c. ॥

Compare the "नाल्पीयसा महतोऽभिभवः संभवति" of *S'alikā*, page 94.

न हि खदिरगोचरे परशौ &c. ॥ (1. Addenda).

As already pointed out in the Preface to the second Handful, the meaning of this nyāya (which formerly somewhat puzzled me) is, *The Palāśa tree is not cleft when the axe is applied to the Khadira tree*; and it is used to indicate the complete distinctness of two objects. I have already given four references to passages containing the nyāya, but have since found two of much older date; namely *S'lokavārtika*, page 157, "छेदने खदिरासे पलाशे न च्छिदा यथा", and *Nyāyavārtika*, page 333, "न हि

खदिरे छिद्यमाने पलाशे छिदा भवति.” See also an admirable example in *Tâtparityatîkâ*, page 112, line 11. Akin to these is the following in *Tantravârtika*, page 546, “न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्य श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति.”

न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं &c. ॥ (2)

This is no doubt based on Jaimini's sûtras 2. 4. 8 and 20, and a reference has already been given to it in S'abara's bhâṣya on the latter. There is another at the top of page 16 of the *Tantravârtika*, and a further one in S'ankara on *Bṛihadâraṇyakopaniṣad* 2. 5. 16 (with the commentary).

न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्ति &c. ॥ (2).

Is found in two other parts of the Mahâbhâṣya, namely in 4. 1. 1 (vârt. 15), and 6. 1. 13 (vârt. 13).

न हि वरविघाताय कन्योद्ग्रहः ॥

The oldest instance of the use of this illustration, so far as my knowledge goes, is in the *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya*, 4. 1. 2 (page 1041), where it reads “न हि वरघाताय कन्यामुद्ग्राहयन्ति.” Dr. Thibaut omits it from his translation.

न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि बटुः &c. ॥ (2).

References to this are given on pages 27, and 61. A still older example of it is found in *Brahmasûtrabhâṣya* 3. 3. 54:— “न हि नटः शिक्षितः सन्स्वस्कन्धमधिरोक्ष्यति.” The parallel nyâya, of which one example is given on page 61, is found also in *Tâtparityatîkâ*, page 255, as “न हि तथैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा छिद्यते,” and in *Nyâyamakaranda* page 131, we read “नो खल्वङ्गुल्यैवाङ्गुली स्पृश्यते छिद्यते वा धारयैवासिधारा.” Both nyâyas appear together in *Syâdvâdamanjari*, page 89, as follows:— “न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि नटबटुः स्वस्कन्धमधिरोढुं पटुः । न च सुतीक्ष्णाप्यसिधारा

स्वं छेतुमाहितव्यापारा.” Mr. F. W. Thomas tells me that there is a similar combination in Nāgārjuna’s ईश्वरकर्तृत्वनिराकरण. There, the sword-nyāya comes first, and reads “न हि खरतरकरपालधारा स्वमात्मानं छेतुं समर्था भवति.”

न ह्यप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाश्यं प्रकाशयति ॥ (2).

The rendering should rather be, *A lamp does not illuminate until it [i. e. its light] reaches the object to be illuminated.* This is more clearly seen from the following passage of *Tārki-karaṅśā*, page 271:—“न हि दाह्यमप्राप्तो दहनो दहति प्रकाश्यमप्राप्य प्रदीपः प्रकाशयति.”

नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः ॥ (2).

Udayana did not originate the saying. Vyāsa in *Yogabhāṣya* iii. 14 (page 135), says “नान्यदृष्टस्य स्मरणमन्यस्यास्ति.” The nyāya is found also in *Syādvādamanjarī*, pages 61 and 154; and in *Nyāyamānjarī*, page 437, line 10.

पिष्टपेषणन्यायः ॥

Older instances are the following:—“न हि स्निग्धस्य स्नेहं न शक्यं कर्तुं पिष्टस्य वा पेषणम्”, S’abara 9. 2. 3. Also 12. 2. 16 of the same, and *Tantravārtika*, pages 54 and 477. S’ankara’s disciple, Sures’varācārya, in his *Bṛihadāraṇyakavārtika*, 1. 4. 1216, has the following:—“विद्याविधानाच्चाविद्या ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति गम्यताम् । विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः” ॥

प्रदीपे प्रदीपं प्रज्वाल्य &c. ॥ (1. Addenda).

In *Upadeśasāhasrī* xvii. 41 (page 215), S’ankarācārya says:—

“न हि दीपान्तरापेक्षा यद्दीपप्रकाशने ।

बोधस्यात्मस्वरूपत्वान्न बोधान्यस्तथेष्यते” ॥

The following is from Sures'vara's *vārtika* on *Bṛihadāraṇya-bhāṣya* 4. 3. 501 (page 1465):—

“ननु दीपः स्वमात्मानं स्वात्मनैवावभासयन् ।
दृष्टो दीपप्रकाशार्थं न हि दीपान्तराहतिः” ॥

See, too, *Nyāyamanjari*, page 625, on *sūtra* 5. 1. 10.

फलवत्सन्निधौ &c. ॥ (2 Addenda).

The source of this is S'abara 4. 4. 19. See also *Nyāyamālā-vistara* 4. 3. 16 (*sūtra* 37).

वधिरकर्णजपन्यायः ॥ (2).

Compare the following from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 405:—
“तदेतद्वधिरस्य रामायणं वर्णितमस्माभिर्य एवमपि श्रुत्वा वेदार्थपरिगमाभ्युपायं
मृगयते.”

भक्षितेऽपि लघुने &c. ॥

Occurs also in *Kalpataruparimāla*, page 37; but I have met with it nowhere else.

मणिप्रभामणिमतिन्यायः ॥ (2).

My friend Mr. Arthur Venis has given me the following rendering of this *nyāya*:—“*The judgment that the given object is a gem is due to the gem-like brilliance (perceived). In other words, I believe it is a gem because it shines like one.*” In the *Bauddha* chapter of *Sarvadars'anasangraha* (page 23 of Bib. Ind., and 27 of Jivānanda's edn.) it appears in a slightly varied form as *मणिप्रभाविषयमणिविकल्पन्याय*, which, as interpreted by Mr. A. E. Gough, means *the supposition that the light of a gem is itself the gem*. He adds that, in this case, “we may yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light; while, if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver.” The correctness of this view is established by an important

passage at the beginning of *Pancadas'ī* IX, which treats of ध्यान as a means of arriving at a right knowledge of Brahman. Such meditation, being directed towards Brahman with qualities, is of course erroneous, inasmuch as that Impersonality has no qualities; but it nevertheless leads on to the underlying *nirguna* Brahman, just as the mistaken notion regarding the sparkle of the gem leads to the discovery of the gem itself. This is styled **संवादिभ्रम**, an error which has a corresponding reality underlying it. To mistake the distant shining of a lamp through the keyhole of a door for a gem, is an illustration of **विसंवादिभ्रम**, an error entirely devoid of an underlying reality. The passage is as follows:—“मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषोऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥ २ ॥ दीपोऽपवरकस्यान्तर्वर्त्तते तत्प्रभा बहिः । दृश्यते द्वार्यथान्यत्र तद्वदृष्टा मणेः प्रभा ॥ ३ ॥ दूरे प्रभाद्वयं दृष्ट्वा मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः । प्रभायां मणिबुद्धिस्तु मिथ्याज्ञानं द्वयोरपि ॥ ४ ॥ न लभ्यते मणिर्दीपप्रभां प्रत्यभिधावता । प्रभायां धावतावश्यं लभ्येतैव मणिर्मणेः ॥ ५ ॥ दीपप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिर्विसंवादिभ्रमः स्मृतः । मणिप्रभामणिभ्रान्तिः संवादिभ्रम उच्यते ॥ ६ ॥

The commentator, Rāmatīrtha, ascribes verses 2-5 to a *vārtika*; whilst Citsukha Muni, in his comment on verse 2, where it is quoted in the *Nyāyamakaranda* (page 148), names Dharma-kīrti as its author. The *vārtika* may therefore be his. I may add that verse 2 is quoted also in Citsukha Muni's own work *Citsukhī*, ii. 18 (page 496 of Paṇḍit for 1883). In *Nyāya-manjarī*, pages 24 (line 1), 33 (line 4 from bottom), and 158 (line 10), the *nyāya* is found as **मणिप्रभामणिबुद्धिवत्**. Then on page 308 (line 9 from bottom) there is the following passage which corresponds with the extract from *Pancadas'ī*, namely:—**अर्थं हि मूलवर्तिनमुपलभ्य प्रवर्तमानस्तमाप्नोति अपवरकनिहितमणिप्रसृतायां कुञ्चिकाविवरनिर्गतायामिव प्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः । यत्र तु मूलेऽप्यर्थो नास्ति तत्र व्यामोहात्प्रवर्तमानो विप्रलभ्यते दीपप्रभायामिव तथैव मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः ॥**

Other references to the *nyāya* are *S'ālikā*, page 22, line 4; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, vol. i, page 263; and *Tāṭhikarakṣā*, page 16, line 2 (where the reading corresponds with that quoted above from *Sarvadars'anasangraha*).

मण्डूकमुत्तिन्यायः ॥

I noted this five times in the *Mahābhāṣya*, namely, 1. 1. 3 (vārt. 2); 5. 2. 4 (vārt. 2); 6. 1. 17; 6. 3. 49; 7. 2. 117. See also Dr. Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyāya*, ii. 80.

मध्यदीपिकान्यायः ॥

The following from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 212, illustrates this:—

“गृहे दधिघटीं द्रष्टुमानीतो गृहमेधिना ।
अपूपानपि तद्देशान्प्रकाशयति दीपकः” ॥

मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां &c. ॥ (2. Addenda).

The verse quoted from *Khaṇḍana*, is on page 278 of that work; and in the first line, read निर्ममः instead of निर्महः.

मुञ्जादिषीकोद्धरणन्यायः ॥

This is as old as the *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, in 4. 3. 3. 16 of which, we find the following:—“तं देवाः सर्वस्मिन्विजितेऽभयेऽनाद्रे यथेषीकां मुञ्जाद्विवृहेदेवं सर्वस्मात्पाप्मनो व्यवृहन्त्यन्माहेन्द्रं ग्रहमगृह्णन्स्तथो एवैष एतद्यथेषीका विमुञ्जा स्यादेवं सर्वस्मात्पाप्मनो निर्मुच्यते यन्माहेन्द्रं ग्रहं गृह्णाति.” See, too, Prof. Rhys Davids' *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 86 (page 88); from the footnote to which I obtained the reference to the above. For another example, see *Bṛihadāraṇya-vārtika* 4. 4. 1277 (page 1933).

याचितमण्डनन्यायः ॥ (1. Addenda.)

I have met with another instance of this in *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, page 62, line 9 from bottom, as follows:—“इत्थमिन्द्रियजन्यत्वेनेन्द्रियजन्यसाक्षाद्दीर्घपरामर्शजन्यानुमितिः । वाक्यजन्या शाब्दी । सादृश्यवैसादृश्यान्यतरधीकरणिकोपमितिः । संस्कारजन्या स्मृतिः । इयं च याचितम-

ण्डनमिव याथार्थ्यं दधत्यपि न प्रमेति चतस्र एव प्रमाश्रत्वार्येव तत्करणानि प्रमाणानीति.”

I am still ignorant of the meaning of the nyâya.

रेखागवयन्यायः ॥ (2).

For *Nyâyamānjari* read *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyatikâ*. A second example is the following from *Kalpataruparimala*, page 363, line 9:—“यथा तात्त्विकारुन्धतीप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानापुरुषैः कल्प्यमानायां तत्प्राच्योदीच्यादिनक्षत्ररूपायां स्थूलारुन्धत्या यथा वा रेखागवय-
न्यायेन नित्यशब्दप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया नानाव्याकरणैः परस्परभिन्नप्रकृतिप्रत्यय-
विभागेन कृत्रिमशब्द इति भावः ॥ See also *S'ribhâsya*, page 322 (page 77 of Dr. Thibaut's translation).

वधूमाषमापनन्यायः ॥ (2).

I am still without the slightest clue to the meaning of this. Is there no one amongst India's wise men who can throw light upon it?

वनसिंहन्यायः ॥ (2).

I am indebted to Professor Dr. Pischel for the following quotation *Udyogaparva* xxxvii. 46:—

“न स्याद्वनमृते व्याघ्रान्न्याघ्रा न स्युर्ऋते वनम् ।
वनं हि रक्ष्यते व्याघ्रैर्व्याघ्रान् रक्षति काननम्” ॥

See also verse 64 of the same.

वरगोष्ठीन्यायः ॥ (2).

Has the following remark of Kumârila's (*Tantravârtika*, page 169) any bearing on this? “कन्यावरणार्थागतमूर्खवरगोत्रप्रश्नो-
त्तरवत्.”

वृद्धिमिष्टवतः &c. ॥

Another good example is *Pancadas'ī* vii. 81:—

“वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि नष्टमितीदृशम् ।

लौकिकं वचनं सार्थं सम्पन्नं त्वत्प्रसादतः” ॥

See also *Vedāntakalpataru*, page 321. In *Syādvādaman-jarī*, page 19, we find it in the form “लाभमिच्छतो मूलक्षति-रायाता.” Compare Raghunātha's “पुत्रलिप्सया देवं भजन्त्या भर्तापि नष्टः,” and “चर्मतन्तौ महिषीं हन्ति.” The former I have never met with, but the latter is doubtless based on the following verse in *Mahābhāṣya* 2. 3. 36 (6):—“चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति दन्तयो-र्हन्ति कुञ्जरम् । केशेषु चमरीं हन्ति सीम्नि पुष्कलको हतः” ॥

शतपत्रपत्रशतभेदन्यायः ॥ (2).

A much older example is found in *S'loka-vārtika*, page 311 (verse 157), to which I append Mr. Gangānātha Jhā's translation:—“यत्प्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं सूक्ष्मकालोऽस्ति तत्र नः । दुर्लक्षस्तु यथा वेधः पद्मपत्रशते तथा.” “You have brought forward the case of the lamp and the light emitted by it, as an instance of the simultaneity of the cause and the effect. But in this case also, there is a minute point of time (intervening between the appearance of the lamp and that of the light), though this is imperceptible; just as is the case with the piercing (with a needle) of the hundred petals of the lotus.” Professor Jacobi has kindly pointed out an instance of it in *Nyāyavārtika*, page 37, in the form उत्पलदलशतव्यतिभेदवत्, from which, perhaps, Aniruddha took the nyāya rather than from the very modern *Sāhitya-darpana*. The same expression उत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत् is found in the Jaina work *Syādvādamanjarī* (page 92) which is older than Mādhava's *Sarvādars'anasangraha*. Besides these, I have met with the nyāya in *Tātparyatīkā*, page 334, line 2 (in the form शीघ्रतरबाणहेतुकशतपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवत्); in *Nyāya-manjarī*, page 498 (as सूक्ष्मप्रभिद्यमानकोकनददलकदम्बकवत्); in

Tarkabhāṣāṭīkā, page 24; in *Tārkkikarakṣāṭīkā*, page 126 (as शतपत्रशतनवत्); and in *Citsukhī* ii. 9 (शतपत्रपत्रशतव्यतिभेदानुभववत्).

शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति &c. ॥

Probably taken by Mādhava from *Ātmatattvaviveka* (p. 31). I know of no third instance of it. We may compare with it the following from *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 432, line 11:—
“अथोच्यते न प्रत्यक्ष आत्मा किंत्वपरोक्ष इति नेदमर्थान्तरवचनं शिशव एव प्रतार्यन्ते न प्रासाणिकाः.”

शृङ्गग्रहिकान्यायः ॥

Other examples are *Bṛihadāraṇyavārtika*, page 611, and *Taittirīyavārtika*, page 197; *Tātparyāṭīkā*, page 58, line 4; *Nyāyamanjarī*, page 245, line 13, and 277, lines 18 and 20. Molesworth defines it thus:—“In logic. Distribution; taking singly and severally all the particulars included under a general term, or all the individuals composing a body.”

सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः ॥ (2).

See *Mahābhāṣya* 6. 1. 84 (vārt. 4), and 108 (vārt. 3); also 6. 4. 104 (vārt. 3). There are cognate expressions, too, in S'abara 11. 1. 28, 35; and 12. 3. 10. The nyāya is found also in *Vedāntādhikaraṇanyāyamālā* 4. 1. 1.

सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैः &c. ॥ (2).

Vācaspatimis'ra no doubt borrowed this from Kumārila. It occurs in *Tantravārtika*, 3. 2. 36 (page 807).

सिंहावलोकनन्यायः ॥

Vācaspatimis'ra was fond of this. In addition to the reference already given to the *Bhāmati*, it will be found at least

six times in his *Tâtparyatîkā*, pages 97, 199, 230, 322, 403, 405; and again on page 36 of his *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudî* (under *kârikâ* 7). It occurs also in Hemacandra's *Paris'îṣṭa-parvan* i. 63. Molesworth defines it thus:—“(The manner of looking of the lion, which animal is said to be constantly looking behind). Pausing and reviewing from time to time (the portion written or read, or done generally).”

सूचीकटाहन्यायः ॥

Outside works on Alankâra, I have met with the *nyâya* in the following treatises:—*Nyâyamakaranda*, page 181; *Saptapadârthî*, page 21; *Nyâyasûtravritti*, Book ii. page 2 of Ballantyne's *Aphorisms of the Nyâya*; and S'eshânanta on *Nyâyasiddhântadîpa*, page 39, line 3 from bottom.

स्थालीपुलाकन्यायः ॥

We have this in the *Mahâbhâsya* l. 4. 23 (*vârt.* 15) in the following words:—“पर्याप्तो ह्येकः पुलाकः स्थाल्या निदर्शनाय.” Other examples are found in *Tantravârtîka* 3. 5. 19 (page 1044); *Vedântakalpataru*, page 446; and *Kalpataruparimala*, pages 115, 468, 667, 685. Of similar import is the following from *Paris'îṣṭaparvan* vii. 94:—“सिक्थेनापि द्रोणपाकं जानन्ति हि मनीषिणः.”

स्थूणानिखननन्यायः ॥

An older example than those in the *S'āṅkarabhâsya* will be found in *S'abara* 7. 2. 1 (page 19).

स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवति ॥

Additional instances will be found as follows:—*Bhâmati* 3. 4. 20 (page 682); *Tâtparyatîkā*, pages 72, 90; *Târkkikarakṣâ-tîkā*, page 50; *Târkkabhâsâtîkā*, page 82; *Khaṇḍanoddhâru* pages 58, 62.

ALPHABETICAL LIST

OF

NYÂYAS EXPLAINED IN PARTS I, II AND III.

THE NYÂYAS BEING ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER IN EACH HANDFUL, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO QUOTE THE PAGES. AS SOME OF THEM, HOWEVER, APPEAR A SECOND TIME IN THE ADDENDA OF EACH, WHILST OTHERS ARE FOUND ONLY IN THE LATTER, THE LETTER 'A' HAS BEEN ADDED TO INDICATE THIS, WHILST THE LETTER 'S' REFERS TO THE SUPER-ADDENDA OF PART III.

LIST OF NYĀYAS.

अकाले कृतमकृतं स्यात् iii.	अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत् iii.
अक्षिपात्रन्याय iii A.	अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वम् iii.
अग्निहोत्रन्याय iii.	अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्याय iii A.
अंगुलिदीपिकया ध्वान्तध्वंसविधिः iii.	अम्बुनि मज्जन्यलावूनि iii.
अंगुल्यग्रं न तेनैव iii, and A.	अयमपरो गण्डस्य iii A.
अंगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते iii.	अरण्यरोदनन्याय ii.
अजाकृपाणीयन्याय i, iii S.	अरुणैकहायनीन्याय iii, and A.
अजातपुत्रनामोक्तीर्तनन्याय ii.	अरुन्धतीप्रदर्शनन्याय i, and A.
अत्यन्तपराजयात् ii, iii S.	अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत i, and A.
अत्यन्तबलवन्तोऽपि iii.	अर्थी समर्थो विद्वानधिक्रियते ii, iii S.
अदिस्सोब्रेणिजः iii A.	अर्धजरतीयन्याय i, and A.
अधिकरणसिद्धान्तन्याय iii, and A.	अर्धवैशसन्याय ii, and Pref.
अधिकारन्याय iii.	अलाभे मत्तकाशिन्याः ii.
अध्यारोपापवादन्याय ii.	अवतप्तेनकुलस्थितम् iii.
अनधीते महाभाष्ये iii A.	अवयवप्रसिद्धेः iii, and A.
अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा iii.	अवयवशक्तेः i A, iii S.
अनिषिद्धमनुमतम् iii A.	अविरविकन्याय iii.
अन्तरंगबहिरंगयोः iii.	अशक्तोऽहं गृहारंभे i.
अन्तर्दीपिकान्याय i.	अशोकवनिकान्याय i (Pref.), iii S.
अन्धकवर्तकीयन्याय i.	अश्मलोष्टन्याय i A.
अन्धगजन्याय i (Pref.), ii (Pref. and A).	अश्वतरीगर्भन्याय ii.
अन्धगोलांगूलन्याय i.	अश्वारूढाः कथं चाश्वान् iii, and A.
अन्धदर्पणन्याय ii, iii S.	असाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति iii.
अन्धपरम्परान्याय i, and A.	असिधारामधुलेहनन्याय iii.
अन्धस्यैवान्बलप्रस्य ii.	अस्त्रमस्त्रेण शाम्यति i, iii S.
अन्यवेशमस्थितान्दूमात् iii.	अहिकुण्डलन्याय i.
अन्यार्थमपि प्रकृतं iii.	अहिमुक्कैवर्तन्याय ii.
अपच्छेदन्याय iii.	अहृदयवचसामहृदयमुत्तरम् iii A.
	आकाशमुष्टिहननन्याय i, iii S.

आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां iii, and A.

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति ii, and A.

आर्द्रं वस्त्रं iii.

आम्रसेकपितृतर्पणन्याय ii, iii S.

आम्रान्पृष्टः ii A, iii S.

आयुर्धृतम् ii and A, iii S.

आषाढवाते चलति iii A.

इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटी iii A.

इषुकारन्याय ii A, iii S.

इषुवेगक्षयन्याय ii A, iii S.

इष्यमाणस्यैव प्राधान्यं iii.

उत्कृष्टदृष्टिः ii.

उत्खातदंष्ट्रारगन्याय ii.

उदरे भृते कोशो भृतः iii A.

उपजीव्यविरोधस्यायुक्तत्वम् ii, iii S.

उपयन्त्रपयन्धर्मः i, iii S.

उपसजानंष्यमाणनिमित्तः iii.

उभयतःपाशा रज्जुः iii, and A.

उद्भूकण्टकभक्षणन्याय i (Pref.), iii S.

उद्भूलगुडन्याय ii, and Preface.

ऊषरवृष्टिन्याय ii, iii S.

ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतः ii, iii S.

एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत् ii, iii.

एकमनुसन्धिततः i.

एकवृन्तगतं i.

एकसम्बन्धिदर्शने iii, and A.

एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञा ii.

एकामसिद्धिं परिहरतः ii.

कटकगवादाहरणम् ii A.

कण्टचामीकरन्याय ii.

कदम्बकोरकन्याय i, iii S.

कपिञ्जलन्याय iii.

कफोणिगुडन्याय i, iii S.

कम्बलनिर्णेजनन्याय iii.

करविन्यस्तबिल्वन्याय ii A.

करिवृंहितन्याय iii.

कर्मभूयस्त्वात्फलभूयस्त्वम् ii A.

कलञ्जन्याय iii.

कलशपुरःसरप्रासादं iii, and A.

कांस्यभोजिन्याय ii, and Pref., iii S.

काकतालीयन्याय i.

काकदाधेवातकन्याय iii.

काकदन्तपरीक्षान्याय i, iii S.

काकाक्षिगोलकन्याय i.

काकाधिकरणन्याय iii, and A.

काचिक्षिपादी पुत्रं प्रसूते iii A.

काण्डानुसमयन्याय iii.

कारणगुणप्रक्रमन्याय ii.

काशकुशावलम्बनन्याय i, and A.

किं चक्षुषा मम iii.

किमार्द्रकबणिजः ii A.

कुड्यं वनाचत्रकमव ii, iii S.

कुल्याग्रणयनन्याय iii.

कूटकाषापणन्याय iii.

कूपखानकन्याय iii.

कूपमण्डूकन्याय i.

कूपयन्त्रघटिकान्याय i.

कूर्माङ्गन्याय i.

कृतक्षौरस्य नक्षत्रपरीक्षा iii.

कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः iii.

केवलैर्वचनैः iii.

क्रिया हि विकल्प्येत न वस्तु iii.

कोष्ठः क च नीराजना iii A.

क्षते क्षारमिव iii A.

क्षामेष्टिन्याय iii.

क्षीरनीरन्याय ii, iii S.

क्षीरं विहाय i, iii S.

खले कपोतन्याय ii, iii S.

खलवाटबिल्वीयन्याय i.

गगनरोमन्थन्याय i, iii S.

गङ्गुरिकाप्रवाहन्याय i, and A.

गर्गशतदण्डनन्याय iii.

गर्तवर्तिगोधामांसविभजनन्याय ii A.

गले पादुकान्याय ii, iii S.

गार्हपत्यन्याय iii.

गुडजिह्विकान्याय i, iii S.

गृहीत्वार्थं गताश्चौराः ii.

गोदोहनन्याय iii, and A.

गोबलीवर्दन्याय i, iii S.

गोमयपायसीयन्याय i.

गौणमुख्ययोः iii.

ग्रहैकत्वन्याय iii.

ग्राणि रेखेव iii A.

घटप्रदीपन्याय ii.

वटीयन्नन्याय ii, iii S.

वट्टकुटीप्रभातन्याय i.

घुणाक्षरन्याय i.

चक्रभ्रमणन्याय ii.

चन्दनन्याय iii.

चन्द्रचन्द्रिकान्याय i A.

चित्राङ्गनान्याय iii.

चिन्तामणिं परित्यज्य ii, iii S.

चेतनस्य यत्नहीनस्य ii.

चौरापराधान्माण्डव्यनिग्रहन्याय i, iii S

छत्तिन्याय i, iii S.

जलकतकरेणुन्याय ii, and A; iii S.

जलतुम्बिकान्याय iii.

जाताष्टिन्याय iii.

जामातृशुद्धिन्याय iii A.

जामात्रार्थं श्रपितस्य सूपादेः ii.

ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यव त्ववतकम् iii.

ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्ना° ii, iii S.

टिट्ठिभन्याय ii.

डमरुकमणिन्याय iii A.

तक्रकौण्डिन्याय ii A, iii S.

तदादाशशकुन्तपातन्याय iii A.

तत्कतुन्याय iii.

तत्प्रख्यन्याय iii.

तत्स्थानापन्ने तद्धर्मलाभः iii.

तदन्तापकर्षन्याय iii.

तद्वपदेशन्याय iii.

तपनीयमपनीय ii.

तप्तं तप्तेन सम्बध्यते iii.

तमःप्रकाशन्याय iii.

तमोदीपन्याय i, iii S.

तत्स्करकन्दुन्याय ii A.

तत्स्करस्य पुरस्तात्कक्षे सुवर्णं ii.

तिलतण्डूलन्याय ii.

तुलोन्नमनन्याय ii A, iii S.

तुषकण्डनन्याय ii, and A.

तुष्यतु दुर्जनन्याय ii.

तृणजलायुकान्याय ii A.

तृणभक्षणन्याय iii A.

तैलकलुषितशालिबीजात् iii, and A.

त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थं ii.

दग्धपटन्याय i.

दग्धबाजन्याय iii A.

दग्धेन्धनवह्निन्याय ii, and A, iii S.

दण्डापापकान्याय i, iii S.

दण्डिन्याय ii.

दत्तमेकधा सहस्रगुणमुपलभ्यते iii A.

दत्तर्णाधमर्ण इव iii A.

दधित्रपुसं प्रत्यक्षो ज्वरः iii.

दघदाहस्य वेत्रबीज^o iii.

दामव्यालकटन्याय ii (and Pref.),
iii S.

दूरस्थवनस्पतिन्याय iii.

देवदत्तशौर्यन्याय iii.

देवदत्तहन्तृहतन्याय iii.

देहलीदीपन्याय i, iii S.

धनंजयन्याय ii.

धान्यपालन्याय ii, iii S.

धारावाहिकन्याय iii.

न खलु शालग्रामे ii, and A.

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात् iii.

नङ्गलोदकं पादरोगः iii.

न यद्विरिष्टङ्गमारुह्य ii, and A.

नरसिंहन्याय ii.

नर्तकन्याय iii.

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथन्याय i.

न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य i, iii S.

न हि करकं कणदर्शन्याय iii.

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टार्यां iii.

न हि क्वचिद्भ्रवणं iii, and A.

न हि खदिरमोचरे परशौ i A, ii
(Pref.), iii S.

न हि गोध्रा सर्पन्ती iii.

न हि ग्रामस्थः iii.

न हि त्रिपुत्रो द्विपुत्र इति कथ्यते iii.

न हि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनः iii.

न हि निन्दा ii, and A, iii S.

न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणः iii.

न हि पूतं स्याद्गोक्षीरं iii.

न हि भवति कुण्डं बदरम् i A.

न हि भवति तरक्षुः ii.

न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति ii, iii S.

न हि भिक्षुको भिक्षुकान्तरं iii.

न हि भूमावग्भोरुहं सत् iii.

न हि यदेवदत्तस्य युध्यमानस्य iii.

न हि वरविधाताय i, iii S.

न हि विधिशतेनापि तथा iii.

न हि श्यामाकबीजं ii.

न हि सर्वः सर्वं जानाति iii A.

न हि सहस्रेणाप्यन्धैः ii.

न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि बटुः ii, and A,
iii S.

न हि सुतीक्ष्णाप्यसिधारा ii, and A,
iii S.

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः iii, and A.

न ह्यन्धस्याज्यावेक्षणोपेते कर्मणि iii.

न ह्यन्धस्य वितथभावे iii.

न ह्यप्राप्य प्रदीपः ii, iii S.

न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधः iii.

नागृहीते विशेषणे iii, and A.

नान्यदृष्टं स्वरत्यन्यः ii, iii S.

नासकाग्रण कर्णमूलकषणन्याय iii.

निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविदा iii, and A.

निपादस्थपतिन्याय iii.

नो खल्वन्धाः सहस्रमपि ii.

पंकप्रक्षालनन्याय i, and A.
 पंगवन्धन्याय i.
 पञ्जरचालनन्याय i.
 पञ्जरमुक्तपक्षिन्याय iii.
 पण्डकमुद्राह्य ii.
 पदार्थानुसमयन्याय iii.
 परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः iii.
 परस्परविरोधे हि iii.
 पर्जन्यवत् iii.
 पर्णमयीन्याय iii A.
 पलालकूटस्य सादृश्यम् iii.
 पश्यस्यद्रौ ज्वलदग्निं iii.
 पाटच्चरलुण्ठिते वेश्मनि i.
 पाटनमन्तरण iii.
 पाठक्रमन्याय iii.
 पादप्रसारिका ii A.
 पिण्डमुत्सृज्य करं लेढि ii.
 पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य i.
 पित्रनुसृतस्तनधयन्याय ii.
 पिष्टपेषणन्याय i, iii S.
 पुरस्तादपवादाः iii.
 पुष्टलगुडन्याय ii.
 पूर्वं ह्यपवादाः iii.
 प्रकल्प्य वापवादावषय iii.
 प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ iii.
 प्रतिनिधिन्याय iii A.
 प्रत्यक्षे किमनुमानेन iii, and A.
 प्रदीपे प्रदीपं प्रज्वालय i, iii S.
 प्रधानमल्लनिवर्हणन्याय i.
 प्रपानकरसन्याय iii.
 प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः iii A.
 प्रमाणवन्त्यदृष्टान् iii A.
 प्रयाजनमनुद्श्य iii.

प्रस्तरग्रहरणन्याय iii.
 प्रावर्तिकक्रमन्याय iii.
 फलवत्सन्निधावफलं तदङ्गम् ii A, iii S.
 फलवत्सहकारन्याय iii.
 बकबन्धनन्याय ii A.
 बधिरकर्णजपन्याय ii, iii S.
 बर्हिर्न्याय iii.
 बलवदपि शिक्षितानां iii.
 बहुछिद्रघटप्रदीपन्याय ii.
 बहूनामनुग्रहो न्याय्यः iii.
 बालस्य प्रदीपकलिकाक्रीडयैव iii.
 बाजाकुरन्याय i.
 बुभुक्षितस्य किं निमग्नप्राग्रहः iii.
 ब्राह्मणग्रामन्याय iii.
 ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजकन्याय i.
 ब्राह्मणवसिष्ठन्याय i (Pref.).
 ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्याय i.
 भक्षितेऽपि लक्षुने i, iii S.
 भस्मन्याज्याहुतिः iii.
 भाण्डानुसारिस्नेहवत् iii.
 भाण्डालेख्यन्याय iii A.
 भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्याय i.
 भीमभासदृढन्याय ii and Pref.
 भूमिरथिकन्याय iii.
 भूलेङ्गन्याय ii.
 भौतविचारन्याय ii A.
 भ्रष्टावसरन्याय iii.
 भक्षिकान्याय iii.
 मज्जनान्मज्जनन्याय iii.
 मणिप्रभामणिमतिन्याय ii, iii S.
 मण्डूकह्युतिन्याय i, iii S.

मदशक्तिवत् iii.
 मधु पश्यसि दुर्बुद्धे iii.
 मध्यदीपिकान्याय i, iii S.
 मध्येऽपवादाः iii.
 मन्दविषन्याय iii.
 महतापि प्रयत्नेन तमिस्रायां iii.
 महति दर्पणे महन्मुखं iii A.
 महार्णवयुगच्छिद्र° iii A.
 मात्स्यन्याय ii.
 मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः i.
 मिथिलायां प्रदीप्तायां ii A, iii S.
 मुञ्जादिषीकोद्धरणन्याय i, iii S.
 मुण्डितशिरोनक्षत्रान्वेषणम् ii.
 मुनिर्मनुते मूर्खो मुच्यते iii A.
 मूषासिक्तताम्रन्याय ii.
 मूषिकभक्षितबीजादौ ii.
 य एव करोति स एव भुङ्क्ते iii.
 यः कारयति स करोत्येव ii.
 यत्करभस्य पृष्ठे न माति iii.
 यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम् ii.
 यत्राकृतिस्तत्र गुणाः iii.
 यदश्वेन हतं पुरा ii.
 यद्रूहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुः iii, and A.
 यववराहाधिकरणन्याय iii.
 यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः iii.
 यस्य नास्ति पुत्रः iii.
 यस्योन्मूलनाय iii.
 याचितमण्डनन्याय i A, iii S.
 यादृशो यक्षः ii.
 यावद्बचनं वाचनिकम् ii.
 येन नाप्राप्ते iii.
 रथकारन्याय iii.

राजपुत्रव्याधन्याय ii.
 रात्रिसन्नन्याय iii.
 राधावेधोपमा iii.
 रूढिर्योगमपहरति ii.
 रेखागवयन्याय ii, iii S.
 रोहणाचललाभे iii.
 लाङ्गलं जीवनम् ii.
 लोष्टप्रस्तरन्याय i.
 वटयक्षन्याय iii.
 वधूमाषमापनन्याय ii, iii S.
 वध्यघातकन्याय ii.
 वध्यतां वध्यतां बालः iii A.
 वनसिंहन्याय ii, iii S.
 वरं सांशयिकान्निष्कात् i.
 वरगोष्ठीन्याय ii, iii S.
 वरमद्य कपोतः i.
 वर्चोन्याय iii.
 विपुलकदलीफललिप्सया i.
 विभक्तधनेषु भ्रातृषु iii.
 विलूननासिकस्य iii.
 विश्वजिन्याय iii.
 विषकुम्भं पयोमुखम् iii.
 विषकुम्भिन्याय i.
 विषवृक्षन्याय i.
 वीचीतरङ्गन्याय i.
 वृक्षप्रकम्पनन्याय ii.
 वृद्धकुमारीवाक्यन्याय i.
 वृद्धिमिष्टवतः i, iii S.
 वृश्चिकभिया पलायमानः ii.
 वृश्चिकीगर्भन्याय ii.
 व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या iii.
 व्यालनकुलन्याय ii.

शकुनिग्राहकगतिन्याय iii.
 शंखन्याय iii.
 शतपत्रपत्रशतभेदन्याय ii, iii S.
 शते पञ्चाशत् ii.
 शरपुरुषीयन्याय i.
 शर्करोन्मजनीयन्याय i.
 शलभन्याय iii.
 शबोद्धर्तनन्याय ii.
 शाखाचन्द्रन्याय ii.
 शान्ते कर्मणि वेतालोदयः iii.
 शान्द्याकांक्षा iii.
 शाल्यादिविषयस्य iii.
 शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तारि iii A.
 शिबिकोद्यच्छन्नरवत् iii.
 शिरश्छेदेऽपि i, iii S.
 शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीप° iii.
 शीर्षे सर्पः i.
 शुक्नलिकान्याय i.
 शुष्केष्टिन्याय iii.
 शुङ्गग्राहिकान्याय i and A; iii S.
 श्येनकपोतीयन्याय i.
 श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वन्याय iii.
 श्वः कार्यमद्य कुर्वीत iii.
 श्वपुच्छोन्नामनन्याय iii.
 श्वलीढमिव पायसम् iii.
 श्वश्रूनिर्गच्छोक्तिन्याय i.
 श्वा कर्णे वा iii.
 षोडशिशग्रहणाग्रहणन्याय iii.
 सकृत्कृते कृतः शास्त्रार्थः ii, iii S.
 सकृद्गतिन्याय iii.
 सत्रन्याय iii.
 सन्दिग्धस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयः iii.

समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः iii.
 सम्भवत्येकवाक्यत्वे iii.
 सर्वनाशे समुत्पन्ने ii A.
 सर्वे बलवतः पथ्यम् iii.
 सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्याय iii.
 सहैव दशभिः पुत्रैः ii, iii S.
 साकमेधीयन्याय iii.
 साक्षः पुरुषः iii.
 सामान्यविधिरस्पष्टः iii.
 सावकाशनिरवकाशयोः iii.
 सिंहस्यैकपदं iii.
 सिंहावलोकनन्याय i, iii S.
 सिकताकूपवत् iii.
 सिकतातैलन्याय iii.
 सुन्दोपसुन्दन्याय ii.
 सुभगाभिधुकन्याय ii.
 सूक्तवाकन्याय iii.
 सूचीकटाहन्याय i, iii S.
 सूत्रशाटिकान्याय iii, and A.
 सोपानत्के पादे iii.
 सोपानारोहणन्याय ii.
 स्थालीपुलाकन्याय i, iii S.
 स्थावरजङ्गमविषन्याय iii.
 स्थूणानिखननन्याय i, iii S.
 स्फटिकलौहित्यन्याय ii, and A.
 स्वभावो दुरतिक्रमः ii.
 स्वविषमूर्च्छितो भुजङ्गः ii.
 स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवति i, iii S.
 स्वाङ्गुलिज्वालय iii.
 स्वामिभृत्यन्याय ii.
 स्वेदजनिमिक्तेन शाटकत्यागः iii.
 हदनक्रन्याय ii.

ERRATA.

Page 32, line 14 from bottom. For त्वैत्सर्गिकेण read त्वौत्सर्गिकेण.

Page 64, line 9. For दैवादागतायां read दैवादागतानां.

Page 89, line 12 from bottom. For “cut of”, say “cut off.”

